


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# CONTENTS

## HERMÈS REVIEW & THE CAUCASUS JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES JOINT ISSUE

SECTION I	7
INTRODUCTION	
<b>THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION: A PROJECT WITHOUT OBVIOUSNESS</b> <i>Gilles Rouet</i>	9
<b>INCOMMUNICATION, AN ESSENTIAL CONCEPT IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL COMMUNICATION</b> <i>Dominique Wolton</i>	13
<b>EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND CITIZENS: AN INCOMMUNICATIVE TRIPTYCH</b> <i>Elise Bernard</i>	23
<b>INCOMMUNICATIONS AT THE HEART OF THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PLAN</b> <i>Guillaume Martin, Dimitri Oudin</i>	30
<b>THE BREXIT, FAILURE OR SUCCESS?</b> <i>Gilles Rouet</i>	35
<b>THE POSITION OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN EUROPEAN EDUCATION AND THEIR ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA</b> <i>Mária Huraj Rošteková &amp; Eva Molnárová</i>	43
<b>BETWEEN ACTORS OF THE BOLOGNA PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH AREA</b> <i>Thierry Côme</i>	51
<b>THE SPORT: AN EUROPEAN UNION'S NEW SOFT POWER TOOL</b> <i>Martin Mancoš &amp; Radovan Gura</i>	58
<b>"UNITED IN DIVERSITY"? THE EUROPEANS AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS</b> <i>Petia Gueorguieva</i>	66
<b>INDIFFERENCE AS A CURABLE EVIL. TOWARDS A COMMON PATH FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN THE FACE OF MEDIA-TERRORISM</b> <i>Mihaela Gavrilă</i>	75
<b>THE MEDIA WAR: STRATEGIES AND ESCALATIONS</b> <i>Simona Modreanu</i>	85
<b>POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND DISINFORMATION</b> <i>Martin Klus</i>	95

SECTION II	101
<i>LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE</i>	103
<hr/>	
<b>LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA</b>	
<i>Maia Chkheidze, Tamar Natroshvili, Revaz Tabatadze</i>	103
<b>MIXED METHODOLOGY IN THE RESEARCH OF THE CONCEPT “PATRIOTISM” IN MODERN ENGLISH</b>	
<i>Tamar Lolishvili</i>	118
<b>THE CONCEPT OF BEAUTY IN OSCAR WILDE’S “THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY”</b>	
<i>Natia Asatiani, Khatuna Tsiklauri, Lela Verbi</i>	129
<b>LINGUISTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOGANS IN PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE</b>	
<i>Ekaterine Kutalia, Maka Kutalia</i>	138
<b>LINGVUOCOGNITIVE AND LINGVUOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONCEPT “LIFE” IN MODERN ENGLISH</b>	
<i>Sophiko Chkoidze</i>	150
<b>DEFEATED EXPECTANCY – EFFECT OR SITUATION?</b>	
<i>Teona Kirakozashvili</i>	162
 <i>ECONOMICS &amp; HUMAN RESOURCES</i>	 176
<hr/>	
<b>COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET PERFORMANCE THEORIES</b>	
<i>Murad R. Taghiyev</i>	176
<b>EVALUATION OF “HIGH POTENTIAL” INDICATORS</b>	
<i>Nino Kajaia, Nana Burduli</i>	182

Hermès Review  
&  
Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

Joint Issue

SECTION I





# THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION: A PROJECT WITHOUT OBVIOUSNESS

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GILLES ROUET

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HERMÈS, CNRS & LAREQUOI, PARIS-SACLAY UNIVERSITY

Without any external or internal coercion, European states, at the end of the Second World War, decided to link their daily lives and even their destiny. The European Union, in continuity with the European Communities, is an ambitious political project, but above all, it is unique in the history of humanity. A quick review of the debates that have punctuated the stages of its construction shows that it is difficult, even illusory, to seek “objective” and indisputable origins or justifications for this political confederation: the “roots,” the national or regional histories, are juxtaposed without always being articulated, the naturalness of the borders does not stand up to analysis, the languages and cultures are infinitely diverse, the traditions, cultures and political organizations are, obviously, multiple. Reuniting the supposed “European continent” was not, and still is not, in any way obvious: for this, a sufficiently solid and shared “why” is needed, or rather “whys”: a desire for dialogue, peace, and prosperity, then, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a desire for the “return back” of the countries of Central Europe, in particular, “in” Europe, and assertions of identity that are more in need of confrontation and exchange than isolation.

Thus, an original institutional and political setup has been put in place, progressively, in stages, in more than 70 years: according to the countries and the times, by voluntarism or mimicry, or both at the same time, starting not from a single project, but from several, in parallel, and which find themselves in an institutional space of convergence, the European Union, imperfect and perfectible. Between and within each Member State, the citizens adhere or not. They may not have the same desire for Europe, and their identification, adherence, and involvement levels differ according to their personal or collective projects, yet, this setup holds, endures, and evolves.

Why? And how? Because dialogue and communication are at the center of the realization of the European project. Exchange and sharing were already at the heart of the creation of the Council of Europe, a political organization created in 1949 to provide a framework for European collaboration in fields as varied as politics, economics, culture, social affairs, education, law, etc., and which today plays a more fundamental role than one might think in the protection of human rights. In 1963, a similar approach accompanied the political efforts for “reconciliation” between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which were concretized by the Élysée Treaty, which provided for institutional cooperation and promoted twinning, meetings, and school or cultural exchanges. Today, far from being outdated, they are the cornerstone of the recently theorized “diplomacy of the regions,” which the European Union is trying to take into consideration in order to best articulate the dialogue between large and small levels.

Today, the European Union is a realized utopia for some, who defend the project or even find it insufficient in terms of political integration, and a quasi-dystopia for others, who denounce some transfers of sovereignty as harmful to the Member States and their citizens. Remarkably, the institutional setup allows for the cohabitation and confrontation of these positions. As there is no obvious solution, the construction of Europe is based on permanent negotiation, with 6, 10, or 27 member states, i.e., on the conjugation of differences that are not always well understood or explained. In this context, situations of incommunication are attempts to pursue dialogue, with imperfect inter-comprehension, hesitations, disagreements, and even conflicts. It is these particular confrontations that allow us to live and build together. This situation seems inevitable in the context of a plurality of opinions, options, and analyses. In the end, it is not surprising that in times of crisis, one can have the impression that the EU moves forward more quickly and with more solidarity... crises are, in fact, obvious facts that impose themselves on everyone and that can provide a favorable context for negotiations. In trying to resolve crises, the political and institutional evolve.

The achievements are numerous: peace and stability for 70 years within the Union; a single market that is an economic driving force; conditions for the development of mobility; an internal space whose borders have been virtualized; a single currency for a large part of the European population, which is not only more practical but also a symbol of unity; rights and protections for Europeans (fundamental rights, digital rights, consumer rights, etc.); an ambitious policy of humanitarian aid; an evolving Europe of health.

In other areas, the achievement is not complete or may never come, such as the European research and higher education area, while attempts at European universities are being made. Erasmus has been a tremendous incentive, perhaps more to develop mobility than to bring higher education institutions closer together. Generations of mobile Europeans are now taking advantage of their European citizenship, complementary citizenship that does not easily translate into rights and duties for the vast majority of them. We can still mention migration policy, social Europe, the Brexit, the situation at external borders and European diplomacy, still lacking recognition, and, of course, the war in Ukraine, but then it is no longer a question of incommunications, but of acommunication, of rupture...

---

A Hermès office, the first French-speaking scientific journal published by the National Council for Scientific Research, has been set up in Georgia, within the University of Georgia in Tbilisi, to invite debate, particularly on the construction of Europe, with a focus on communicational analysis.

The issue №90 of Hermès, Europe, between incommunications and wars, is published five years after the issue №77, European incommunications, and returns on the achievements and the failures, with, thanks to or because of the European incommunications, but also on the current situation, the war in and against Ukraine. Nine texts among the fifty that make up the issue are proposed in English in this issue of the Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences, as well as two unpublished texts selected by the editorial board.

Dominique Wolton proposes a fruitful framework of analysis and an ultimately realistic approach to social, political, and economic relations based on incommunications. European integration is a complicated process, Europe is obviously not the same for all citizens, in representation as well as in projection, as the text by Élise Bernard reminds us. Among the successes, the economic recovery plan, unprecedented, ambitious, which, according to Guillaume Martin and Dimitri Oudin, was implemented through negotiations centered on both misunderstandings and situations of incommunication. The Brexit, currently forgotten in the media with the dramatic news of war and its consequences, is another example of a political process that illustrates the relevance of the approach proposed in this issue and, more generally, in the journal Hermès. The creation

of a European Higher Education and Research Area is generally considered a success (Thierry Côme), as are sports policies, which are now at the center of a particular diplomatic strategy (Radovan Gura & Martin Mancos), or European policies in response to the Covid-19 health crisis (Petia Georgieva), perhaps the prefiguration of a Europe of health.

However, leaders' positions and public opinion still diverge on many points, even if protecting children is a shared objective (Mihaela Gavrilă). So how do the different Member States and their populations react to the warlike aggression against Ukraine? The context of media warfare (Simona Modreanu) and disinformation (Martin Krus) are now the framework of our democracies. Denial is useless and can lead to ruptures, especially between rulers and citizens, and not only between countries but also within each State and each region: dissonances with respect to values, attitudes of identity withdrawal, rejection of others, acceptance of situations of acommunication. Let's read or reread the essay that Tzvetan Todorov published on September 11, 2008 (Todorov, T. (2008): we can become "barbarians" ourselves.

Of course, not all crises lead to war, and a large part of Europe did not want to believe it, especially in the West. Even if not all Europeans have the same conception of Europe and its eastern "margins", and in particular do not necessarily understand why European integration is a formidable objective for Georgian citizens, the war in Ukraine obviously hustles us and invites us to re-hierarchize our values, to strengthen our cohesion, to redouble our efforts to try to understand each other and communicate better. Relationships are essentially based on incommunication: Admitting this can allow us to do everything possible to avoid, at all costs, incommunications, and barbarism.

Todorov, T. (2008). *La Peur des barbares. Au-delà du choc des civilisations*. Paris: Robert Laffont.

# INCOMMUNICATION, AN ESSENTIAL CONCEPT IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

DOMINIQUE WOLTON  
CNRS, HERMÈS

*“Finally, there are three situations of communication. First, the ideal, i.e., sharing and inter-comprehension. Then, the incommunication: we do not understand each other, in spite of the common values and vocabulary. So, we negotiate, constantly, to try to cohabit. Finally, acommunication: rupture, failure. Between the three situations, the crucial role of negotiation, trust and stereotypes.*

*Communication? A balance of power between these three dimensions, without forgetting the central role of context, inequalities and cultural differences. The main thing, in the last century, is the discovery of the growing role played by incommunication. Everything was supposed to be made easier. Everything is becoming more complicated. Regardless of technologies. One seeks the same, one negotiates with the other. Communication? An eminently human and political question, well before a technical one. Opening on the others, and the world, without guarantee of success.*

*Communication? A challenge between cognition and experience. Between oneself and the other. Between the individual and the collective. How to do without it?*

*Saving communication? Is to think the incommunication at the time of the otherness”.*

DOMINIQUE WOLTON

ABSTRACT

Communication and incommunication are inseparable, but incommunication is the condition for communication, and can no longer be considered as “the failure of communication”. Incommunication and otherness are complementary for thinking about the difficulties linked to the illusions of the “communication society”. Europe is only a sum of incommunications and only endless negotiations prevent failure, whether about the enlargement process or the incessant resolution of crises. With incommunication, we rediscover the importance of the concept of otherness. Incommunication is an integral part of political construction. To revalue incommunication, and all the contradictory dimensions of history and politics, is to escape the constant devaluation of communication, often reduced to attempts at manipulation, and to legitimize intercomprehension as a modest but essential tool for the organization of debates. Incommunication, negotiation, and translation: three essential concepts to try to manage the question of otherness.

*Keywords: Incommunication, Europe, otherness, negotiation, otherness*

No communication without incommunication. And vice versa. The two are inseparable, but we don't talk much about incommunication because it is assimilated to failure. If communication is often devalued, because it is difficult and identified with manipulation, it is even worse for incommunication! The less we talk about it, the better.

*My hypothesis is exactly the opposite.* Incommunication is the condition for communication, because it allows persisting after difficulties and failures. And the more exchanges occur, the more incommunication plays a central role. The abundance of information does not necessarily create more communication. In fact, it is often the opposite. "Informing is not communicating." This in-between situation postpones failure and values negotiation.

Incommunication then often becomes the condition for communication. This is exactly what is happening with Europe. Everything separates us, misunderstandings prevail, along with lies, mistrust, and other disputes. And yet Europe is constantly being built. Incommunication paradoxically becomes the condition for the resumption of dialogue in order to avoid acommunication, i.e., rupture, as we see with Ukraine. Incommunication means both the reality of disagreement and an invitation to negotiate to avoid failure and war. A largely underestimated strategic role.

This is the meaning of the issue of Hermes №90: "*Europe, between incommunication and war*".

To show the importance of incommunication and negotiation to bring together points of view that are often radically opposed. Anything to continue to negotiate and dismiss the acommunication.

Incommunication? A political communication concept that is at least as important as that of communication: the symbol of the interest of negotiation when everything has apparently failed. Europe, the greatest democratic and peaceful experiment in the history of humanity, has been based for 60 years on the strength of incommunication. And when war imposes itself, yesterday in Yugoslavia, today in Ukraine, it is by this approach that we try to limit the worst. Europe? A sum of incommunications, a weak pride for all that has been done, but an improbable will to avoid rupture. It is essential to recognize the theoretical and strategic importance of this concept, to the extent of globalization where the omnipresence of technology makes us believe, wrongly, in the ease of inter-comprehension. However, the opposite is true: there have never been so many borders, never have there been so many conflicts. Incommunication? The necessary concept, in the age of globalization, to avoid the multiplication of conflicts as digital globalization should sup-



posedly bring inter-comprehension. Incommunication means trying to postpone acommunication and leaving the space for negotiation open, knowing that, without agreeing on anything, we can nevertheless try to avoid the catastrophe of war. It resembles the symbol of Europe: “never agree, always together” (Wolton, 2022a, 2022b).

### *I. The assets of the concept of incommunication*

*First of all*, incommunication can no longer be considered as “the failure of communication”, it is its double. Incommunication is a state of affairs that leads either to negotiation or rupture. It exists along/within human communication as it does within technical communication and shows in all cases the fragility of inter-comprehension, the weight of inequalities, and context. It also reminds us of the importance of the difference between technical interactivity and human inter-comprehension. On the other hand, it is the tipping point concerning the central question of otherness. This one is not denied but becomes a state of fact whose importance is proportional to the intensity of the exchanges.

Incommunication and otherness are complementary to think about the difficulties linked to the illusions of the “communication society.” Finally, incommunication revalorizes the other concept, that of negotiation. Negotiation to avoid rupture and to try to cohabit, the known bridges instead of walls, of which Pope Francis constantly speaks, between languages, cultures, histories, etc. We don’t understand each other, but we respect each other in part, and we listen to each other a little. We look for the minimum common values rather than break up. Negotiate rather than fight, even if the outcome is not certain. Words rather than blows. All the difference, for example, in recent history between the thought and actions of Gorbachev with the fall of communism and that of Putin with the war in Ukraine.

This is one of the most important concepts to legitimize at a time when, with the globalization of exchanges, the simple but false idea that everything is going to accelerate and facilitate dominates. To take incommunication head-on is not to accept failure. It is to accept the contradictions and to try, through negotiation, to push them back a little. Negotiation and cohabitation may be modest concepts, but they are essential to avoid acommunication. Accepting incommunication also means integrating the importance of the context of inequalities of time and admitting that there are several forms of negotiation. In a word, it means reopening the game.

## II. Europe

It illustrates the positive importance of this concept. Europe is only a sum of in-communications and only endless negotiations prevent failure, whether it is about the enlargement process or the incessant resolution of crises. *Europe, without an ultimately positive and active conception of incommunication, would long ago have tipped over into failure.* The wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s and in Ukraine today illustrate the fragility of balances and destinies. With incommunication is valued everything that still allows us to talk to each other and negotiate. With acommunication the opposite happens: everything that brings discord is valued, and bridges are cut. We understand that, with the enlargement of Europe and more widely with globalization, it is essential to value this concept of incommunication which tries to postpone the moment of rupture. Communication and incommunication are political concepts that directly concern peace and war. Europeans are not proud enough of the dynamic role of incommunication for the last 60 years. The United Nations and its agencies are the second examples of the essential role of incommunication in avoiding war. At the UN, it is only a question of incommunication against a negotiation background, sometimes trying to promote the norms and values that could try to unite States. Even if nobody is fooled about the “reality” of these shared values, it does not matter: the important thing is that they are accepted and put forward.

## III. A new dimension of contemporary political communication

With incommunication we rediscover the importance of the concept of *otherness*. It is impossible to ignore it, but it is also impossible to let it settle like an implacable destiny, with acommunication and war as the outcome. Basically, it is the growing risks of war and rupture that explain the enhancement of this concept. “Last exit before the war,” we could say, referring to the famous sentence from Hubert Selby’s novel. And Europe has illustrated the richness and dynamism of the concept for 60 years. Recognizing its value is as important as accepting the concept of political communication. This one has imposed itself with the enlargement of politics linked to universal suffrage, to the media, to the polls, and more widely to society and to mass democracy. *It is impossible today to think about globalization without valuing the concept of incommunication.* The proof not of failure but of the possibility to exchange, to negotiate, and to cohabit, knowing that we do not agree on much. The difficulties and discontinuities of incommunication actually illustrate the discontinuities of communication.

This enhancement of the word incommunication finally concerns a considerable number of human, social and political situations. We do not stop exchanging neither negotiating to postpone failure. Think and act with incommunication to avoid acommunication. The main goal? *Save time*. Avoid the chain of catastrophes, as we have witnessed the threats of war since at least the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The more the world accelerates and shrinks, the more it is necessary to slow down and “lose time” to avoid the irreparable. Incommunication contributes, in its own way, to maintain this intermediate state which is never “lost time.” The faster everything goes and the more complex it becomes with intertwining the political, social, cultural, and globalization aspects, the more it is necessary to escape the illusion of speed, transparency, and rationality. Diplomacy has always known the importance of incommunication in negotiations.

Despite the lack of communication, the important thing is to value all the common points (languages, histories, values...) to avoid the victory of otherness. Incommunication is an integral part of political construction. Mr. Orbán is not Mr. Putin, the enlargement of the negotiations to the otherness is a way to avoid tipping into failure.

#### *IV. Incommunication and the digital world*

Another form of incommunication exists, one that is not linked to history and its upheavals but to the misunderstandings resulting from digital technologies. For more than a generation, the Internet and digital economy have been introduced as the means to overcome historical violence and to build a model of “peaceful society” based on information and communication. This is not the case; the digital world does not dissolve historical and political conflicts and confrontations. This is particularly true in Europe, the most digitalized space in the world. We are even witnessing the opposite. Digital technology can be integrated into all forms of totalitarianism, particularly in Russia and China. *The complement of the growing incommunication is not technology but politics*, that is to say, the integration of the factors of incommunication in the logic of political concertation. Incommunication, a new political concept, must remain distinct from the digital world. The latter is not an alternative; it can even be a gas pedal of antagonisms. Technical prowess is not complementary to cultural and political values. At the endpoint of the networks, there are societies and civilizations that have nothing to do with technical performance. Technology is not a substitute for politics, or else it is the triumph of technical ideology. And this one can perfectly contribute to accelerating the risks of

acomunication. No, the digital revolution is not a new stage of political history. Incommunication is not a waste of time at a time when the digital world does not cease to want to accelerate everything through the GAFAs and the reign of the information industries' speed. The order of politics is not that of speed and technology. Neither it is the reign of scientism. The passage from the 20<sup>th</sup> to the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that of the continuity of information and its flows to the discontinuity of communication.

#### *V. The incommunication to push back the risks of acomunication*

Three fundamental fields must be recalled to show the complexity of the question of incommunication. *First*, acomunication is increasing as the technical "globalization" of information and communication flows proceeds. Therefore, valuing the concept of incommunication is essential to avoid that abundance increases disorder. Pipes are global, and humans and societies are not.

*Then*, to value incommunication is to value history, cultures, styles, stories, debates, and contradictions in relation to the illusions and seductions of technical communication. It is human beings who wage wars, not robots or networks. The more technical communication expands, the more it is essential to rebalance with more human communication. And the confrontation of multiple incommunications is typically of the order of political communication, or of human communication, but is ultimately not a matter of technical communication.

*Finally*, this challenge is political, social, and cultural. It is about the gaps between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Inequalities have never been resolved, and disputes are growing in the East as the memory of the Cold War fades and the difficulties of misunderstanding increase. The "superiority" of the West does not diminish, and demands for justice and equality continue to grow. In short, the dispute between the East and the West of Europe is a cultural, anthropological, and political reality before being economical and social. Digital Europe is not a solution. We must rediscover our histories and confront them.

#### *VI. Five situations of radical incommunication in Europe*

Five examples evoke, each in its own way, the importance of the space of incommunications in the construction of Europe. They have more to do with anthropology than with politics. Anthropology is more "profound," and less official. For

example, if Europeans are generally very critical of European politics, we can see from qualitative studies that there is simultaneously an adherence to the project. There is the discourse, and there are deep-seated beliefs.

The first debate is linked to the post-war period in Ukraine and the question of the enlargement of Europe from 27 to 30 or more. In it lie the History and the rivalries between the two Europes, of the West and the East. All the stereotypes, clichés, racism, and nationalism that structure debates of mistrust, even hatred, emerge here. The post-war Ukraine forces to rethink the identities and relationships between all the protagonists of these confrontations. The question of otherness is central here. The second debate concerns immigration, the symbol of otherness. Here Europe betrays all its democratic traditions. A shame. Why so much hostility towards migrants? They have always been linked to European adventure. The third debate concerns “interreligious dialogues”, in other words, what is at the basis of countless acommunications. Only recently have we moved from the “wars of religion” to the search for an interreligious “dialogue.” And still, violence is very quickly at the rendezvous, and the dialogue narrows... Fundamentalisms are reborn, and not only on the side of Islam. The fourth antagonism, less violent but just as decisive for the future, revolves around indifference towards youth. They are offered almost nothing to them, except for a few examples, such as the far too narrow Erasmus program for students. Youth, though naturally European, is left fallow, explaining the return of radicalism and other nationalisms. Europe is no longer experienced as a mobilizing utopia, at least not as much as the digital ideology! As if networks were a political utopia that would change human beings and society... The last area of confrontation concerns the “ecological transition.” Some see it as the “last utopia,” others, more modestly, as a new policy to be developed and not necessarily the model for a new society. Five areas of political and cultural confrontation. These political or historical antagonisms are not the most dangerous, but rather the silence, the indifference, and the absence of contradictory and cultural debates.

As we have understood, from the point of view of the future of Europe’s political utopia, the essential is in the confrontation between incommunications and projects. Anything but silence or technocratic rationality. Europe illustrates the main hypothesis: incommunication is not a failure but an opportunity. Three conclusions:

1. Re-examine the relationship between speed and slowness in history and politics. Leave behind the ideology of immediacy so closely linked to globalization and the triumph of digital technology. Accelerating unceasingly in the hope that the culture of the present would avoid conflicts? History and its contradictions come back all the more violently as we pretend to ignore them, especially in a

“transparent” world where we see everything without always understanding. Incommunication and its contradictions are the way to recognize the importance of time and history. To debate everything contradictorily, to avoid mortifying silences.

2. To make incommunication an essential concept for the construction of Europe. A widening of the field of deliberation, as a kind of “bridge” between contradictory visions. If incommunication prevails to this extent, we must open all the closets. Talk about everything, get to know each other, without closing ourselves off from the community. Europe, whatever its definition, only exists with openness to the world. Not too many external borders. There are so many inside already...
3. The place of incommunication reminds us of the importance of human communication compared to technical communication. The weight of human and social relationships against the speed and efficiency of technical and digital systems. These can perfectly well become factors of antagonism, especially if the only horizon left is technical, economic rationality.

Revaluing incommunication is revaluing all the contradictory dimensions of history and politics. It is also escaping the constant devaluation of communication, often reduced to attempts at manipulation. It, therefore, legitimizes intercomprehension as a modest but essential tool for organizing debates. Everything is to be taken into account in communication, even incommunication, the important thing being to avoid acommunication and the violence that results from it. At a time when “the transparency of the world” and “the efficiency of technology” should allow us to master the violence of History, it is not useless to mobilize all the resources of communication and incommunication to avoid the ravages of acommunication...

And if we needed a word to illustrate the importance of this new concept, we could talk about translation. Managing incommunication is as necessary and difficult as ensuring translation. It is constraining but indispensable. Translation? Trying to understand each other when we do not understand each other. And Europe knows something about this, with more than twenty-five official languages!

*Incommunication, negotiation, translation* three essential concepts to try to cohabit as much as possible and to try to manage the most complex and violent question: that of otherness. *Finally, to think about incommunication is to think about the status of otherness in communication.*

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, CIVIL SOCIETY  
ORGANIZATIONS AND CITIZENS:  
AN INCOMMUNICATIVE TRIPTYCH

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ABSTRACT

The perception of the actions promoting European construction appears to be particularly flawed. This failure is perceptible because of the numerous elements of misinformation that never seem to have been taken seriously. This article seeks to shed light on the responsibility of the actors of the relatively old organized civil society in this context.

*Keywords: citizenship, inclusion, disinformation, democratization*



From the very first studies on the development of the construction of the European Union, the leading role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as legal entities (Non-governmental organizations, think tanks, political parties, trade unions) can be noted. They appear in parallel with the work of the neo-functional movement in the 1950s 1970s, which is devoted to these interest groups (Saurugger, 2010). The neo-functional approach is one of the best-known theories of European integration. Associated with Ernst B. Haas, who developed it in the late 1950s as part of his doctoral research, building on the work of the functionalists, neo-functionalism was later expanded and theorized by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold in the 1960s 1970s.

The latter was to push European integration towards a new formulation of national sectoral policies. As a result, the actors of the communitarian fad (Haas, 2004; Lancien, 2013) and its “spill-over” are mostly sector-specific rather than state-specific. The “spillover” can be defined as “the expansive logic of sectoral integration” according to “the process by which policy cooperation carried out in a specific way leads to the formulation of new objectives to enable the implementation of the original aims.” Indeed, CSOs then transferred their expectations from the national to the European level. Moreover, the extension of the EU’s fields of intervention over the decades has multiplied the number of CSOs. This makes the picture even more complex to visualize, and, as a result, communicating the virtuous effects of the EU today becomes a daunting task.

Some citizens may feel neglected or threatened by European integration, even though it is supposed to promote inclusion and progress for all. This opinion is expressed in a Eurosceptic discourse according to which the Union has been designed solely by and for its market and, therefore, exclusively for the multinationals, or even the United States, which is particularly detrimental to low-income workers and small businesses. Thus, the CSOs promoting the construction of Europe would have as their sole aim to promote these dominant economic actors, with subsidies decided to align political actions with their sole interests. Consequently, the lack of communication about the European institutions opens up space for misinformation and erroneous conflation, which may explain the rejection of European construction as a whole (Bernard & Kolozova, 2022). The debates on the adoption by referendum of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE), which was rejected in France and the Netherlands in 2005, are particularly illustrative in this respect.

If the multiplication of factual or legal checking actions as a response is a first step or a necessary riposte, it is, unfortunately, to be feared that these actions are - still - only addressed to a circle of insiders. The lack of inclusiveness of the EU can be

explained by a persistent confusion between democratization and inclusion, as well as by a biased perception of EU action on inclusion.

*The confusion between democratization and inclusion*

In 2005, the so-called ‘liberal’ dimension of the CETA was particularly decried. The mistake made by European specialists and institutional representatives at the time was to limit themselves to being annoyed by this assessment from an economic perspective alone – and to ignore what would be called *fake news* ten years later. Obsessed with what they consider to be “rich institutional and democratic advances” (Chopin & Bertoncini, 2005), they forget to be inclusive. The misinformation about the regression of women’s rights at the time is a significant sign of this. The Europe of the wealthy appears to be established, and the proposals resulting from the ASCOs, such as the “most favored European citizen clause” of the former MEP and candidate for the European elections, Gisèle Halimi, are not perceptible, to cite just one example. The European Commission becomes a convenient scapegoat for those who want to protect themselves from their political ambitions.

However, some State representatives prefer a Europe of nations, in other words, a Union of decisions taken between the Member States in the (European or EU) Council and as far as possible by unanimity. The promoters of this model, such as the Hungarian political party of Fidesz, insist on the aforementioned shortcomings of inclusion to legitimize their vision which is rooted rather in the interests of their nations’ people, what some call populism (Godin, 2012).

European institutional law, although oriented towards the defense of the democratic rule of law, is not accessible. The resulting lack of communication about the expected results leads to an inglorious description: wealthy people who fund bodies that are not legitimate to act (Vassalos, 2017). What is, in part, the reality is becoming systematic in what can be described as Eurosceptic discourse. Witness the 2018 legislative campaign in Hungary and its public posters - unsigned but attributed to the government - depicting the President of the European Commission, Luxembourg’s Jean Claude Juncker, and the American billionaire of Judeo-Magyar origin, George Soros (Gessem, 2018), accompanied by the slogan “You too have the right to know what is going on in Brussels”. Undoubtedly, the Eurosceptic Prime Minister and President of Fidesz, Viktor Orbán, is addressing all those who feel excluded and is taking advantage of the opportunity to rile people up and make them forget the meaninglessness of such posters. This gives him the advantage of being able to hide behind sulphureous arguments and not to advance what he is pursuing: the annihilation of the challenges to his mode of government in place

since 2010. By presenting themselves as the representatives of citizens who feel ‘excluded from Europe,’ the representatives of the Eurosceptic Fidesz movement can influence decision-making processes at a European level and block any progress when their legislation, which is contrary to the European rule of law, is criticized (Gnesotto, 2022). Thus, while some MEPs are inclined to trigger Article 7 of the EU Treaty (European Parliament, 2020) in order to protect the democratic rule of law, it should not be forgotten that too few citizens know what the envisaged sanction is, which may explain the lack of political will to see this procedure initiated.

### *The missed opportunity for social inclusion in Europe*

While interest groups have always gravitated towards European institutions, consultation with associations active in the field of social initiatives began to take on a certain importance when these issues became a priority on the EU agenda. Rather late, in 1993, after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission and its Directorate General for Social Policy decided to intervene more decisively in the field of youth, social exclusion, racism and gender equality (European Union, 1993; 1994). A European structural policy is therefore supposed to be developed that would promote inclusion. The objective at this point is for the Commission to support inclusive initiatives through broad consultations with CSOs by strengthening the Community interest vis-à-vis state interests. The Commission would thus have been strengthened within the European institutional triangle: Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers of the European Union. It is here that EU legislation is drafted, debated and amended by a certain legitimacy provided by the presence of CSOs vis-à-vis the EU Council Ministers.

Unfortunately, events turned out differently. At the request of the United Kingdom, the European Court of Justice annulled the Commission’s decision to fund nearly 80 European projects against social exclusion (European Court, 1998). Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009, which renamed the Union’s judicial body the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) because of the recognition of the single Union as a legal entity, the term “Court of Justice of the European Communities” (ECJ) was used, which at the time were the ECSC, EURATOM, and the EEC.

While legal doctrine in the 1990s focused mainly on the fact that the annulment may have led to the reimbursement of funds received by the structures (Simon, 1998), it must be admitted that the political message – without going back on the court decision – was to brand social policy actions. States seem to have only the new World Trade Organization (WTO) in mind, which took over from the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1995. In this respect, the European Commission has been confronted with the hostility of member states to its intervention in these areas to promote social inclusion, leading to the cruel conclusion that CSOs are shaped by institutional interests (Sminsmans, 2003). This translates in the perceptions of citizens into a very relative interest by the EU institutions in the issue of social inclusion and, worse, into a systematic instrumentalization.

If, since 2019 and the new legislature, efforts have been made to communicate, for example on the leading role of the European Fund for the most deprived in the financing of the association *Les Restos du cœur*, it must be noted that it does not, or hardly, elicit any reaction (*Le Point*, 2019 ; *Les Restos du cœur*, 2019). While we discover that a quarter of the sums received by the organization founded by Coluche come from the EU, the European financial commitment to the fight against exclusion seems invisible. The media prefer to accuse the European Commissioner for Equality Helena Dalli – and her ill-fated attempts to promote inclusion – of wanting to destroy the European Christian fundamentals in the guide (*Famille Chrétienne*, 2021), published by her Directorate General in 2021, *Commission Guide to Inclusive Communication* (European Commission, 2021). Such is the outcry that it finds itself having to justify itself: “In no way were our recommendations binding or imposing any way of thinking, acting or speaking about European citizens” (Kovacs & Rován, 2021).

It is a cruel fact that the EU’s communication on inclusion for the purposes of being “woke” (aware of and actively attentive to facts and issues but in a negative way as provoking useless drama) and disruption of our fundamentals appears to be far more effective than the EU’s support for action on the ground to combat social exclusion. Far from simply regretting or denouncing this, funders should probably demand more careful communication from grant recipients about EU support for their social inclusion actions in order to clarify what each is doing.

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# INCOMMUNICATIONS AT THE HEART OF THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PLAN

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## ABSTRACT

The recovery plan, which aims to breathe new life into the European economy in the post-COVID era, has been built through dialogic communication / incommunication, which has been one of the cements of the European Union since its creation. The opposition and then the negotiation between the frugal states, supporters of budgetary orthodoxy and an intergovernmental debt, and the prodigal souths, in favor of pooling the debt at the Union level, gave rise to sufficiently ambiguous points of agreement to allow an ideal consensus vis-à-vis the pooling of the debt and its financing.

*Keywords: Europe, incommunication, communication, recovery, bonds*

At the Brussels Summit on July 21, 2020, the leaders of the 27 countries of the European Union agreed on a historic plan intended to revive the European economy following the first Covid 19 crisis. In its statement of strategic intent, the recovery plan aims to “make Europe greener, more digital and more resilient” (European Commission, 2021).

The summit that led to the agreement on this recovery plan lasted no less than 90 long hours. They were nevertheless preceded by days of preliminary discussions, which enabled the need to discuss this recovery plan in the European agenda. Discussed in March 2020, the principle was recorded at the European Council on April 23, after procrastination by certain European countries, and under sufficiently broad and non-operational conditions for it to be adopted unanimously. From the discussions prior to this meeting, differences emerged between the States on the concrete mechanisms for implementing this plan, particularly around the debt contracted in euros on the financial markets. Where France, Italy, and Spain, in the lead, defended a pooling of debt to finance the plan, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany wanted financing by recourse to the collective loan by the Member States, but with an individual commitment by the States to the extent of the financing obtained.

In other words, three months before the Brussels summit, two groups of States emerged which were presented almost as antagonists by the press: the “frugal” states, attached primarily to budgetary orthodoxy that mutualized loan financing could call into question, and the prodigal souths, including France, who defend the principle of pooling borrowing and were described by the frugal states as spendthrift and highly indebted. A semantic battle was thus played out between supporters of “Corona Bonds” and those of “Euro Bonds,” where each defended the same idea of pooling debt at the European level without, however, agreeing on the nature of the debtor (the EU for the first, the states in an intergovernmental logic for the latter). A third group appeared made up of Poland and Hungary, whose hardening of the regimes and the questioning of the rights of certain minorities have been strongly criticized by the other European States which have brandished, for several years, the threat of sanctions against them, which crystallized on the question of the recovery plan.

### *Miscommunications at the heart of the European recovery plan*

The tipping point in the negotiations before the Brussels summit lies in the reversal of Germany which, for reasons of economic strategy (helping the



European countries which are its main customers), but also ideological (in favor of European solidarity and the Franco-German couple as a driving force), leaves the paradigm of the frugal to join the position of France. As often, the Franco-German couple mediates the communication/incommunication dialogic (Wolton, 2017).

On May 18, Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron go beyond the generalist agreement in principle to a recovery plan and propose, during a joint videoconference, a plan of 500 billion euros (which later became 750 billion euros) financed by loans contracted on the financial markets by the European Commission on behalf of the States, and which are intended to be redistributed in the form of loans or grants. On this much more operational basis, new differences appeared between the Member States. But on the same principle as the first phase, which led to discussions on the recovery plan, these differences have been overcome by sufficiently general conditions for each State to be able to understand it in the terms it wishes while facilitating the process of European integration and cooperation.

Thus, at the end of five days of negotiations at the Brussels Summit, the governments of the Member States of the European Union agreed on the principle of the recovery plan and its financing via mutualized debt at the European level, which were to, in accordance with European institutional rules, be accepted unanimously. However, to satisfy States with divergent interests, two main conditions have been imposed on the implementation of this plan. Here again, after negotiations and the search for a consensus, they have been sufficiently ambiguous to be accepted by all, without anyone understanding them in quite the same way, that is to say, stated without guaranteeing that they are “without misunderstanding” (Oustinoff, 2019).

Firstly, and despite initial resistance from Poland and Hungary, the disbursement of funds from the recovery plan is conditional on compliance with the rule of law, the system of which can be activated by the Council of the European Union and only by a qualified majority. This conditionality was definitively adopted in December 2020. Although Poland and Hungary are directly concerned by these provisions, given the various procedures that had been carried out in the past, they nevertheless obtained that this mechanism can only be effective after verification of its legality by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and that the European Commission be required to inform the State concerned in advance of any sanctions. In addition, it was agreed that the State concerned could ask the President of the European

Council to open a debate at the next summit. Finally, the final beneficiaries of the funds (associations, local authorities, etc.) who consider themselves foreign to the non-respect of the rule of law can ultimately benefit directly, without going through the sanctioned State.

These “safeguards” seemed sufficient to Poland and Hungary, which at the same time needed European funds from the recovery plan given the economic context and, at the same time, sufficiently restrictive in the eyes of the other States to make this conditionality effective. Especially since if the regulation understands the rule of law as “the existence of a transparent, responsible, democratic and pluralistic legislative process,” including the principles of “fundamental rights, separation of powers, non-discrimination and of equality before the law,” the differences of interpretation exist on the minimalist version (on a strictly budgetary level, such as corruption linked to European funds) and maximalist, that is to say, more political, of the non-respect for the rule of law. It is this ambivalence that has enabled all European states to come together to validate the mechanism. This, incidentally, finally allowed the European institutions to take a real additional step in their ability to compel the Member States to respect the rule of law since the CJEU validated on February 16, 2022, the first sanctions of the Commission against Poland and Hungary, which have seen the payment of European funds suspended.

The second condition for validating the recovery plan concerned the sources of its financing. It is intended to reassure the frugal who feared having to bear the burden of the debt of states in southern Europe that they do not consider, in particular in the light of the financial crisis of the early 2010s, to be fiscally virtuous.

Here too, one of the ways of overcoming the differences between the States consisted in introducing a new system which, incidentally, *de facto* reinforces the principle of European integration, but whose contours are sufficiently broad and therefore imprecise to satisfy governments with different visions and interests. Firstly, the July 2020 agreement sets a relatively distant horizon for the repayment of this loan, to the year 2058. Above all, and this is a very important development for the functioning of the European institutions, the European Commission refers to the possibility of levying own taxes and duties, which would not be borne directly or indirectly by European citizens. They would primarily target non-European players by penalizing non-virtuous companies from the point of view of their social responsibility (tax on non-recyclable plastics) and with a European solidarity mechanism financed by

a tax on financial transactions and on large digital corporations (in the first place the GAFAM), even a carbon tax at the borders.

*“Long live incommunication” (Wolton 2020): towards a form of European federalism*

In theory, this is considerable progress towards a form of European federalism. However, in fact, at the time of the agreement, neither the mechanisms for implementing these taxes, nor their base, nor the amounts are concretely defined, but postponed to a later date. This is how a consensus can emerge, on an ideal, almost philosophical level, vis-à-vis the pooling of the debt, and, consequently its financing, without the latter being concretely resolved. This is what allows, paradoxically, one of the major advances in the construction of Europe through the first recovery plan of this type in the history of the European Union.

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# THE BREXIT, FAILURE OR SUCCESS?

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## ABSTRACT

The Brexit is now a reality, increasingly de-dramatized, six years after the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty by the British government following the result of the June 2016 referendum. Until the Covid-19 health crisis, the Brexit was at the center of media spaces within all member states. This unprecedented process was initially often seen as revealing misunderstandings or even questioning of European construction. But could European integration for the United Kingdom really be envisaged beyond the economic?

*Keywords: Brexit, referendum, otherness*

The media in Europe is currently less interested in the Brexit. It has become a reality, increasingly de-dramatized. This situation is the result of a rather lengthy process that formally began six years ago, with the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty by the British government on March 29, 2017, after the results of the June 26, 2016 referendum (Antoine, 2020; Drevet, 2021). The citizens of England and Wales then tipped the scales of British opinion towards a departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Then, until the Covid 19 health crisis, the Brexit was at the center of media spaces within all member states. This unprecedented process has very often been seen as revealing a deep malaise in the construction of Europe or even as a sign of the disintegration of this original confederation, whereas it is possible to see it as a perspective specific to the United Kingdom, which could be anticipated as soon as European integration went beyond the economic framework, that is, in the end, right from the start: a very good example of incommunication with regard to the project itself.

*Europe is not the same for all Europeans...*

During a certain period, within the framework of the complicated negotiations preparing the divorce, other inclinations of rupture were evoked, a possible Polexit (for Poland), or even a Frexit (for France), a theme developed in particular by nationalist and/or sovereigntist political parties, often described as populist, including in the context of the 2019 European Parliament elections. The results of the 2016 referendum have been analyzed; researchers and journalists have sought to understand how the British public could have chosen *Leave* (see for example, Bailoni, 2017; Henkel, 2019; Fieldhouse et al. 2020). The arguments of Charles de Gaulle, justifying the French veto to the two applications of the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community, in 1963 and 1967, were then (re) mobilized, often out of context. The French President considered, on the one hand, that the United Kingdom's Atlantic tropism was incompatible with the European project and on the other hand, that the *acquis communautaire* of the time could suffer from this enlargement, in particular with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was not unanimously supported at the time.

Many Europeans did not believe in divorce, could not really envisage it, and did not understand the results of the British vote. The campaign of the *Leave* supporters was widely questioned, with the denunciation of fake news, particularly with regard to the financial benefits to be gained from leaving the United Kingdom for each British citizen. A simple and convenient explanation that avoided addressing

a rather disturbing fact: the citizens of all Member States do not view Europe, and the European Union, in the same way, and it is very difficult to share and communicate in such a context (see Nowicki, Radut-Gaghi & Rouet, 2017). The Brexit forces us to admit that more than forty years of integration and transposition of European texts into British national law have not succeeded in installing a European identification among the population. British integration began, and thus ends, with economics.

Is Europe, for a majority of British people, only economic (Tombs, 2020)? Several factors can explain the results of the Brexit referendum. For Hobot (2016), one must take into account political disillusionment, the lack of confidence of citizens in the politicians in power, the lack of consideration of economic problems such as those related to immigration. However, these themes are widely shared by other Europeans and do not allow us to distinguish between Europhiles and Europhobes. However, the question put to the British people in the referendum was to choose between *Leave* and *Remain* in a very clear-cut manner, without being able to assess the type of participation in the European Union desired by the citizens.

The results of a survey of a sample of nearly 1,700 people in June 2017, just days after the Brexit process began, provide insight into the position of British citizens (Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2018). It is clear that the economy is the top priority for British citizens. The continuation of free trade with the EU is envisioned by a large majority of citizens: 78% of respondents demand free access for European companies to British markets and 81% aspire to the same for British companies within the EU. Thus, confidence in the leadership is low, but confidence in the country is high, and a large proportion of those surveyed believe that the UK is able to make its own trade deals with many countries around the world. The pursuit of trade with the EU is part of a utilitarian perspective, with a search for compromise on the rights of EU citizens in the UK. However, this last element is divisive: a quarter of respondents are totally opposed to accessing British social benefits for foreigners, whether European or not, while the majority remain in favor of a controlled free movement of European citizens in their country. The end of unfettered free movement has led to the departure (or return) of many Europeans (Alemanno & Kochenov, 2021).

Finally, a majority position emerges from this survey: the priority to the economic implies a compulsory negotiation after leaving the customs union to obtain access to the EU internal market and the acceptance of a compromise concerning the migration of EU citizens.

*Beyond economics: otherness and identity*

After the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, a referendum was held two years later, and 67 percent of Britons voted to remain. This result may suggest a significant shift in public opinion between 1975 and 2016 (Bailey & Budd, 2019), but it was already about having access to a large market, ensuring the country's economic growth, and limiting constraints on growth. The free movement of persons was introduced in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome for economic purposes: it applied only to workers. The generalization came much later, in particular with the 1990 directives that allowed all European citizens to move and settle in other EU countries, whatever the reason. The United Kingdom did not join the Schengen area, which ended internal border controls in 1995. So, the evolution of public opinion may well be very relative!

The free movement of people and European citizenship have favored an important evolution of attitudes that are often minimized: European citizens can invest in a living space, confront different cultures and customs, integrate into another country without questioning their origins, and build a European identity. Thus, the European foreigner becomes European and is no longer really a foreigner, in a renewed relationship to otherness. Europeans may no longer be part of a migration process and become "mobile citizens" within a progressively restructured political and societal space, for example, by temporarily settling in another EU country (Rouet, 2011). What was the situation in the UK? The integration of migrants, European or not, is obviously possible there, regardless of whether the country belongs to the EU or not, but a posture of mobility of European citizens is difficult to envisage in a different context of relationship to otherness, abroad, on the part of British citizens who do not appreciate very much the status of "member State" submitted to Brussels for their country, a former imperial power, with a certain "postcolonial melancholy" (Menon & Wagner, 2020).

To understand the Brexit, we must therefore go beyond the recurrent explanations, particularly the denunciation of migration in a context of high unemployment and Brussels considered as an institution confiscating resources that should be allocated to the British, and take into account the question of identity, the difficult combination or articulation of a British identity with a European identity (van der Zwet *et al.*, 2020; Wilson, 2020; Wolkenstein, 2022). In this context, it was quite easy to scapegoat European institutions and migrants. However, the United Kingdom is a multinational state, and not every citizen can identify with Britishness. The referendum highlighted significant differences of opinion between England and Wales on the one hand, and Scotland and Northern Ireland on the other. The

dominant British in England rejected the EU more than the British in Scotland, and it would be necessary to go further into the analysis of identity and the determinants of identification to try to understand this differentiation. The political evolution of the last twenty years and the rise of nationalist movements within the different British nations may explain a strengthening of national identities, to the detriment of a relative British multicultural identity, likely to be more open to migration.

The special Eurobarometer 517, conducted at the end of 2021, i.e., without the United Kingdom, shows that the majority of Europeans have a favorable opinion of the EU and consider that their country's membership is a good thing. More than 80% believe they are happy to live in the EU (European Union, 2021). Among the assets mainly cited: respect for democracy, human rights, the rule of law, then the economy and solidarity between Member States. The Eurobarometers, organized since 1973, show that national and European identities are not mutually exclusive, but are combined. A majority of French people, for example, feel both French and European, as confirmed by a recent survey (IFOP for EuropaNova & the *JDD*, 2021). A minority (depending on the survey and the year, between 15 and 30 percent) feels only French, while in the United Kingdom in 2010, less than half of Britons felt European, the lowest score in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2010). A European identity that conflicts with, rather than complements, the national identity, which makes it difficult to accept any European federalist project and finally explains why, beyond the economic aspects, no British government for more than 50 years has ever supported the idea of deepening European integration.

It is, therefore, not only a question of highlighting a priority economic prism but also a particular national posture, supported politically, which has favored the development of a deeply rooted Euroscepticism among citizens driven by a feeling of exclusive identity and who have long been trying to assert themselves in a multinational political environment.

### *Brexit, success or failure?*

Now the divorce is effective in the texts: after a withdrawal agreement adopted in October 2019 and entered into force on February 1, 2020, a trade and cooperation agreement was signed between the European Union and the United Kingdom on December 30, 2020, to take effect on January 1, 2021, after a difficult negotiation. Customs and migration controls have been put in place under complicated conditions. The free movement of people is no longer applicable as before, nor is the free movement of goods because even if the agreement does not provide for



any customs duties, trade is subject to formalities and controls.

The Brexit, since the referendum until today, is very often considered in the European press as a failure. For the past six years, the media (as well as many politicians and researchers) have reported on the difficulties of various kinds and the negative consequences in the short and medium term. This has resulted in long queues of lorries before the border in France, tedious new formalities, administrative delays, and a drop in trade. The media had to be educational in explaining to their audiences the complexity of the Northern Ireland protocol or the tensions in the fisheries sector. The political and diplomatic context was also much commented on, both in terms of European positions towards the United Kingdom and internally, between England and Scotland in particular. Besides, Brexit was also a good opportunity for European citizens to learn about the United Kingdom and its four constitutive nations!

It will obviously take a few more years to be able to draw the lessons that the European community will learn from this rupture (Faucher & Hay, 2020). However, it is often argued that the European Union is built on exogenous crises such as the subprime crisis or the Covid crisis. These crises have been factors of cohesion. The same was true of the Brexit, although it was an internal crisis.

The European Union was able to preserve its internal market and showed inventiveness in the negotiations to overcome, perhaps temporarily, certain major problems caused by the breakup, such as the question of the border between the north and south of Ireland. From this point of view, the Brexit can be considered a success for the EU.

Neither the European Union nor the United Kingdom has any interest in a long and confrontational process. The lack of understanding of each other's positions can justify the punitive overtones often seen on the part of the EU, whereas it is essential to recognize the rejection of the European project by a majority of citizens across the Channel and to stop seeing the Brexit as a missed opportunity or a failure of European integration. Unlike the countries of the former Soviet bloc that joined in 2004 and 2007, the United Kingdom has never really been part of a Europe of the peoples and therefore has never "returned back to Europe" by joining the EEC. In Great Britain, as in the European Union, citizens have everything to gain by trying to understand and accept that not everyone is European in the same way, and that the Brexit is also a success for the British, who can build now a different and accepted partnership relationship with the other Europeans. The latter can also build on this result to deepen their internal relations and choose a new form of community integration.

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# THE POSITION OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN EUROPEAN EDUCATION AND THEIR ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA<sup>1</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

In the European area, we have recently noticed an increase in the spread of conspiracy theories and propaganda. Several crises (especially the crisis associated with the Covid-19 pandemic) have reduced the credibility of European/Western institutions in the eyes of many young people. In addition, some states are weakened by the rise of Pan-Slavism and nationalist ideas. In this context, is it necessary to reconsider the education of future European citizens? How to approach this if countries are facing multiple challenges at the same time?

*Keywords: European education, European citizenship, disinformation, propaganda, Pan-Slavism, critical thinking, media education.*

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Disinformation has always been present in our society; however, its impact has recently become more significant due to its spread and accessibility. False information and manipulation affect the lives of all European citizens, influencing their opinions and decisions, polarizing debate, creating tension in society, and, in many cases, even undermining electoral systems and causing distrust in public institutions. Young people are generally considered to be at risk the most, as they are easily targeted by social networks, their creators, and promoters. In fact, up to 63% of young Europeans are exposed to fake news more than once a week, according to EU surveys (European Commission, 2019).

### *Crises and Disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe*

The spread of fake news and misinformation in the European context has significantly increased after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has undoubtedly had a negative impact on the vaccination rate of Europeans themselves, which reached an average of 66% in December 2021, however with clearly visible regional differences. While Western European countries reported a high vaccination rate of around 80% (e.g., Portugal and Spain), some Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia, reported rates below 50%, or even lower, as is the case of Romania and Bulgaria (24%). Furthermore, the situation with the spread of disinformation had come under scrutiny in many countries after the outbreak of the Russian military invasion against Ukraine, which began in February this year, when, after the initial shock of all Europeans, the attention of many citizens turned precisely to the dangers of the spread of conspiracy theories, as well as Russian propaganda.

We consider it necessary to point out the interconnectedness of both phenomena, which is clearly visible, for example, in the countries of Central Europe, where disinformation before the outbreak of the pandemic focused mainly on Russia's policy and questioning the importance of international organizations such as the EU and NATO. Members of GLOBSEC, which has been dealing with the issue of disinformation since 2015, pointed out that after the annexation of Crimea, some internet portals in Slovakia started spreading conspiracy theories and Russian propaganda. Their number subsequently began to grow rapidly. When the *konspiratori.sk* portal was created, the list had approximately 60 websites, while in 2021 there were already around 200. According to the *blbec.online* portal, there are over 1,700 disinformation sites and open Facebook groups in Slovakia. According to GLOBSEC, we also have to add those that are closed. (Klingová, In: Kačmár, 2021)

Slovak disinformation portals often take content from Czech sources. Their Slovakian counterparts cooperate with Czech disinformation servers, but cooperation between disinformation agents also takes place at the level within the state. (ibid.)

As stated by the Slovak disinformation and conspiracy expert K. Klingová from GLOBSEC, in the early days of the pandemic, some of these disseminators quickly adapted to the situation and started to use “health hoaxes” in order to undermine confidence against the West. Consequently, questioning NATO and the EU remained their main theme, but their “narrative shifted to the health sector.” (Klingová, In: Kačmár, 2021) Despite the efforts of several Slovak government officials who tried to explain that the EU is helping its citizens during the pandemic, some activists manipulated the public by saying that Russia and China are doing much more for the people and that the EU is incapable in this sense. In doing so, the disseminators took advantage of the lack of communication both at the level of the EU, as well as its member states. In Slovakia, where the governing coalition was formed after the parliamentary elections that took place just at the time of the outbreak of the first wave of the pandemic, the issue became a “test of strategic and crisis communication by public officials and institutions,” which had long been given insufficient attention in the country. (ibid.)

This expert’s comments show that while initially the disseminators of this information were considered to be more of a “narrow group of people or websites on the fringes of society” with a small spectrum of readers distrustful of the system, in recent years, conspiracy theories, hoaxes and disinformation have become part of the mainstream and a common part of political debates. (ibid.) Moreover, in the last parliamentary elections in Slovakia, elected politicians have been close to similar narratives. This problem nowadays is no longer exclusive to foreign actors but also to some political parties that profile themselves through the aforementioned themes, addressing groups of addressees prone to believe disinformation.

The above problems are often mentioned in connection with the spread of the ideas of Pan-Slavism – the idea of the unity of Slavic peoples, which resonates in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Stránský, 2020). While in the Czech and Slovak environment, these ideas are mainly associated with the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th century, Slavic mutuality and orientation towards Russia have their supporters in these two countries even today. The propagators of these ideas are particularly active in the alternative media and on social networks through which they spread nationalist ideas to the countries of Central Europe. As stated by the Czech political scientist and lawyer M. Čejka, pro-Western and pro-Russian attitudes appear in top politics in this region as well. (Čejka, In: Červinka, 2020)

“Russia and some of its allies, which is mainly the ageing generation of some politicians from post-socialist countries, have started to intensify their criticism of the EU and other forms of Western integration.” According to him, the divided countries, as well as the traditional Western powers, have themselves to blame for this negative state: “Russian President Vladimir Putin, who skilfully uses his cult of personality and nationalist and Pan-Slavic elements, would be foolish if in the era of populist authoritarians, among whom he plays one of the main roles, he did not use his position,” naming politicians such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Recep Erdogan and Miloš Zeman. (ibid.)

Čejka (ibid.) argues that although this “cold war” line does not yet divide Europe into East and West, as it used to be in the past, it is polarizing mainly Central and Eastern European societies from the inside, which is particularly dangerous in the context of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine. In Slovakia, for example, around a quarter of Slovak citizens believe the recurrent reports that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine is aimed at disarming and denationalizing Ukraine (28%) or that the war was deliberately provoked by the Western powers and that Russia was merely reacting to their provocation (34%). The above survey revealed that the age of respondents does not play a major role in trusting these narratives (Data obtained from a survey conducted by a scientific team from the Institute of Experimental Psychology of the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences on a sample of 900 respondents on 22-24 March). In other words, the young generation that has already been educated in the era of ‘modern European’ education is also at risk.

### *Priority given to teaching*

So, how can we cope with this situation? How should we educate new generations of European citizens so that they are able to detect the danger of conspiracy theories, disinformation, and propaganda better? Experts point to the need to rethink current approaches to the formation of critical thinking, which is more than necessary in the age of social networks and Internet media. Although this issue is certainly not new in many European education systems, including French education, several EU Member States are still lagging behind as far as the development of critical thinking is concerned. Similar outcomes are mapped by the PISA survey, which in 2018 focused on reading literacy with an emphasis on reading comprehension, understanding of context, and the ability to recognize and classify sources: “*In this digital world, people use all kinds of information sources. Reading is no longer*

*primarily about extracting information from texts, but about building knowledge, thinking critically and making informed judgements.” (PISA, 2018)*

The survey revealed that in OECD countries, less than a tenth of students are able to distinguish between facts and opinions based on implicit cues related to the content or source of information. Among the European countries, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Slovenia, Belgium, France, Portugal and the Czech Republic, ranked above the OECD average. The situation is traditionally the same in the Scandinavian countries compared to 2000 and 2009. The representative of Germany, K. Reiss *et al.* (2018), also considers this development to be promising and positive, because in the year 2000, the performance of young people in Germany was below the OECD average; in 2009 the results of young people in Germany were average and finally at present Germany has reached and remained above the OECD average. However, K. Reiss *et al.* (*ibid.*) point to the difference in outcomes between pupils from favorable socio-economic backgrounds and those from unfavorable backgrounds, which has increased by 9% in Germany since 2009. The increased number of pupils with a migrant background also has a negative impact on these results. Therefore, it is important to make resources available to provide more individualized support and ensure no child is left behind. (*ibid.*) Slovakia, for example, remains below the OECD average in the long-term perspective.

For this reason, increasing the digital literacy of individuals through new media and information technologies gets to the attention of the European Commission and, consequently, of the general professional and lay European public. In addition to improving digital and media literacy which is closely linked to the formation of critical thinking, it is also essential to improve the social status of media education in schools.

These needs are via the media communicated from the European level to the national level, as presented in the following analysis of media discourse: for instance, in the German media space, for example, our quantitative analyses confirm the increasing prevalence of some related concepts such as “media literacy” (in German: *Medienkompetenz*), “media education” (*Medienbildung*), “media upbringing” (*Medienerziehung*) and “critical thinking” (*Kritisches Denken*). While the term “media literacy” shows only a slight increase since 2003 (from 0.98/ipm in 2003 to 1.16/ipm in 2020), the terms “media education” and “media upbringing” have appeared in the studied corpus only since 2008 with a constant number of occurrences in the range of 0.18-0.20/ipm. However, the term ‘critical thinking’ shows a significant increase in occurrences (from 108.1/ipm in 2003 to 145.2/ipm



in 2020), which confirms the above-mentioned trend responding to the results of the PISA 2000, 2009, and 2018 surveys<sup>2</sup>. The quantitative analysis of the Slovak media discourse revealed that the term ‘media literacy’ has appeared in the corpus only since 2006 with a low incidence of 0.01/ipm (increasing to 0.24/ipm by 2019), as well as the terms ‘media education’ and ‘media upbringing’ - since 2005 the number of occurrences ranging from 0.01 - 0.04/ipm, similarly as critical thinking (0.01 - 0.08/ipm). Last but not least, alongside media education, concepts of moral and character education are becoming predominant approaches to critical thinking development at all levels of education. (Hurajová & Hladíková, 2022)

In this context, another question arises: how to approach the new reform needs in the field of education in such countries where it is necessary to respond to several societal challenges simultaneously? In the Slovak Republic, for example, in the last decade, the focus has been mainly on the lack of connectivity between education and practice, on the employability of graduates in the labor market, and the related need to improve the quality of dual education, which had to be supported by legislation. Our previous analyses clearly indicated that the topic of dual VET is important in the social discourse in Slovakia, and in the period after 2015 (when a number of legislative measures were adopted), it had sufficient space in the Slovak press. Several important factors have contributed to this, such as the urgent need for reform of the education system at the national and European level, the related European recommendations reflected in the Slovak legislative framework, and a direct link between the quality of VET and the national economy. The above facts have an impact on the pace of economic growth in every country, but probably also the increased interest of the Slovak public in education policies. (Molnárová & Rošteková, 2020)

However, we perceive problematic the way in which this need for reform has been communicated to the public by politicians through the media, often referring to the EU recommendations, when the image of the social sciences and humanities has been continuously defaced by inappropriate and insensitive statements, thus reducing their societal relevance. Furthermore, government officials have repeatedly expressed their intention to interfere directly with the composition of secondary school curricula. The former Prime Minister, Robert Fico, repeatedly called for the

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<sup>2</sup> For the quantitative research, we used the most extensive German annotated corpus DeReKo accessible via COSMAS II. Version 2.4. Mannheim: Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) <<https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/>> [06. 09. 2021] and the Slovak National Corpus. Version prim-9.0-public-inf. [online]. Bratislava: Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics, Slovak Academy of Sciences. Available at: <http://korpus.juls.savba.sk> [cited 2022-04-11]. In order to make the results comparable, we present the number of occurrences of the studied terms per million words, abbreviated as ipm (instances per million).

‘political courage’ that the social situation demanded. He constantly pointed to the possibility of removing the competencies from regional councils in the sphere of secondary schools’ management. (Rošteková, Molnárová & Gura, 2020). Add to that, he stressed the need to reduce the number of those Slovak universities which focus their study programs mainly on humanities. Consequently, several political leaders regarded universities oriented on humanities as culprits of the unfavorable state in Slovak society. However, at the same time, the same politicians publicly concealed the long-standing undersized financing of Slovak higher education institutions.

It is undeniable, however, that at a time when Europe is having to recover from previous crises and at the same time face new economic and social challenges, it is the teaching of social sciences and humanities that should be at the center of attention in all the member states. Therefore, a coordinated approach is essential in the field of education, where common problems need to be tackled together. In this context, it is necessary to positively perceive the decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which contributed to the establishment of the Observatory for the Teaching of History in November 2020. The main objective of the Observatory is to collect and share factual information on the state of the teaching of history in 17 participating countries in order to promote the exchange of good practice and mutual learning and to act as a platform for professional development, which in turn could become “a valuable tool in the fight against dangerous revisionism and efforts to falsify historical truth.” (Jambon, 2021) To conclude, this initiative can be seen as one of the steps towards the creation of the European Education Area, which is expected to be established by the year 2025.

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# BETWEEN ACTORS OF THE BOLOGNA PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH AREA

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## ABSTRACT

The European Higher Education Area (EHEA) has become a reality that is detached from the model of the medieval university. This outcome was far from obvious when the treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. Erasmus and the Magna Carta are the cornerstones of the Bologna process, which – despite bureaucratic governance but with the support of the EU – translates and allows the actors of the university to have a necessarily common approach to teaching and research.

*Keywords: higher education, universities, EESR, European policy, Bologna process, Magna Charta.*

The construction of the European Higher Education and Research Area (EHEA), despite the criticism it has generated as much on its aims as on its implementation and governance methods, is undeniably a European success story. There is not a single student today who does not know that his or her diplomas are recognized throughout Europe or that he or she can carry out a study mobility or a professional internship there: the Erasmus program is moreover considered in many opinion polls as a symbol of Europe (Côme & Rouet, 2013). There is also no researcher who is unaware of the necessary European dimension of his or her work, if only for funding reasons. The numerous reforms of universities in Europe, even if they have sometimes provoked strong protests, have allowed the restructuring of their training programs into three cycles and their interoperability thanks to the ECTS credit system. This opening towards Europe, together with the affirmation of their common values, has profoundly changed the image of universities and their representation: from spectators of an evolution, they have become actors in the process of construction of a common space of teaching and research, in which they want to play an essential role. As a result, they have modified their social, economic, and even cultural role. They have accompanied a massification of students, allowing many young people to enter a knowledge economy that is accepted and not imposed. They have relied on the autonomy the supposed superiority of the market model to forge links with companies in their territory and with local communities while benefiting from State and European Union subsidies, creating a new system initially called the Triple Helix, a system that has become more complex and democratic to become Quadruple and Quintuple. The EHEA is now a reality that has withstood the Brexit, the coronavirus, and the war in Ukraine (Côme & Rouet, 2017).

*The homogenization of higher education in the early years of European construction: from a revisited past to a forgotten objective*

However, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, there was no way to predict this evolution. In 1957, for many, the Europe of Universities as a representation of a homogeneous model was only a memory or even a utopia based on a historical reconstruction of medieval universities, *Universitas magistrorum et scholarium*, gathering in the same place the masters and their students, at a time when on the European continent religious homogeneity was the rule and the University universal, even if this vision of the universal was governed by the Church and the teaching more based on transmission than on research.

This vision of a unified system was based on the inter-university wanderings of doctoral students necessary to obtain their doctorate and the use of a universal language, Latin. However, this homogeneity did not prevent the establishment of a hierarchy between the universities or even a competition based on pedagogical innovation. Thus, Sorbonne University was renowned for practicing the art of scholasticism and the subtleties of *disputatio* and attracted the greatest names in Christendom.

The irruption of secular authorities, whether cities or princes and the Reformation, which put an end to religious uniformity, put an end to this universal model if it ever really existed. Certainly, some positive elements of this myth still remain the constantly reaffirmed universal tendency, the importance given to the university community, the immunity of its members, the recognition of the title of doctor and the tolerance of the sometimes-transgressive practices of students. The fact remains that the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolutions with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the need to train in new technologies and to improve them constantly, and above all, the increased importance of the State, led to the creation of national models of university, either by privileging the education of elites and social reproduction, as in English universities or French higher education or by advocating the need to base teaching on research, as in the German university.

The universities in the 1960s certainly had a more pragmatic objective - the training of executives - but the myth of a common historical model of the university in Europe remained, all the more so because, apart from this assumed objective and the overall unpreparedness for the democratic wave that was being prepared because of the baby boomers, they were distinguished above all by their diversity. It would be even more judicious to evoke a European multiversity where each of the existing configurations represents an assembly of fields of study and research without any apparent coherence or logic, fluctuating according to the initial models, their evolution, the choices made by the governments, the ruptures, the influences, the ideological positions but also the expectations of the students and the needs of the society. This multiversity is still present today with, for example, a rate of higher education graduates that varies from simple to double between Romania (less than 30%) and Luxembourg or Lithuania (nearly 60%). This diversity, this latent conflictuality made it difficult for the fathers of Europe to base their European model on a modern vision of what a University could be, they preferred

not to communicate on this theme, and the Treaty of Rome, therefore, does not mention the University and only left Europe with research as a shared competence, with the application of the principle of subsidiarity leaving the States free to exercise their competences only if the EU does not apply its own, which was the case for many years. Education (and therefore higher education) and vocational training are the only supporting competences for Europe. And, as a small institutional detail that adds to the difficulty of defining a homogeneous European area, when European Councils are held, research is dealt with by the Competitiveness Council, higher education is dealt with by the Education Council, and different Directorates General of the European Commission are in charge of these subjects.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the first European years did not lead to a homogenization of higher education and research. It was not until 1984 that the first framework program for research and development was set up. The European Commission alone could not move the lines, as the States did not wish to reduce their prerogatives over the University, which had been a sensitive issue since May 1968. The stakeholders did try to organize themselves at the European level, the student associations created in 1982 the *European Students Bureau*, the forerunner of the ESU, the European Students Union, and 39 European universities set up in 1984 the first European network, the *Coimbra Group*, but the situation remained globally blocked.

*From Erasmus and Magna Charta, factors of incommunication, to the Bologna Process and emergence of EHEA*

This situation changed with the establishment in 1987 by the Commission of the Erasmus system with an objective of 10% of students in mobility (increased since the Rome conference in 2020 to 20%) and especially the signature by 388 rectors and presidents of universities of the *Magna Charta Universitarum*, with a name reminiscent of the medieval model, which claims the autonomy of universities as a place that produces and critically transmits culture, fundamental academic freedoms (research, training, teaching) and above all the absence of borders in the quest for knowledge, i.e., openness to others and interaction between cultures. This demand for mobility and openness was the trigger that enabled us to move from a situation of acommunication, where none of the stakeholders in the European space took into account the wishes of the others, to a situation of incommunication proposing a common horizon, the creation

of a European area of higher education and research as part of a Europe of knowledge, a factor of social and human development, and a guarantor of democratic governance, an area in which students, teachers, and researchers could, reminiscent of the medieval university, travel freely. Of course, none of the stakeholders had the same reading or the same representation of this space, each one thinking that they would find their interests in it: the Universities an increased autonomy, a recognition of the importance of their role in this new knowledge society; the students, a training adapted to the new conditions of the job market, the possibility of a new way of life but also a listening to their daily concerns; the governments, a method to reform their own university system by putting forward Europe and the European Commission, an excellent way to reinforce its role and to pursue the European construction.

In 1998, the Sorbonne Declaration, signed by the four Ministers of Education, French, Italian, German and English, followed a year later by the Bologna Declaration signed by 29 states and the European Union, launched the Bologna Process (BP), which allows organizing this incommunication (Côme, 2011). The BP is adapted to this challenge, it is intergovernmental but organized mainly by the host country of the conferences held every two or three years and which lead to declarations, both milestones in the process and roadmaps to achieve and improve the common goal of an efficient and competitive EHEA. It is also a participatory and continuous process. Indeed, it is not only appropriate to participate in the conferences; members are invited to participate in a process follow-up group, the Bologna Follow-up Group (BFUG), comprising representatives of the 48 member States, representatives of the universities (EUA, European University Association), and the professionalized higher education institutions (EURASHE), teachers and students (ESU). This mechanism sometimes appears bureaucratic due to the low representation of stakeholders in the field (universities, teachers, students), which discourages their participation and effective involvement in the process, especially due to the important role played in the BFUG by the representatives of the Ministers (present only at the conferences), but also by the role played by the “Bologna experts,” appointed by the governments and responsible for drafting the press releases issued after each conference. This quasi-bureaucratic control is compensated, fortunately from the point of view of communication, by the voluntary and flexible nature of the process. Indeed, the commitments and recommendations made by the States at the time of their accession and during the conferences are not part of a normative obligation, as could be a treaty, it is a “flexible” right that applies whose implementation and pace of installation



are the responsibility of each country. It is a voluntary commitment by each state to continuously reform its own higher education system to make it fully participate in the EHEA, but taking into account its culture, its model, and the evolution that will be required of it. This goes far beyond the principle of subsidiarity; the Union does not oblige or intervene in any way, nor does it have the competence to do so. It supports the initiatives and projects set up within this framework, in particular by financing them, with special support for research and mobility, or by facilitating structuring from the bottom up, in particular by supporting the creation of the EUA or, more recently, by supporting the initiative launched by the French President Emmanuel Macron on the European Universities, a grouping of universities across borders. It also allows for the dissemination of tools to achieve the objectives defined in each declaration, notably proposing a European qualification framework with an 8-level grid, a European reference framework for quality assurance in education and vocational training. To measure the effectiveness of the implementation of the EHEA, the EU has created a multidimensional mapping of the institutions that are part of it, U-Multirank. The objective is to be able to compare universities without being subject to the diktats of world rankings, such as Shanghai (Rouet, 2022). The States knowingly commit themselves to participate in this process and to evolve their own higher education systems to achieve their goals through their understanding of their mutual interests in doing so. This understanding is based on their beliefs and information sharing. This shows that incommunication is necessary for the deepening of the Bologna Process. But beyond States and governments, the march toward EHEA also depends on incommunication among all BP stakeholders. It is largely due to these interventions by non-governmental stakeholders that conference communiqués regularly emphasize that higher education is a public good, that the inclusion of socially, economically or physically disadvantaged students is a fundamental mission of universities, and that tuition fees must be limited. In the end, it seems necessary for the EHEA to remain a positive humanist project that these situations of incommunication continue...

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# THE SPORT: AN EUROPEAN UNION'S NEW SOFT POWER TOOL<sup>3</sup>

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## ABSTRACT

Since the twentieth century, sports have developed based on their “eternal values,” as set forth by Pierre de Coubertin; these values have been transmitted by the Olympic Games and have gradually become institutionalized worldwide. By being included in programs such as Europe’s Erasmus student exchange or projects with non-member states, “sports diplomacy” has acquired a dimension that is social, cultural, political, and even “linguistic,” both within and outside the EU. This has made it a pillar of public diplomacy that relies on neither propaganda nor any overt governmental influence.

*Keywords: sports, diplomacy, values, integration*

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Sport in Europe has developed, especially since the 20th century, from the “eternal values of sport” of Count Pierre de Coubertin, disseminated through the Olympic Games and within the framework of a progressive institutionalization of sport in world society. Its development in the cultures and nations of the world remains rather dichotomous: in the dominant discourse relayed by the media and official speeches, sport is clearly perceived as necessarily “good” because it is the bearer of rules, virtue, respect for others as well as for oneself, but also as a form of regulation of human affects and behaviors. From this point of view, sport is marked by timeless ethics (Bodin *et al.*, 2011).

The role of sport in international relations has been highlighted by Joseph Nye in his approach to soft power, particularly in the context of a so-called “popular” culture and wide dissemination within the media (2004). Sport, or “sport diplomacy,” is one of the components of influence on public opinion worldwide and, therefore a pillar of public diplomacy, without recourse to propaganda or overt government influence.

#### *Sport and social, cultural, and political dialogue in the European Union*

According to a Eurobarometer survey, more than 40% of Europeans participate in sports on a weekly basis (Vale & Lastennet, 2021). Thus, over the years, awareness of sport has increased in the European Union, not only as a factor that can have an economic impact but also as a tool for social inclusion, fighting discrimination, xenophobia, and building a sense of belonging (Tomaselli, 2019). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 already highlighted the social importance of sport and its impact on European identity (European Commission, 1999). The following year, a working document recognized the five functions of sport: educational, health, social, cultural, and recreational. The Helsinki Declaration of 1999 confirmed the EU’s interest in sports by calling for the recognition and strengthening of the educational and social functions of sports. The 2000 European Council in Nice declaration on the specificities of sport and its social functions in Europe is no exception (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, 2019). All subsequent initiatives and efforts to recognize sport and its role contributed to the adoption of the *White Paper on Sport* in 2007, which was the first comprehensive policy initiative to address sport at the European level, to develop the European dimension of sport, cooperation and dialogue in this area (European Commission, 2011).

The entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in 2009 is an important step in the process of institutionalizing the role of sport in the EU. Article 165 of the TFEU provides the power to support, coordinate and complement national sport-related strategies and provides the legal basis for a program dedicated to the financing of sport and the development of its European dimension. Moreover, it also links sport to other policy areas, such as education, health, and youth, but also the promotion of social inclusion of minorities, social ties, and the ideals of peace, solidarity, tolerance, and justice. Furthermore, this article also recognizes the role of sport in the EU's external relations, which is in line with the recommendations of the 2007 *White Paper on Sport* (Garamvölgyi, 2016). The EU has thus clearly identified sport as a means that can be mobilized for its foreign policy and diplomacy to promote, disseminate, and share values, internally in relation to European identification but also externally.

The first retrospective reference to the use of EU sports diplomacy is the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the International Football Federation (FIFA), which aims to use soccer as a means of development in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. This initiative highlighted the potential for the EU to use sports to pursue foreign policy objectives (Parrish *et al.*, 2021). Another milestone: in 2014, the Specialized Unit of the Directorate General for Education, Youth, Sport, and Culture achieved significant success in terms of improving the status and funding of sport with its inclusion in the EU's Erasmus+ program.

An important moment in the field of EU sports diplomacy was the creation of the High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy in 2015, whose main task was to identify the value of sport in EU foreign policy and public diplomacy. In its final report, this group states that sport has the potential to become, in particular, a new tool to improve foreign policy and international relations, to reach external audiences more effectively, or to facilitate change and dynamism in diplomatic practices. The final report also mentions the use of sport in public and cultural diplomacy and emphasizes that sports should be part of dialogue and cooperation with third countries (Grassroots Sport Diplomacy, 2019).

The direct inclusion of sport in the Erasmus+ program is a good testament to the fact that sport is currently at the same level of priority for the EU as other policy areas (in previous programming periods, an "Erasmus+ Sport" category was created for sport). The Erasmus+ budget for the 2021-2027 programming period amounts to €26.2 billion, almost double compared to the previ-

ous period (European Commission, 2022), and the budget dedicated to sports activities also increases every year, rising to €51.89M in 2022, compared to €41.7M in 2021 (EOC EU Office, 2021). This evidence suggests that sport and its funding lead to meaningful social, cultural, and political dialogue not only between actors in EU member states but also with actors in the EU's external environment. The organization of sports projects promotes good governance in sports, the European sports model, and other principles, ideals and values fundamental to the EU. Moreover, from 2023 onwards, a new activity in the field of sport, the promotion of mobility, should even be introduced: sports organizations will be able to send their coaches, referees, and staff members to exchange experiences and establish closer cooperation with different partners (European Commission, 2021).

### *Sport: an EU language for non-member States*

The reference to the concept of “sports diplomacy” in the current European Commission’s statement of priorities is confirmed by the statement of the current European Commissioner for Sport, Mariya Gabriel, who considers that “*sport contributes to increased employment opportunities and a better understanding of issues related to peace migration, mobility, and security,*” but also social development, the promotion of key EU interests such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and its values in the form of team spirit, solidarity and gender equality (Gabriel, 2020, p. 5).

It is also evident from the recommendations of the 2016 High-Level Group on Sport Diplomacy that the EU uses the added value of sport to establish and deepen partnerships with third countries. In addition to EU member states, non-EU countries can also participate in the Erasmus+ program in the form of a partnership (except for the following countries that are considered participating countries in the program: Northern Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Turkey, and Serbia, see European Commission, 2021). Partner countries “*may participate in certain actions of the program, subject to specific conditions or criteria [... respecting] all restrictions imposed by the European Council on EU external assistance [...], the general values of the EU concerning respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for Human Rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities*” (European Commission, 2021, p. 35). These conditions, therefore, condition the admissibility of projects linking non-EU and EU Member States in the

field of sport. Out of a total number of 651 sport-related projects funded in the 2014-2020 programming period, 192 projects include the participation of third-country organizations, which is almost one-third of the total number of sport-related projects.

Table №1 shows the important position of Turkish organizations in terms of coordination of European projects. The EU Member States bordering the partner countries are not more involved, in proportion to their population than the non-bordering Member States (such as Germany, France, or the United Kingdom). The involvement of sports organizations, especially non-governmental ones, from the entire European area (in the sense of the Council of Europe) can therefore be observed independently of direct neighborhood relations.

*Table №1. Nationalities of coordinating organizations, Erasmus+ Sport, 2014-2020*

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Country	Number of projects
Turkey	50
Germany	17
France	14
Spain	10
Romania	8
United-Kingdom	7
Poland	6
Malta	6
Greece	6
Bulgaria	6
Sweden	5
Serbia	5
Latvia	5
Croatia	5

*Source: <[https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/grants/2014-2020/erasmus\\_fr](https://www.eacea.ec.europa.eu/grants/2014-2020/erasmus_fr)>.*

The European Commission has highlighted two initiatives as “good practices”: a mobility project coordinated by a French organization (Project “Séjour multi-national Voilier FRATI”) which integrated discussions on democracy, European citizenship, social inclusion, and equality in (and through) sport, and a project coordinated by a Greek organization, focused on cultural dialogue, intergenerational education and the fight against racism and discrimination in sport (Project

“Balkan (re)vision”). Sport is thus clearly identified, in the convergence between European countries, as an indisputable vector of European values.

Another element illustrates the important role of sport in establishing and deepening social, cultural, and political dialogue: the progressive establishment of references to sport in international agreements between the EU and third countries. Such references can be found, for example, in international agreements with Armenia, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, Moldova and Ukraine (Source: <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>>). These are generally contractual commitments by both parties to promote and deepen cooperation in the field of sport and physical activity, for example, through the exchange of best information and practices and the promotion of the social and educational values of sport. Compliance with these provisions often refers to the use of existing frameworks for funding and cooperation in the field of sport. Examples can be found in the case of the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Program (TAIEX), including expert missions and study visits to share best practices with Georgia in 2016, 2018, and 2019 to assist in the development of a local sports strategy and action plan, or a 2020 expert mission to share European best practices in sports, cultural and artistic activities for people with disabilities with the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Egypt and similar initiatives at the transnational cooperation level with non-member countries such as Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Montenegro or Serbia (TAIEX Search, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020).

Cooperation in the field of sport is developing at the level of the EU and non-member states to deepen social, cultural, and political dialogue. Sport is undoubtedly an important means for the European Union to conduct a dialogue with non-member countries and cultures to strengthen ties and partnerships, targeting a broad audience.

Globally, the EU relies on the initiatives of non-governmental organizations (Oustinoff, Ruiz; 2022) and their willingness to cooperate with their European environment. However, the implementation and evaluation of EU-funded projects is bureaucratic and likely to discourage applicants, especially after an initial failure, and provides little incentive for applicants to re-submit projects. This situation can lead to the evolution of certain sports organizations towards a specialization for European projects and to the development of a self-censorship for others, which will perhaps continue their initiatives, in particular in cross-border areas, but in an autonomous way.



The Europe of sport exists in practices as well as in the media, and it is obviously interesting, politically, to consider enhancing this European convergence and to engage sports organizations in the construction of Europe through this “language of sport,” which can become actors of European public diplomacy, inside and outside the EU. A project that remains to be developed.

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# “UNITED IN DIVERSITY”? THE EUROPEANS AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS

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## ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic erupted in the wake of previous crises that have put European integration to the test. Faced with an unprecedented health crisis and the numerous challenges triggered by the pandemic, the members of the European Union demonstrated their ability to work together and provide effective common responses while also launching ambitious programs for the future. Without erasing national and societal differences, the EU managed to get together and to emerge united from the COVID-19 crisis.

*Keywords: health crisis, COVID-19, European integration, national differences*

The Covid-19 pandemic and the multiple crises it triggered gave rise to diverse arenas of information, communication, incommunication, and cohabitation at the European level, between member states, and within the countries.

In *Incommunications européennes*, Wolton reminds us that “to communicate means to negotiate”<sup>4</sup> and “to cohabit” (2017a, p. 4) and has pointed out the paradox that Europe, which had built its political project against the incommunication, finally reaches the incommunication (2017b, p. 247). European incommunications characterize the relationships between different levels and actors: between the West and the East, the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean, and the dynamics within the member states and their immediate neighborhood (Nowicki *et al.*, 2017, p. 20). How have these trends been affected by the pandemic?

### *Together against Covid-19...*

In March 2020, the Covid-19 outbreak hit the EU and the entire globe in an unprecedented way in a century. Hundreds of millions of European citizens have been affected together, and in the face of this ordeal, they have been able to stay together.

Experts were quick to point out that, compared to previous crises, the EU has demonstrated its increased adaptability and rapid decision-making capabilities in the face of Covid-19. “*The EU is confronted with a permanent state of emergency, and the capacity of the EU to deal with crises is now part of its normal mode of policymaking,*” Wolff and Ladi (2020, p. 1029) pointed out. This would be due to the learning acquired during and between recent crises and the new mechanisms put in place (Idem, p. 1031). This was also possible because of a spirit of cooperation: “*The Covid-19 pandemic made it clear early on that the virus has no borders and that cooperation between member states as well as the backing of European institutions proposals by key countries such as France and Germany were of a paramount importance for the EU’s adaptability*” (idem, p. 1037). They emphasize the discursive and endogenous nature of crises and the importance of framing them for the development of events and policies (idem). The significant discursive and policy shifts in the early months of the Covid-19 crisis with respect to state aid or economic governance seem to be a step towards a paradigmatic shift in the EU (idem, p. 1036).

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<sup>4</sup> All translations are suggested by the author.

Politicizations and depoliticizations of the health crisis have taken various forms at the level of EU elites or in member countries, but also within societies. The EU has experienced unity but also protest movements of anti-maskers, against anti-epidemic measures, against lockdowns and restrictions of freedom or vaccines.

State of emergency legislation, passed in a move of national unity as in the case of a “war”, concentrated decision-making inside the executive, but the national parliaments quickly adapted to a remote mode of operation. The Covid-19 crisis has been instrumentalized for political or electoral purposes, as in Poland and Bulgaria. It has been a catalyst for opposition and internal conflicts in various countries. In the East, governments have tried to use the crisis to tighten their grip on society and marginalize the opposition or to attack the rule of law. For Guasti, the Covid-19 crisis was a major test for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (2020, p. 57). As a counterweight, citizens’ protest outbursts gave strong signals in defense of democracy or against corruption, such as the Bulgarian protest summer of 2020.

Clearly, the European Union has emerged more robust and integrated into the face of Covid-19. After an initial period in which member states were tempted to close in on themselves, the gravity of the situation has encouraged them to cooperate. Greer, de Ruijter, and Brooks point out that the COVID-19 crisis is a “good” crisis for the EU:

*“The predictable, if demoralizing, phase of disorganization and national egotism lasted only about a month ( March-April). In May and June 2020, it created a substantial new first-face health policy agenda, reasserted its second-face market-preserving powers, and shifted its fiscal stance [...]. The COVID-19 crisis exposed European Union member states’ interdependence. It has, so far, also led to integration”* (2021, p. 761- 762).

The *EU4Health* program was designed to respond to the impact of Covid-19 on hospitals and medical staff: “it is the largest health program ever,” with a budget of five billion euros for the period 2021-2027 (European Commission, 2021a). Its objectives are to improve health and health systems, protect EU citizens from health threats, and improve medical devices.

The Emergency Aid Instrument was activated on April 14, 2020, to support member states in a strategic and coordinated way at the European level, acting on the principle of solidarity and pooling resources to mitigate the immediate

consequences of the pandemic (European Commission, 2021b), to order vaccines, etc. Another instrument aimed at supporting economic recovery within States is REACT-EU (European Commission, 2021c). During the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU adopted the *NextGenerationEU* recovery plan, “the largest ever funded recovery package in Europe,” aiming to invest €806.9 billion for a “greener, more digital and more resilient” Europe (European Commission, 2021d). The European Commission, with the support of member states, is launching in June 2020 a joint European approach to ordering and purchasing vaccines against Covid-19 (European Commission, 2021e), made possible by the *Advance Purchase Agreement*, which authorizes the European Commission to act on behalf of member States.

In the area of academic exchanges, the adaptation of the Erasmus+ program has been rapid with the expansion of the digital component, which has allowed for a leap forward with the development of digital tools such as the “E+ Dashboard” and *Erasmus without Papers*.

In her 2021 State of the Union address, “Strengthening the Soul of our Union,” Ursula von der Leyen emphasizes the unity of Europeans in the face of COVID-19, joint effort, and cooperation: “We have chosen to face up together” to access to vaccines, with the *NextGenerationEU* and with the *Green Pact for Europe* (European Commission, 2021f).

At the Conference on the Future of Europe in Strasbourg on May 9, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the “unique European model” based on “solidarity” and “humanism”:

*“If we have resisted this pandemic together, it is because for 71 years, we have built together what was not at all obvious. We have resisted first of all through our social protection model, through a Europe of solidarity, and it is the fruit of a model that is both productive and social, of a Europe of competitiveness, of production, of economic strength, but which has always thought about these solidarities from the beginning: regional and territorial solidarity, solidarity in our societies”* (Presidency of the French Republic, 2021).

On May 9, 2022, at the closing of the Conference on the Future of Europe. President Macron emphasized that the pandemic had shown the greatness of European democracy:

*“That the free, open science, that the democratic, transparent, deliberative processes demanding in our national parliaments and at the*

*European level, that a Europe inventing itself as a health power [...] – together we have built an unprecedented response to this pandemic – of science, democracy and efficiency. By succeeding in producing a vaccine on our own soil, by becoming the world’s first vaccine production area, [...] by always being the ones to leave the borders open and [...] by being the first power of vaccine solidarity. This is the Europe we should be proud of: a Europe of democracy, of open and free science and of efficiency” (Presidency of the French Republic, 2022).*

*... but a situation of incommunication.*

However, communication and cooperation were not always automatic or easy. The early days of the pandemic were marked by uncooperative management at the national level, and citizens expected their governments to play a leading role. At the forefront, for Brooks, de Ruijter, and Greer, was “*the failure to coordinate, or even to identify a shared agenda between member states, but also flamboyant exercises of national egotism. Border closures and bans on export of key medical supplies to other member states were moves that attacked the core principles of European integration and the value of solidarity meant to underpin the project*” (2021, p. 237). However, the result has not been the decomposition of the EU, but “the redefinition of public health in EU law” (idem, p. 238).

In early 2020, Italy, hard hit by COVID-19, became an epicenter of the pandemic. The EU was not up to the task of providing assistance in time. “I apologize, we are with you”, the President of the European Commission later wrote in a letter to the Italians (*France24*, 2020).

However, as highlighted by Lequesne and Beaumais (2020), the European solidarity has been present since the beginning of the pandemic, with the “European roadmap” of the European Commission from 26th of March 2020, defining recommendations to the member states such as sending of face masks from one country to another or receiving of patients from neighboring countries in difficulty and overloaded hospitals and healthcare system.

The “frugal” countries, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, initially opposed the 750-billion-euro recovery plan and the associated solidarity mechanisms in June 2020. The “frugal” countries had reservations about the countries of the South because of their lax budgetary policies and wanted to make the plan conditional on respect for the rule of law in countries like Poland and Hungary (*Euronews*, 2020).

The pandemic revealed deficiencies in health systems, a lack of preparedness, and the lack of equipment. Differences in the quality of health systems between the West and the East have been highlighted, although, in several countries, the lack of doctors, nurses, and hospital capacity has become a major problem.

Second, differences in the types of vaccines ordered appeared between Northern and Western Europe, which had primarily ordered RNA vaccines (Pfizer-Biontech and Moderna), while Southern and Eastern Europe had relied on viral vector vaccines (AstraZeneca and Janssen) (Barneaout, 2022).

In the spring of 2021, the governments of six Central and Eastern European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, and Latvia) accused the European Commission of failing to ensure an equitable distribution of Covid-19 vaccine doses among member states. The Commission then defended its approach, called on these governments to be responsible for ordering vaccines (*Reuters*, 2021), and called for European solidarity, again, with transfers of vaccine doses from West to East.

Thus, behind the overall picture of successful Covid-19 vaccinations in the EU, differences between the West and East are visible. In the EU and the European Economic Area, 85.9% of citizens over 18 years of age have been vaccinated with at least one dose of the Covid-19 vaccine, and 8.4% are fully vaccinated (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2022). But just 36% of adults in Bulgaria have received at least one dose of the Covid-19 vaccine, and 35.5% are fully vaccinated.

In terms of information and especially the multiple misinformation and conspiracy theories related to Covid-19, the European Commission committed itself early on to developing platforms to combat fake news: “the fight against misinformation, misinformation about the coronavirus saves lives” (European Commission, 2021f). On this point, too, it is essential to emphasize the greater importance of conspiracy theories in the East than in the West.

For Schmidt, Europe seems to be making a paradigmatic shift in terms of policy and process in the economic and health fields, but not in other areas. “*Such changes in different policy domains have also differentially affected European integration, with deepening integration in some areas, greater differentiation in others, and even reversal of integration possible in yet others*” (2020, p. 1178).

The Covid-19 pandemic thus revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the EU (Ash, 2021). The health crisis is one of those rare events threatening the lives of most of the population, such as World War II, or having a profound signifi-



cance of change like the protests of 1968 or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. “This shared threat should have pulled us together. But has it? And what will happen as the solidarity fades and long-term differential impacts become apparent? Will the EU ultimately emerge stronger or weaker?” (Ash, 2021). This will depend, for Ash, on how effectively the European Union responds to the problems and expectations of citizens. One of the great successes is the European budget and the Recovery Plan for Europe *NextGenerationEU*, a reinforced integration with a shared debt.

Europeans have been able to work together on containment, masks, multiple tests, movement restrictions and anti-epidemic measures, vaccination, the “European health pass,” and the “re-open Europe” system. The health crisis of Covid-19 has catalyzed and exposed the differences between the countries of the EU, but at the same time has advanced the EU and strengthened the European identity through democracy and many actions of solidarity and mutual aid between countries with the transfer of patients, or deliveries of medical and health equipment. The Covid-19 crisis has therefore brought not only the countries but also the European citizens closer together, preparing them for the crises to come...

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# INDIFFERENCE AS A CURABLE EVIL. TOWARDS A COMMON PATH FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN THE FACE OF MEDIA-TERRORISM

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## ABSTRACT

The article focuses on an issue that has remained in the shadows of the public debate on the war between Russia and Ukraine, i.e., the relationship between media narratives and the children and adolescents directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. Whether through direct on-the-ground experience or media exposure to unprecedented horror, children are the silent victims. The thesis is that with regard to minors, media practitioners at all levels should become aware of child protection regulations and their communication responsibilities, which necessarily implies the assimilation of the ethical dimensions as a daily practice. In this way, the media could fully exercise their mission as Social Action Societies, guided not only by profit but fully embedded within a true “moral economy”.

*Keywords: media narratives about war, children protection, media ethics, information overload, media Literacy*

*Introduction. Children and young people between real war and media terrorism*

*“Today, when the whole world is commemorating International Children’s Day, we must state with sadness that almost 700 Ukrainian children, according to official statistics alone, became victims of this war. They were either killed or wounded. But I don’t think anyone knows how many children are victims of Russian aggression today,”* is the statement of the Archbishop of Kyiv Sviatoslav Shevchuk in his video message of 1 June 2022 (Ukrainian Catholic Crisis Media Center, 2022).

His denunciation calls into question an issue that is still marginal in the public debate on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, or at least little explored by scholars, public opinion, and journalism: the protection of the most vulnerable groups, such as children and adolescents, whether involved directly or indirectly in the conflict.

On the one hand, minors are victims of war and instruments of war propaganda. On the other, they are overexposed to the conflict narrative and find themselves emotionally involved in an unprecedented horror show in which media narration protocols and child protection are too often forgotten.

Regarding the analysis of the complex situation of the war between Russia and Ukraine, both media narration and child protection fall squarely within the field of attention of this journal, which urges a more decisive commitment to a new communication policy aimed at the protection those segments of the population exposed to media narratives of all kinds that are more fragile for reasons of age, education, and social affiliations.

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Albert Bandura coined the expression “moral disengagement”, which refers to a characteristic of numerous actors in the contemporary public space, i.e., actors who tend to engage in behavior with negative consequences for personal advantage (often economic gain or individual “security”) without such behavior affecting their sense of self-esteem and self-respect (Bandura, 1999).

Bandura also identifies several dimensions through which the moral threshold tends to be lowered, permitting a more rapid acceptance of acts of violence: moral justification, euphemistic labelling (a mechanism based on the power of language that allows a reprehensible action to be masked by the attribution of positive characteristics so that the subject feels free of responsibility), advantageous comparison (comparing one’s own deplorable act with a worse one, to alter perception and judgement), shifting of blame, diffusion of responsibility

(e.g. “everyone does it”), distortion of consequences or non-consideration of consequences, dehumanization of the victim, attribution of guilt: these are the mechanisms of moral disengagement that can be observed in individual, collective, and even institutional conduct on a daily basis.

Such public behavior also be applied to a form of moral disengagement that public and private actors, politics and media institutions *in primis*, have displayed towards the issue of minors who are victims of the war in Ukraine and, although apparently less relevant, towards minors who find themselves projected into the often-unfiltered representations of war through the media, especially television and the web.

For children who are victims of actual war, those who lose their lives, and their families, experience the trauma of being a refugee at an early age, the actions available to us are, for the most part, those calling for solidarity, aid, shelter, and psychological support (Fazel & Stein, 2002).

More can be done in the second situation, i.e., when children and young people are overexposed to catastrophic media texts, strong and violent images, and the indiscriminate representation of children in difficult situations. Often, the media and their representatives rely on mechanisms (it is always someone else who must watch out for the overexposure of children and young people on TV) or advantageous comparisons (“others do worse”), thereby tending to justify commercial strategies that are incompatible with the needs of children and young people. Consequently, it becomes important to take appropriate measures to counter such deep-seated evil that can instill itself in the most fragile minds and even spill over into our political and social bodies.

Certain production routines are often imposed to the detriment of the sensitivities and rights of the most fragile, primarily minors, neglecting the impact that these experiences can have on the outcomes of socialization processes and the development of the personality of children, tomorrow’s adults.

Indeed, still reeling from the traumatic impact of Covid 19, young people, particularly children, have suddenly found themselves catapulted into a new and even more violent reality far beyond any rational comprehension: war. War is certainly not a normal situation for those involved: neither for those who experience it directly nor for those who follow it through screens of all kinds, let alone those who narrate it.

*Overcoming fear. Assessing child protection in digital media*

Nothing more than poorly managed fear can have devastating effects on human beings' biological and social nature. Fear destroys the fragile platform of mutual trust, challenges the role of institutions, and allows the affliction of insecurity to insinuate itself into people's hearts and limit their desire to project into the future. This problem was even more relevant during the Covid-19 pandemic, which began with the first lockdown in 2020 and has now been extended and amplified with the new threat of the neighboring war in Ukraine, which is increasingly affecting the most vulnerable groups of children and young people.

Fully aware of the difficulties that media operators are facing in guaranteeing the fundamental right to information in a challenging and even precarious operating context, it seems appropriate to introduce a reflection involving all the components of civil society and, in particular, the media in all its forms, regardless of the broadcasting platforms, to balance information with humanity, avoiding broadcasting excessively spectacularized and bloody narratives and respecting children's rights when they might be present in front of the screens.

To combat such phenomena, we have regulatory tools at our disposal, such as deontological charters for journalists and self-regulation or co-regulation codes for media operators<sup>5</sup>, which the European regulations on Audiovisual Media Services of recent communication seasons also refer to (European Parliament, 2018). In Italy, these regulatory instruments are upstream of the TV and Minors Code, a document on the basis of which the Media and Minors Committee operates at the Ministry of Economic Development (MiSE). The need to guarantee a media environment unpolluted by an increasingly compulsive, polarised, and conflictual communication has also been taken up by all the Italian and international regulations on the subject, starting from the Constitutional Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to arrive at the recent *Testo Unico per la fornitura di servizi di media audiovisivi*

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<sup>5</sup> In Italy, the reference is the Carta di Treviso, approved in 1990 by the Ordine dei giornalisti and Fnsi – in agreement with Telefono Azzurro and Authorities and Institutions of the City of Treviso - sets the deontological rules concerning minors. This document, already revised in 2006, in the light of the changes that occurred in the media world, was amended and updated by the Ordine dei giornalisti e Fnsi in the current version approved on 6 July 2021. The Charter draws its inspiration from the principles and values of the Constitution, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Adolescent, implemented in Italy by Law no. 176/1991, international and European regulations and the law establishing the Order of Journalists (no. 69/1963) by extension of Article 2. In addition to these documents is the self-regulation code "Tv e Minori" (2002), which is the basis for the functioning of the Comitato Media e Minori.

(Legislative Decree no. 208 of 8 November, 2021) which represents the transposition of EU Directive 2018/1808) and in force since December 2021.

In view of the entry into force of the new Consolidated Text, the Media and Minors Committee saw the urgency of proceeding with the updating of the *TV and Minors Self-Regulation Code* in light of the technological, social and communication changes and the strong urgency of the emergencies of recent years. This process reaffirms the importance of the synergy between the Media System and all the other institutions involved in guaranteeing the harmonious growth and development of minors as well as awareness of media education and the configuration of a cultural awareness-raising and training project on the relevant issues in this field and on the main changes taking place. This Code is an important cultural tool to counteract war and the fears in children's eyes. For example, the *Garante per la Protezione dei dati personali/ Guarantor for the Protection of Personal Data* and the *Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni/ Italian Communications Regulatory Authority* intervened, calling on the media to provide more responsible and respectful information to children and young people.

*“No more desperate children's faces on television, in newspapers, and on social networks. Let's at least avoid taking the youngest ones to war a second time, in the digital dimension”* (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 2022). According to the opinion of this protective body, any personal data concerning children, including images, should only enter the media system if it is indispensable or when its publication is in the child's best interest. There is a concrete risk that the images and data, in the digital dimension of the algorithms, will haunt those children forever insofar as they may be exposed to discriminatory consequences of a social, cultural, religious, and political nature, as well as even, in the present day, unforeseeable consequences.

From its perspective, the *Autorità per le Garanzie nella Comunicazione (AGCOM)* invites communication operators, in full respect of editorial autonomy and Article 21 of the Italian Constitution (which guarantees freedom of information), to pay attention to the use of war images, “in order to avoid turning them into an unnecessary spectacle” (AGCOM, 7 March 2022).

In this sense, all broadcasters must carry out the activity of television information, a service of general interest also referred to in Article 4 of the European directive on audiovisual media (European Parliament, 2018). Broadcasters are required to guarantee adequate information on current events in order to con-



tribute to the formation of an informed public opinion, conforming to criteria of impartiality, fairness, completeness, correctness and plurality of points of view.

To make the reflection more complete, it was decided to use the results of the national research project (Progetto di rilevante interesse nazionale – PRIN) “Media e Terrorismi. L’impatto della Comunicazione e delle reti digitali sull’insicurezza percepita”<sup>6</sup>. The project relied on analyzing the content of media narratives dealing with terrorist attacks in recent years (2015-2020), focus groups with pre-adolescents and adolescents, and in-depth interviews with media operators and police force representatives. Ideas and proposals were developed that went far beyond the issues posed by international terrorism, aiming to interpret and counter distortions in media narratives and to orient security, media, and public space operators in other complex contexts, such as migration, crime and more recently, pandemics and war, which have upset geopolitical balances, precarious security and information production routines (Gavrila & Morcellini, 2022).

This part of the research, devoted to children and adolescents exposed to violent television texts carrying traumatic messages, leads to some conclusions that we can also make about what happened during the period of the war in Ukraine. The first and most vigorous response from the minors interviewed highlighted that it was not terrorism but television and its catastrophic messages that generated the most fear. However, these narrative modes are not new and are, to a certain extent, part of what scholars have called ‘the Italian anomaly’ (De Domenico, Gavrila & Preta, 2003; Morcellini, 2005), characterized among others by an excess of particularization of pain, and even the invention “the TV of pain” genre, which turns individual and collective trauma into a strategy of audience engagement (Morcellini, 2013).

Therefore, one can also take against the “black” narrative as valid in relation to the unfiltered and ongoing war narrative<sup>7</sup>. In the light of the symbolic violence unleashed by the strategies of terror intrinsic to war, the collective trauma that ensues (Alexander, 2012), the capacity of global traumatic events to amplify

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<sup>6</sup> The research project “Media e Terrorismi. L’impatto della Comunicazione e delle reti digitali sull’insicurezza percepita”, started in 2015 and was directed by Mihaela Gavrila together with Mario Morcellini, with the involvement of academic scholars from six Italian universities.

<sup>7</sup> For several weeks, starting on 27 February 2022, with the beginning of the War in Ukraine, the Italian mainstream television networks devoted more than 50 per cent of their news broadcasting time (news, talk shows, infotainment programs) to the topic. This choice has been strongly criticized by public opinion, also in the light of the excessive particularization of the topic and the treatment of the topic not only as a duty to inform.

the sentiment of fear through the use of the media and the almost “pedagogical” action of transforming the attitudes and behavior of the public subjected to the media bombardment (Gerbner & Signorielli, 1988; Boltanski, 1999), it is necessary to imagine a *communicative counter-performance* to oppose the “war performance”: a counter-narrative that balances information with humanity and that places sensitivity towards all those involved at the center.

Ultimately, insecurity is an evil that can be defeated as long as social and cultural capital that enables people to interpret and manage emotions, fears, and everything that fuels hostile feelings and visions of a threatening future is restored (Benasayag & Schmit, 2003). The way to reconcile the shock generated by media terrorism and war with the maintenance of social equilibrium is based on symbolic resources and communication that favors a narrative capable of becoming an explanation or at least a contextualization of social facts; a pro-social communication that can become a form of accompaniment to change, reducing stress and complexity.

#### *Alliances against moral disengagement*

Hyper-communication is no guarantee of the quality of communication (Wolton, 2016: 13-22); on the contrary, it cultivates a greater sense of inadequacy and affects our connection with others: sicker, lonelier, more fearful, more secure in our insecurities and, therefore, more unhappy, as the categories underlying the various world reports on happiness also show (Helliwell, Layard, Sachs & De Neve, 2021).

In this context, focus on the universe of audiovisual media must be even more accentuated since these are contents, often multiplatform, that are primarily part of the communicative diet of weaker subjects such as minors. The shared commitment should go in the direction of a decisive strategy to consider audiovisual media as a safe space of “cohabitation” between values, generations, and sensitivities, favorable to the development of children and young people but also the rebirth of society as a whole (Colombo, 2000; Gavrila, 2021). Going in this direction is the aforementioned European legislation of 2018, which broadens the spectrum from linear audiovisual media to web offerings. It has now been adopted at the level of the member states and provides, in addition to the protection of vulnerable groups, the protection of national and international security and the fight against all forms of terrorism, violence, and hatred (Gavrila, 2021).

Hyper-communication is no guarantee for quality communication (Wolton, 2016: 13-22); on the contrary, it cultivates a greater sense of inadequacy and places us in a state of deficit of real connection with others: sicker, lonelier, more fearful, more secure in our insecurities and, therefore, more unhappy, as the categories underlying the various world reports on happiness also show (Helliwell, Layard, Sachs & De Neve, 2021). Becoming aware of the responsibilities of communication implies the assimilation of the ethical dimension as a daily practice by media practitioners at all levels.

In this way, the media could fully exercise their mission as social joint-stock companies, guided not only by the logic of profit but fully embedded within an authentic 'moral economy' (Sayer 1999: 68; Murdock 2011; Hesmondhalgh 2015).

In times of information overload, misinformation and disorientation generated by the stratification of uncertainties and fears, the proposals offered above go in the direction of a renewed willingness to bet on the prospects of an economy of knowledge and good communication to block the bulimia of insecurity, which pours into homes every day, through screens of all kinds, cultivating media-terrorism, flowers of evil, harmful behavior and with repercussions on the physical and mental health of children, adolescents and society as a whole. These choices put the most fragile people at the center, whether culturally or by age.

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# THE MEDIA WAR: STRATEGIES AND ESCALATIONS

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## ABSTRACT

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, caused a real planetary shock, not only on the battlefields but also in terms of the multiplication of the components of a hybrid war. Information and disinformation go hand in hand on both sides, with significant conflicting approaches that illustrate two different worldviews.

*Keywords: media, war, Ukraine, Russia, strategy, symbol*

The war in Ukraine, triggered by Russia's invasion of a sovereign country, challenges us in many ways. There is the battle - horrible, devastating, inhuman - that continues its deadly course on the ground, and there is also the other battle - no less dangerous but much more perfidious and difficult to manage - that unfolds through the media and social networks. Asymmetrical battles at all levels: military, diplomatic, economic, media, and psychological.

But the main problem does not come from the battlefield, or at least not only. Rather, it comes from human nature and, more precisely, from the organization of our brain, which, over time, for reasons of survival at first, has learned to judge and evaluate in a dualistic way. In other words, although no one doubts that life, the world, or the human mind have countless shades and colors, our fundamental impulse is to analyze in black and white, to sort out the immensity of the stimuli that assail us every second, to classify, to simplify, to take shortcuts and... to get used to everything, even to the worst. The double danger lies here in this propensity to embrace a cause, a unique and monovalent vision, to the detriment of any criterion of objectivity, and in what, for some time now, following in the footsteps of Hannah Arendt, we have called the banality of evil.

Thus, today, the largest part of the democratic world, caricaturally speaking, abhors the Russians and adores the Ukrainians. Or rather, it hates and fears the Putin regime and is under the spell of the surprising President Zelensky. Because it seems that, especially in times of war, one is not allowed to soften radical statements at the risk of being bluntly dismissed as a supporter of one side or the other. Obviously, the puppeteers who articulate, stage, and filter any political message have long understood how the human mind works, and they juggle the brake and gas pedals of our emotions. Communication thus becomes an informational weapon just as powerful as the HIMARS rocket launchers.

In the aftermath of the pandemic, from which it has issued with a lot of sores, humanity has been brutally confronted with another provocation, equally disturbing, although indirect and intermediated, backed by the inconceivable nuclear threat. The problem is that perceptions of information differ according to our upbringing, past experiences, values, and beliefs at both individual and community levels. Differences can be deleterious or at least disconcerting when national identities are challenged. Sometimes, this generates insurmountable differences in the interpretations of the same situation, assuming that one has, through the various media, an accurate picture of the facts. And the questions that already plagued the ancient world come back to haunt us: Who decides where the borderline between good and evil

lies? The elected? The masses? The shadowy leaders we ignore? Can we be certain that these people hold the absolute truth? And what is absolute truth, after all?

Faced with a situation as serious and complex as the war in Ukraine, our reptilian brain asks us to take a position for or against, to scan the situation, to evaluate it, and to issue a negative or positive judgment. In this sense, contemporary military conflicts represent a particularly rich laboratory of communication and media experiments. From the Romanian Revolution, which was watched live on television, to the various Orange, Green, and Spring revolutions, or to the wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, the media have progressively taken center stage, relaying information and facts according to the political orientation and interests of their financial backers. But the role and impact of visual and emotional communication in information and disinformation have never been so obvious, so important as in the 2022 war in Ukraine.

We are not interested here in the media battle that is supposed to circumvent the power in place in an authoritarian country like Russia, but precisely in the elaboration and the elements that make up the official arguments of the two sides. The war of images and narrative discourses engaged by the Russians and Ukrainians has been unfolding roughly in parallel with physical aggression. And the vocabulary of both sides established its landmarks from the outset, both for fellow countrymen and foreign addressees. On the Russian side, there is a “special military operation” – a formula from which no one can escape since the word “war” is forbidden, and the persons who use it risk being sentenced to prison. What follows it is also standardized: Russia has only responded to the so-called request for help from the “republics” of Lugansk and Donbass, where Russian speakers are “persecuted” by the “Nazis” and “drug addicts” of the “depraved” regime in Kiev. In the other camp, they immediately spoke of “invasion,” “war,” and “occupiers.”

From then on, progressively and in parallel with the advance on the ground, we have witnessed how narratives have become more complex and adjusted, depending on the bias adopted and the intended recipients, as well as on military realities on the ground and echoes in international circles. This flexibility and discursive suppleness are probably a contemporary achievement, a direct consequence of the explosion of instantaneous networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, in a world that has increasingly less patience for long unfolding and in-depth explanations. Brief, punchy, gripping: this is how news hits home and can influence the masses. This conflict has been dubbed the “TikTok War”, or more succinctly, the “WarTok”.



From day one, the communication strategies of the two presidents and the two media structures that relay their messages have been clearly divergent with, however, some points of convergence. The West, bathed in its democratic reveries and diplomatic minuets, did not see it coming. Yet this war started in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea; it happened so suddenly that it took everyone by surprise and did not cause any real international reactions. True, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution denouncing the attachment of the peninsula to Russia, and the United States, the European Union, and other countries decried the violation of international law. Yet, in fact, the free world was just beginning to discover this great country that was thought to be orbiting the Russian Federation and that the Euromaidan revolution and the flight of former President Yanukovich had revealed as modern, fearless, and pro-democracy. It was already knocking on the doors of the EU and NATO, but its geopolitical position was too complicated and dangerous for any prospect of integration in the near future. In any case, the EU is militarily impotent, NATO was not directly concerned, and the United States did not want to stir Moscow's nuclear bear. Moreover, despite a liberal-focused economy, a strong and vocal civil society, and a bloc of Western-oriented NGOs and media organizations (generously funded by Western donors), Ukraine was – and still is – quite dependent on the same oligarchic system that is rampant in Russia. Basically, Euromaidan, like the Arab Spring, was not about political and social rupture or structural change but rather about replacing the ruling elites with more Western-oriented and modern ones, but on the same basis of heavy paternalism and clientelism inherited from the former USSR. As the Ukrainian state weakened after the annexation of Crimea, two other determining factors entered the increasingly tangled game in the region: European and American military, logistical and political aid, and the strengthening of far-right groups such as Svoboda and Azov, whose ideology is a radical interpretation of Ukrainian nationalism.

If one can legitimately say that there would have been no Euromaidan (or other contemporary revolts) without the media, which first created what Jürgen Habermas termed a public space, and then a public sphere for the ideas and demands of the revolutionaries, broadcast worldwide, one could also argue that the war in Ukraine would not have taken this decisive turn and would not have led to this unparalleled international mobilization in favor of Ukraine and to the detriment of the Russian aggressor without the unprecedented, bold, innovative communication strategies established with lightning speed by President Zelensky's astute image advisors, probably American, or in any case, initiated by them, judging by their style.

International spectators - because thanks to the media and social networks, the planet has become a huge theater - were confronted with two diametrically opposed approaches, corresponding to the profiles of the two presidents and the two nations (despite their common history and undeniable linguistic kinship). The shock was astonishing from the first moment; it was visible, almost palpable. Modernity and prehistory. Fire and ice. Harry Potter and Jurassic Park. A concentrated, persuasive, warm speech facing a tense, cold, implacable message. Don Quixote and the statue of the Commander.

On the one hand, Volodimir Zelensky, a young president-player, in the true sense of the word, a former stand-up comedy actor, was largely unknown before the war in Ukraine began. From then on, however, he was practically the only figure seen in the media. Very quickly, with his entourage, he developed a multi-faceted communication model, with great flexibility in the construction of the message and with striking changes in tone and accent, depending on the recipient. This is one of the main differences that set him apart from Putin: the modulation and adequacy of his narrative content, the alternation of types of discourses, going from injunctions, veiled criticisms or even reprimands addressed to the Western partners – who are often too slow or indecisive –, to the already famous brief and focused daily midnight speeches, intended to reassure or warn the population, to keep up the morale of the troops and to throw jabs at the invaders, to speeches full of respect, gratitude and compassion when he visits the soldiers on the battlefield or in the hospitals, or when he speaks to the bereaved families. And let us not forget the targeted irruptions, equally pragmatic and emotional, in the assemblies and parliaments of the countries that speak mostly for Ukraine, while the appearance of Russian officials in international meetings emptied the rooms. It is also true that Zelensky's acting skills have something to do with it, but beyond a certain facility to draw attention to himself, one feels the authentic man, committed, suffering, and hoping just like his people. Always dressed in combat gear, his face drawn, his voice often hoarse from talking all day long, the Ukrainian president has proven to be, to the equal consternation of the West and Russia, the man of the moment, determined, brave, empathetic, able to convince the most experienced diplomats as well as the simplest people, and above all a communicational genius, handling with an innate and/or acquired prescience the best strategies of persuasion and seduction, embodying the hero who, against his will, guards the doors of European values and freedom. An Ashkenazi Jew by origin, Zelensky skillfully uses this other string of his bow, which allows him to credibly counter the Putin regime's accusations of Nazism and also to win the support of Israel and the powerful Jewish diaspora.

That said, we sometimes feel – and this does not detract us from the sincerity of his remarks – a certain air of American showbiz, which is not always to everyone’s taste. This is particularly the case with the worldwide distribution of the television series “The Servant of the People”, in which Zelensky starred when he was an actor and a comedian, and which he also created and produced. The reception of the series was polarized: its admirers saw it as a premonition (the character played by Zelensky, a young history teacher, climbs the political ladder up to the supreme function in the state), while his detractors and the Russian propaganda used it to denounce the lack of seriousness and the political inexperience of a man whom nothing had prepared to meet the great challenges of history.

This type of communication strategy is indeed a double-edged sword: on the one hand, many are those who appreciate an American-style self-made man story, yet on the other hand, the broader contextualization that followed the broadcast of the series aroused the curiosity of the public and revealed more troubling aspects in the recent past of the star-president. He is not just an actor, he is also a successful entrepreneur, a millionaire (in dollars), the owner of a magnificent villa in Tuscany, among others, and a close friend of certain Russian oligarchs (such as Igor Kolo-moïski).

However, with the help of his advisers, he has been working on putting forward the image of a simple, friendly man, who speaks in a relaxed, familiar way, and who, at the same time, has strength, energy, and the power to instill in his fellow citizens the desire and ability to uphold their position until the end. It is also for the international public sphere that he recently appeared in a photo shoot, with his wife Olena, in the famous fashion magazine “Vogue.” The shoot was made by the legendary photographer Annie Leibovitz. In this case, Zelensky’s communication advisers may have been less inspired than usual. The result, aesthetically flawless, engendered perplexity as to the moral appropriateness of this Hollywood staging, with amorous and nostalgic airs against a backdrop of war, a glamour deemed inappropriate at a time when Ukraine is going through the most profound crisis in its history, and the whole world is suffering the fallout. The recourse to this kind of publicity at this precise moment could be explained by the necessity to reach the international community, which is fond of small juicy details concerning prominent personalities rather than complicated technical and military explanations so that we do not forget the Ukrainian tragedy.

As we are getting used to the unbearable, we tend to drive it out of our thoughts. It is for the same reason that, apart from powerful politicians, Zelensky also invites world-famous actors and musicians (a strategy that the Russians also try to imitate,

without too much success, with the notable exception of Steven Seagal). He thus tries to arouse a surplus of sympathy and attention for the human dimension of this war, even though, in order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to go through an exercise of a certain frivolity.

It is too early now to state whether this communication device has had more positive than negative consequences on the general way of relating to the war. What is certain is that the “Vogue” photoshoot made waves. Here again, we are talking about polarization. But, upon reflection, in the second degree, the contradictory reactions, the collective frenzy of whatever type, fan the flames and perpetuate the interest.

On the other hand, there is the imperturbable President Putin, wax-faced, rigid, reassuring for his own people, ironic, snappy and threatening towards the Ukrainians, the Americans, and the Europeans, a sort of icy mutant, without the shadow of a smile or a benevolent intonation, always perfectly dressed, in an overwhelming setting of splendor, and as if detached from the vicissitudes of this sick planet. Putin is untouchable; he has built an aura of a god descended from the skies to restore the image of a vanished empire and to give the Russian people the glory and the place it deserves. The persuasive capacity of his discourse owes nothing, or very little, to its content. On the contrary, its arbitrary character, swaggering to the point of bordering on the absurd, seduces and fascinates the masses just like the gaze of a snake. His communication with his fellow citizens is most often rough but extremely efficient: Russia is proud and powerful, has weapons and technology far superior to those of its enemies, its natural resources protect it from any international sanction, and the Russian people are unique, invincible, talented, the creator of a civilization that the whole world envies! And this strategy works wonderfully. We have seen TV reports from the streets of major Russian cities and we have listened, in amazement, to young and educated people who are active on social networks, who have access to information unfiltered by the factories of trolls, rallying without a blink to Putin’s politics, and who even add to it, in terms of cynicism. Admittedly, we know that many brave intellectuals, scholars, and journalists wrote open letters to protest against the murderous uselessness of this war. Still, most opponents to the regime left Russia or ended up in jail.

If Zelensky and those close to him bet on relational simplicity – playing on the figure of a leader who has known how to stay close to his people, a normal, natural man, attached to his family, worried but strong, sharing the life and the concerns of his compatriots, Putin and those close to him (a relatively false term, as the chronic distrust and the shadowy character of the Russian President, make him a great lon-

er, like any dictator, basically) favor another communication formula, better suited to the psychology of the Russian people – sentimental, melancholic and slightly whimsical, a great consumer of fairy tales and legends. However, Putin understood very well that, in order to secure the vote of a large majority of the population, he had to preserve his halo of intangibility, of an extraordinary man-God, who gallops and hunts on wild bears, bathes in the icy waters of Siberia, practices all sorts of sports and boasts a black belt in judo. In short, a sort of superman, disciplined and strict, who watches over the destiny of his great nation and does not bother with trifles about his private life. It is through the mystery that his legend survives.

What are the primary objectives pursued by the communication strategies of the two countries? The Ukrainians, through Zelensky, seek recognition of their belonging to 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe, highlighting their adherence to the values, conceptions, and ways of life of the free world. The Russians, through Putin, claim a timeless civilizational and military superiority, a unique place and role among the world's nations. A wish to integrate into the larger structures, on the one hand, a cult of self-sufficient uniqueness on the other. This distinction is also highlighted by non-verbal signs. The Ukrainian President welcomes his foreign guests with ease, in his trademark green T-shirt, at the Mariinsky Palace, or in the streets of Kyiv, or even among the ruins of the bombed cities; he kisses them, stands close to them and speaks to them in a familiar manner. On the other hand, Putin is filmed crossing the huge golden rooms of the Kremlin, or welcoming his guests around tables of varying dimensions, ranging from large to enormous, with all the symbolic subtext of this assertion of discretionary authority and with the message implicitly transmitted to his interlocutors, whether they are heads of state or subordinates.

It is interesting to note that the second ring of power reproduces the model of the leader. We have discovered, from February 24, 2022, onwards, not only a casual, endearing President who spoke quickly and well, at ease with all the powerful figures of this world but also a government made up of dynamic young people, professionals, and fighters, like their leader. Among them, one could particularly notice the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, aged 39, a diplomat and specialist in communications, sober and efficient, speaking in elegant and precise English, knowing very well the backstage of the Kremlin and the political games of the leaders of this world, knowing how to modulate his public speeches, pressing the accelerator pedal if necessary (we have seen him sermonize, alongside his leader or by himself, the representatives of the great powers and international organizations who skimp a little on the harsh sanctions against Russia or on the financial and military aid provided to Ukraine). And, above all, we saw him standing up to

and fighting on an equal footing with the ternal, irremovable Russian Foreign Minister, the extremely cunning and yet petrified, stereotypical Sergei Lavrov, aged 72. The differences in approach, strategy, and means of persuasion are obvious. The accusations of Nazism, the nuclear threat, and the other enormities uttered by Putin's old spokesman no longer seem to convince anyone, not even himself, while the young Kuleba has no difficulty in making his country's demands heard, making judicious use of illustrations and factual data.

Actually, two divergent symbolic imaginaries nourish the two types of discourse and the two communication strategies we are discussing here. The past confronts the present and the future. For Putin and his cronies (especially his staunch and passionate media supporter, Vladimir Soloviev), History stopped at the time of Peter the Great and of Catherine the Great, with a few dives into modern and contemporary history to detach from their context the Russian victories over the European armies. Putin himself published last July, on the Kremlin website, a text titled "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians," rewriting and reinterpreting historical facts to justify the invasion of Ukraine. It is however true that the situation is complex and that it would be unfair to perform a radical and clear cut, separating things, and putting the good guys on the one side and the bad guys on the other. This is, however, too long and tortuous a discussion to undertake in this article. It is clear, nevertheless, that Putin goes back in time to where it suits him, in order to unearth the arguments that he needs to legitimize his current actions and aims.

As for Zelensky, he contents himself with emphasizing the present and the future of a country which, paradoxically and completely against the intentions of the Kremlin, has acquired, or at least has become aware of its distinct identity under the bombardment of the Russian missiles, in the midst of the humanitarian disaster generated by the war. The Ukrainians, and especially a good part of the Russian speakers, who hesitated before, now know what they want and especially what they do not want. They want to be part of the great European and global constructions based on freedom and democracy, they do not want to live gagged, hands and feet tied in the name of a chimera and an ambition they do not share.

But our certainties and convictions should not make us turn a blind eye to the various manipulations and fake information produced and relayed by social networks or traditional media. Critical thinking, lucidity, moderation of judgements are the only safeguards that can guide us in grasping a reality that increasingly escapes us.

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## POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND DISINFORMATION

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### ABSTRACT

Disinformation and conspiracy theories systematically threaten our European democracy. After the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian war against Ukraine has shown us even more that we have a big problem with harmful propaganda directed by an undemocratic Putin's regime. This problem prevents citizens from making informed decisions and undermines our foreign policy orientation, as well as the values of our society. And although the war in Ukraine has changed a lot in this regard, a significant part of EU citizens is still prone to easily succumb to massive disinformation campaigns. The aim of this text is to present the important steps of the institutions of the European Union, as well as the Government of the Slovak Republic and other official European or state authorities, which are trying to reverse this negative trend and gradually expand the capacity to combat hybrid threats.

*Keywords: disinformation, democracy, social media, hybrid war*



There is no doubt that the deliberate use of disinformation, conspiracy theories, hoaxes, and other manipulative content on the internet represent a grave long-term threat for our democratic institutions and societies. The reason is simple. Disinformation manipulates open democratic debate, thus preventing citizens to make informed decisions. Foreign actors can exploit the inherent openness of our democracies to pursue their goals by manipulating public opinion, undermining the trust of our citizens towards our institutions democratic system itself and they can also influence the outcomes of elections, as we saw in the recent past.

Since 2014, Slovakia has been a frequent target of (mainly Russian) hostile information operations which mostly focused on undermining our geopolitical orientation, especially our membership in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU), which we consider as basic pillars of our foreign and security policy. But it's not just about Slovakia. Other European Union countries have a very similar experiences, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, but also Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is no coincidence that these are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., the States of the former Soviet bloc.

In the context of the continuing Russian aggression against Ukraine, we see even growing assertiveness of disinformation campaigns. Slovakia, as Ukraine's neighboring country, has been subject to these hostile campaigns. The strategic goal of these campaigns is to justify Russian aggression and spread the Russian narrative on the Nazi regime in Kyiv, undermine the support of citizens for military aid offered to Ukraine by the Slovak government, undermine public support for EU sanctions, especially for gas and oil embargo, undermine the will of Slovaks to help refugees from Ukraine. These campaigns try to spread distrust and doubt, inciting instability and not least, weakening support for government's policies at national and European levels. This is done by exploiting pre-existing grievances and polarization of our society. Sadly, I have to say that such attempts have been quite successful.

A significant part of Slovak society has long been very vulnerable to disinformation campaigns and propaganda, which is confirmed by several opinion polls or studies. When it comes to believing in conspiracy, Slovak citizens are most likely to believe them, compared to other Central and Eastern European countries. On average, 56 percent of Slovak respondents tend to believe a statement that involves conspiracy or deception. This is followed by Bulgarians (48 percent), Romanians (39 percent), Hungarians (35 percent) and Poles (34 percent). Lithuania was the best in this survey question (17 percent).

This emerges from a survey conducted by GLOBSEC Policy Institute (GLOBSEC,

2020), a policy-oriented think-tank analyzing foreign policy and international environment based in Bratislava, as part of the study *Voices of Central and Eastern Europe: Perceptions of Democracy & Governance* realized in ten countries. According to other findings of the Slovak think-tank from last year, published in the yearbook *GLOBSEC Trends 2021* (GLOBSEC, 2021), up to 55 percent of people perceive Russian President Vladimir Putin positively. And for 47 percent of respondents, Russia is the most important partner for Slovakia. And another example Slovaks (40 percent) identify less than Czechs (52 percent) with the fact that we are part of the information war led by the Russian Federation. This follows from a survey by the Ipsos agency carried out in cooperation with the Central European Digital Media Observatory (IPSOS, 2022).

However, since the outbreak of war in Ukraine at the end of February 2022, the results of several public opinion polls have also been published, which mirror the citizens of Slovakia in a slightly better light. GLOBSEC followed up on previous work and pointed out that Putin's support in our society had dropped significantly. While in March 2021 it was positively perceived by 55 percent of the population of Slovakia, in March 2022 it was only 28 percent (Kern, 2022). This follows from a telephone survey conducted by Focus agency.

In addition, according to the same survey, the perception of Russia as an aggressor has increased. In contrast, NATO's popularity as a guarantor of our security and territorial integrity (62 percent) has increased even more. What can these shifts in the citizens' opinions of Slovak society evoke in us?

Slowly, we seem to be opening our eyes, and we are beginning to realize who our real allies and trusted partners are. But we are not yet cured of a disease called "Kremlin propaganda." This was also shown by recent findings by experts that more than a fifth of Slovaks and Slovaks trust pro-Kremlin propaganda and reports justifying the involvement of Russian troops in Ukraine (Gáliková, 2022).

In this context, the Government of the Slovak Republic, as well as the leading state authorities and relevant institutions, are fully aware of the urgent need to proactively counter foreign influence and protect democratic processes from external interference.

We have adopted several important documents and taken steps that help us to deal more effectively with the spread of disinformation. The new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, which we adopted in 2021, brings specific measures aimed at increasing our resilience to hybrid activities. The Government has already approved an Action Plan for the Coordination of Counting Hybrid Threats which

strengthens capacities and improves coordination in this area. This Plan includes a number of measures, including boosting coordinated strategic communication at the government level, allowing to move from crisis communication to preventive strategic communication, strengthening inter-institutional coordination regarding detection, analysis, and response to the hybrid threats, implementing risk assessment screening mechanism of the FDI', intensifying hybrid threats and disinformation trainings and awareness raising campaigns for government, public administration and security sector employees, implementing media literacy, critical thinking, and digital skills in education curricula, strengthening institutional cooperation with civil society, media, academia and private sector in the field of combating disinformation and enhancing societal resilience – whole-of-the-society approach – it affects all and requires comprehensive approach (Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, 2022). The existing capacities are also further strengthened not only by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, but also by the Slovak Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic itself.

Next, when speaking about tackling disinformation, we must also stress the importance of critical thinking, media literacy, and free and critical media. This is the true whole-of-society approach and the best way to make our societies more resilient.

Since social networks, in the case of Slovakia, especially the most used Facebook, play a key role in disseminating disinformation, we need to support all current initiatives of the EU authorities to strengthen the responsibility and obligations of large digital platforms in the fight against harmful conduct online.

As a current example, I see the EU Digital Services Act (DSA), which aims to ensure stricter regulation of online platforms and faster removal of illegal content from internet platforms, including hate speech, harmful disinformation, or war propaganda.

We also support ongoing work on the new EU toolboxes to counter hybrid threats as well as to counter foreign information manipulation and interference in order to strengthen the EU's posture and deter external interference into democratic processes. We believe that these toolboxes should bring about existing as well as new instruments, allowing us to impose costs to perpetrators, including the possibility of joint public attribution by the EU.

We must finally take this negative phenomenon seriously. So far, we see only minimal, if any, interest from private owners of these digital platforms in solving

this serious problem. But I still believe that we do not have to reject social networks immediately, but they need to be cured together.

Let us not allow disinformation to become a cancer of decent and honest communication between citizens in the countries of the EU. Hatred, aggression, lies, and conspiracies must not prevail over friendly debate, truthful news, or useful information. I remain convinced that social networks can also help, bring people together, connect them and, if necessary, provide reliable information or warnings. After all, this was also one of the ideas with which these internet platforms were created. Business interest cannot stand above social responsibility, morality, and truth.

And therefore, it should be true that what is illegal offline, in real life, must also be illegal online.

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## SECTION II



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*LINGUISTICS & LITERATURE*

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LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF HATE SPEECH ON  
SOCIAL MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

This article aims at defining the essence of “Hate Speech” and studying it as a source of neologisms and metaphors depicted on social media. Concerns about the relationship between inflammatory hate speech and violent acts have grown as a result of the rising number of attacks against people of different national, ethnic and religious affiliations, cultures, orientations and beliefs.

The fact that the language of social media is characterized by tendencies to disguise the truth, reveal half-truths and ambiguous expressions and influence public opinion makes us realize that people especially public figures spare no effort to find effective terminology or phraseology in order to cast a shadow, ridicule or humiliate the opposing side through linguistic means.

Therefore, the analysis of such linguistic peculiarities of social media gain a great importance in order to avoid the use of irrelevant terminology aiming at insulting and humiliating people.

*Keywords: hate speech; metaphors; neologisms; linguistic analysis; social media*



## *Introduction*

Hate speech is considered a means of using one's own feelings, emotions, attitudes rudely, humiliating and belittling the personality of others. Hate speech is often used in emphasizing the predominance of one's power and will. In competitive situations, this form of verbal aggression, as well as the hate speech used by politicians, creates a context that affects society.

Social media has a great role in shaping worldview and attitude towards events. Accordingly, when the broad masses of the population realize how a politician imbued with their sympathy speaks with the language of hatred, how he verbally insults a political opponent or a particular situation through linguistic units (metaphors and neologisms), they also form a certain view of the person or the event.

Hence, the aim of the article is to define the essence of "Hate Speech" and study it as a source of neologisms and metaphors depicted on social media.

## *Body*

It is impossible to explain the modern peculiarities of the English language in media discourse without considering the general linguistic trends brought about by globalization. As far as we are deeply involved in a boundless space of communication, and a special activity of cultural-linguistic contacts is noted, the scale of the actions of social reality on language has increased significantly.

The language competence of the society greatly depends on the political and cultural-educational level of the country.

Society, in terms of speech characteristics and competence, has already been divided into several clearly defined groups and subgroups. While analyzing these groups, we can see that they are mostly located within the boundaries of social division of society creating linguistic subsystems of human social units, which are represented in various social networks.

## *Literature Review*

Hate speech is a form of expression that promotes the establishment of a strongly negative attitude towards groups that are different in particular ways. Hate speech is considered to justify or promote hatred, discrimination, hostility towards people, particularly, racial, religious, ethnic, sexual or other minorities.


The 2015 UNESCO report “Countering Online Hate Speech” points out how on-line hate speech can be produced and spread at low cost, does not go through an editing process like other written work, experiences vastly different levels of exposure depending on the popularity of the post and can be posted cross-nationally, as platform servers and headquarters do not need to be in the same country as the user and their intended audience.

Laub (2019) considers that hate speech online has been linked to a global increase in violence toward minorities, including mass shootings, lynchings, and ethnic cleansing. However, some scholars believe that online and offline hate speech are not fundamentally different from one another.

According to Delgado (2009), hate speech uses words as a magic weapon to directly harm people. It encompasses words that offend and harm where words, tone and context are important. It is worth mentioning that hatred not only affects the individual victims, but it also represents a threat to vibrant democracies and a pluralistic society (The legal and policy framework in the EU).

In 2015, Pew Research Center conducted research asking participants whether people should be able to make statements that are offensive to minority groups publicly. Surprisingly, a great number of participants stated that insulting and humiliating minority groups of people was normal.

*Graph № 1 - People should be able to make statements that are offensive to minority groups publicly*



*Source: Pew Research Center*

Hence, we can define hate speech as usually thought to include communications of animosity or disparagement of an individual or a group on account of a group characteristic such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability, religion, or sexual orientation.

## *Methodology*

The following research methods are used in the work:

1. Analysis of politicians' posts in social networks by categorization (Facebook, Twitter).
2. Linguistic and sociolinguistic analysis of the obtained research units.
3. Description.

Research questions:

1. What causes the use of hate speech in social networks?
2. What type of hate speech do politicians use in their speeches?
3. Does hate speech become a source of neologisms?
4. What are the commonly used metaphors related to hate speech?

## *Results and Discussions*

Hate speech includes all forms of expression that spread, promote, provoke or justify xenophobia, racial enmity, anti-Semitism, as well as other manifestations of intolerance - ethnocentrism, nationalism, discrimination, hostility towards minorities or migrants.

Means of expressing hate speech are - verbal form (verbal aggression - insults, mockery, etc.) written message, making a statement in the media, a message using symbols or a symbolic action, also, racial conspiracy theories, offensive stereotypes, epithets, etc. that contribute to the deliberate discreditation of this or that group, establishment of false views about them, encouragement of violence and endanger a specific group, any part of the society or any strata of the population. Hate speech can be conventionally divided into several parts. The lightest form of hate speech is:

1. Creating a negative image of an ethnic or religious group;
2. Asserting the inferiority of this or that group;
3. Asserting that the representatives of the particular religious group are morally inferior;
4. Mentioning particular groups and its representatives in a demeaning and offensive context;

5. Quoting clearly nationalistic and xenophobic expressions without any comment.

Experts widely note that this form of hate speech is widely noticed on social media. The ideas expressed in different social media are characterized by insulting, nationalistic, xenophobic comments towards people of different races, genders, ages and others.

Table № 1. The examples of light form of the hate speech on social media:

No	Hate Speech Example	Source	Word/Phrase	Form
1	“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best,” Trump said. “ <b><i>They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.</i></b> ”	Twitter: During a June 2015 speech announcing his candidacy, Trump referred to some Mexican immigrants	“Rapists.”	Light form
2	“I’ve followed you for a while, and you are definitely on the side of Ukraine. But what attracts the ire of some Ukrainians, is that you don’t always stick to their narrative. They find only a black/white picture acceptable: <b><i>All Russians are criminals</i></b> , all Ukrainians heroes.”	Twitter: Jon Erland Madsen	“Criminals”	Light form
3	As a candidate, he said <b><i>he would consider surveillance of mosques and shutting some down, and suggested establishing a national database to register Muslims.</i></b>	Twitter: Trump also made widely discredited claims that American Muslims celebrated the attacks on September 11, 2001, in New Jersey.	“Shutting some Down”	Light form
4	“It’s not only those two parties in Slovakia. It’s also SMER - Social Democracy and Republika (Republic). In Republika, <b><i>there are convicted criminals</i></b> , holocaust denier, the right hand of the biggest Slovak ex-mob boss and fascists. But they say <b><i>Ukrainians are nazis.</i></b> ”	Twitter: Martina	“Criminals”, “Nazis”.	Light form
5	“ <b><i>You’re living in poverty, your schools are no good, you have no jobs, 58% of your youth is unemployed – what the hell do you have to lose?</i></b> ” Trump told a crowd in Michigan.	Twitter: During an August 2016 campaign stop, Trump argued that African-Americans have been struggling and taken for granted by the Democratic Party, and should consider voting for him in the November general election.	“Poverty”, “Unemployed”.	Light form

6	<p><i>“You know, it could mean Brooklyn. But it could also mean go back where you came from — you know, Russian Jews who came to the United States, southern Italians who came to the United States, Puerto Ricans newly arrived,” he continues. “So when this came out of the mouth of this president who’s from Queens, it sounded almost like a child saying that in my memory on the streets of New York.”</i></p>	Twitter: Donald Trump	“Go back”	Light form
7	<p><i>“When Donald and Ivana came to the casino, the bosses would order all the black people off the floor,” Brown said. “It was the eighties, I was a teenager, but I remember it: They put us all in the back.”</i></p>	Twitter: Kip Brown, a former employee at Trump’s Castle, accused another one of Trump’s businesses of discrimination	“Black people off the floor”	Light form
8	<p>In a controversial case that’s been characterized as a modern-day lynching, four Black teenagers and one Latino teenager — the “Central Park Five” — were accused of attacking and raping a jogger in New York City. Trump immediately took charge in the case, running an ad in local papers demanding, <b>“BRING BACK THE DEATH PENALTY. BRING BACK OUR POLICE!”</b> The teens’ convictions were later vacated after they spent seven to 13 years in prison, and the city paid \$41 million in a settlement to the teens. But Trump in October 2016 said <i>he still believes they’re guilty, despite the DNA evidence to the contrary.</i></p>	Twitter: Donald Trump	“Guilty”	Light form
9	<p>In season two of The Apprentice, Trump fired Kevin Allen, a Black contestant, for being overeducated. <i>“You’re an unbelievably talented guy in terms of education, and you haven’t done anything,”</i> Trump said on the show. <i>“At some point you have to say, ‘That’s enough’.”</i></p>	Twitter: Donald Trump	“Unbelievably talented”	Light form
10	<p>In 2010, there was a huge national controversy over the <b>“Ground Zero Mosque”</b> — a proposal to build a Muslim community center in Lower Manhattan, near the site of the 9/11 attacks.</p>	Facebook	“Ground Zero Mosque”	Light form
11	<p>Trump played a big role in pushing false rumors that Obama — the country’s first Black president — was not born in the US. He claimed to send investigators to Hawaii to look into Obama’s birth certificate. Obama later released his birth certificate, calling Trump a <b>“carnival barker.”</b></p>	Twitter: Barack Obama	“Carnival barker”	Light form

The moderate form of hate speech is:

1. Justifying historical facts of violence and discrimination;
2. Publications and analysis that question historically generally accepted facts of violence and discrimination;
3. Allegation of the commitment of a historical crime by one or another ethnic or religious group;
4. Connection of the particular group with criminals;
5. Assertion of the disproportionate advantage of one or another ethnic or religious group;
6. Proof of negative impact on the state, society, one or another group;
7. Accusation of any group in territorial expansion or capture of state power;
8. Ignoring a person's citizenship because he/she belongs to a group different from the majority.

Table №2. The examples of moderate form of hate speech on social media:

No	Hate Speech Example	Source	Word/Phrase	Form
1	"Fascist Hitler-Russia, all genocidal fascist Russians are criminals against humanity, they are <i>fascists committing genocide, sickening hate crimes, terrorism, torture, home invasion, rape, corruption, kidnapping of children, and murder. Russians are liars, rapists, and murderers.</i> "	Tweeter: PK24	"Genocide", "Hate crimes", "Terrorism", "Torture", "Invasion", "Rape", "Corruption", "Murder".	Moderate form
2	"I know it's easier said than done, but <i>Armenians must leave Turkey ASAP.</i> That's exactly how it all started in 1915:( Turkey crosses every red line and getting to the point that they don't care what others think AT ALL!"	Tweeter: pəɹɪp.	"Cross red line".	Moderate form
3	" <i>Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not part of Georgia, and Crimea is officially part of Russia</i> ".	Tweeter: Kremser Mariana		Moderate form
4	Cher: "Kurds,But I've Heard About <i>"Blood Thirsty TURKS Who Tortured &amp; Murdered Almost 2Million Armenians SINCE I WAS 11.ALSO HEARD IT IN ARMENIA.TURK SOLDIERS ARE STILL BLOOD THIRSTY. NOW THEY WILL COMMIT GENOCIDE ON THE KURDS WITH trump's BLESSING. GOD!"</i>	Tweeter:	"Blood Thirsty TURKS"	Moderate form

5	“ <b>Black guys counting my money! I hate it. The only kind of people I want counting my money are short guys that wear yarmulkes every day. ... I think that the guy is lazy. And it’s probably not his fault, because laziness is a trait in blacks. It really is, I believe that. It’s not anything they can control.</b> ”	Tweeter: A book by John O’Donnell, former president of Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City, quoted Trump’s criticism of a Black accountant.	“Hate”	Moderate form
6	Federal officials found evidence that <b>Trump had refused to rent to Black tenants and lied to Black applicants about whether apartments were available, among other accusations.</b>	Tweeter: The US Department of Justice — under the Nixon administration, out of all administrations — sued the Trump Management Corporation for violating the Fair Housing Act.	“Accusations”	Moderate form
7	“It is inconceivable that we, the Orthodox people, especially the mountain Georgians, can live as a colony of the country (USA) that <b>preaches homosexual values, hates traditions, campaigns against Christianity... Is this still better than Russia’s alliance?!</b> ”	Facebook: Alt-Info	“Hate”	Moderate form
8	“Not as a Pakistani, but as a practising Muslim one must be against this <b>open violation of stealing territory, taking over the rightfully owned land of Palestine by force.</b> We will always condemn this. Israel doesn’t exist”;	Tweeter: Afsheen Zubair.	“Violation”	Moderate form
9	“Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree <b>recognising the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic</b> and the Lugansk People’s Republic in Donbass as independent, <b>avoiding a direct invasion of Ukraine but justifying occupation.</b> ”	Tweeter: The-NewsHawks.	“Justifying occupation”	Moderate form
10	“ <b>Russia did not annex</b> any country the people of Donbas suffered at the hands of the Nazis Russia warned and was ignored, Crimea has always belonged to Russia.”	Tweeter: Paulo Durão.	“Annex”, “Nazis”	Moderate form

The strict form of hate speech is:

1. Calling for violence;
2. Calling for discrimination;
3. Calling for preventing others from settling in the region.

Table № 3. The examples of strict manifestations of hate speech on social media:

No	Hate Speech Example	Source	Word/Phrase	Form
1	<b>“Citizens of foreign countries should not be allowed to buy land in Georgia and settle here for a long time”.</b>	Tweeter: Alt-info.	“Should not be allowed”.	Strict form
2	<b>“Yes. A foreigner is a foreigner. <i>Foreigners must not be allowed to settle down not only in Assam but also in any part of the country</i>”.</b>	Tweeter: Jaivir Singh.	“Must not be allowed”.	Strict form
3	<b>“<i>Foreigners must not be permitted to settle down in our land.</i> THEY MUST STAY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AND TAKE SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TAKING CARE OF THE NATION!.</b>	Tweeter: Mus.	“Must not be permitted”.	Strict form
4	In congressional testimony, Trump said that <b><i>some Native American reservations operating casinos shouldn’t be allowed because “they don’t look like Indians to me.”</i></b>	Tweeter: Donald Trump	“Shouldn’t be allowed”.	Strict form
5	White People vs. Black People. He said <b><i>he “wasn’t particularly happy” with the most recent season of his show, so he was considering “an idea that is fairly controversial — creating a team of successful African Americans versus a team of successful whites. Whether people like that idea or not, it is somewhat reflective of our very vicious world.”</i></b>	Tweeter: Trump publicly pitched what was essentially The Apprentice:	“African Americans versus a team of successful whites”.	Strict form
6	<b>“George Floyd deserved to die for a fake \$20 bill</b> think Donald Trump should get the Medal of Honor for stealing and refusing to return 150 classified secrets”.	Tweeter: Brad.	“Deserved to die”.	Strict form
7	<b>“Syrian refugees are “terrorists”! Ukrainian refugees are “nazis”!</b>	Facebook: Kareem Rifai.	“Refugees are “terrorists”.	Strict form

As we see, hate speech has become an integral part of social media that is profoundly related to political speeches being transmitted by different means of social platforms. All the mentioned examples are intended to spread, promote, provoke or justify xenophobia, racial enmity, anti-Semitism, as well as other manifestations of intolerance - ethnocentrism, nationalism, discrimination, hostility towards minorities or migrants.



## *Metaphors in Hate Speech*

Metaphor is a rhetorical device that has a strategic value during the exchange of arguments. According to Oswald (2013), metaphor is one of the ways to strengthen an argument and its purpose is to convince the addressee.

In research discourses, metaphor is intensively used as a means of managing public (audience/reader) attention (attracting, arousing and/or diverting attention) and using arguments - in this sense, no difference can be observed between politicians. Metaphor, like other linguistic markers, is often presented in the form of hate speech and/or intended to enhance the effect of the use of hate speech.

In terms of the specificity of using metaphors, the discourse of each politician can be characterized as follows:

1. By using vivid metaphors, politicians mainly try to focus the listener's attention in order to strengthen belief to manifest own strength and turn against the opponents;
  - 1.1. *like a red flag to a bull* – Zelensky: “*Our brave actions turned out to be like a red flag to a bull to the occupants*”;
  - 1.2. *go off the deep end* – Boris Johnson: “*the world will witness how Vladimir Putin will go off the deep end when the troops leave Ukraine without gaining victory*”;
  - 1.3. *black mood* – *The parliament advised the prime minister to keep away from the president as he was in a black mood*;
  - 1.4. *Get hot under the collar* – *The officials were trying to get hot under the collar even though they realized the possible consequences of the event*;
  - 1.5. *see red* -*Discrimination of African Americans made Biden see red resulting in adopting new regulations against it.*
  
2. In the examples found on social media, cases of using metaphors of an intense nature predominate. The use of metaphor serves to emphasize the intensity of the situation:
  - 2.1. *be up in arms* - *The citizens of my country were up in arms over the destruction of the old church*;
    - 2.1. *blow a fuse/gasket/your top* – *The president was offended for the fourth time that made her blow a gasket her top*;
    - 2.2. *eat someone alive* – *The prime minister will eat us alive if we do not manage to bring changes into the new declaration*;
    - 2.3. *go ballistic* – *The government of the People's Republic of China went ballistic when Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022*;

2.4. *skin someone alive - Donald Trump used to skin alive everyone who dared to oppose his ideas.*

3. We have come across cases when metaphors are mainly used to divert attention to the behavior of the opponents, to the actions taken by them:

- 3.1. *fly off the handle – Boris Johnson flew off the handle when Vladimir Putin refused to meet him to discuss the problems brought by the war in Ukraine;*
- 3.2. *give a piece of one's mind – Zelensky got so irritated by the actions of the Russian government that he decided to give the Russian Officials a piece of his mind;*
- 3.3. *I'm ready to take the gloves off! – When Erdogan and Putin met each other in Tehran, they were ready to take the gloves off;*
- 3.4. *go postal - The government of Israel went postal when Palestine bombed Tel Aviv in 2019;*
- 3.5. *foam at the mouth - The leader of opposing party was foaming at the mouth while complaining about the resolution adopted by the government.*

In the research material, we found examples where politicians mainly try to emphasize their self-confidence, power, intensity of the situation through metaphors.

### *Hate Apeech Based Neologisms*

Neologisms play a significant role in the modern language system and speech. In linguistics, the term neologism refers to new words, phrases, or meanings. Neologisms are often formed by combining existing words or using them in a new context.

Some neologisms have become part of standard English, while others have fallen out of the use. Similarly, some of today's neologisms will enter the vocabulary of the 22nd century, while others will be forgotten and replaced by more descriptive linguistic units.

There are five general criteria for defining neologisms:

1. psychological - "a neologism is a word that is perceived as new by the language community";
2. lexicographic - "any word that does not appear in the dictionary";
3. exclusive definition - "a word not appearing in a pre-determined exclusion

lexicon”;

4. diachronic definition - “any word-form that appears in a recent general language text, and was not previously a part of that language;
5. reference corpora definition – “any word that in a recent general language text and does not appear in an established reference corpus of that language”.

Based on the conducted research covering 150 neologisms derived from the speeches made by politicians, we have found the frequency of the usage of the neologisms according to the above-mentioned criteria:


*Table № 4. The frequency of the usage of the neologisms according to the above-mentioned criteria:*

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Criteria	Percentage %
Psychological	30 %
Lexicographic	8 %
Exclusive definition	12 %
Diachronic definition	40 %
Reference corpora definition	10 %

Out of the studied units, 87 neologisms were created by men, while 63 neologisms were created by women.

*Graph №2 – Number of neologisms created by gender*



Based on the conducted research, three types of neologism are distinguished:

1. Completely new words;
2. A completely new meaning of old words;
3. New sense in the existing word.

The first type of neologisms contains only those lexemes that did not exist before a certain period of time.

The second type of neologisms represents words that have changed their meaning but remained their old form.

The third type of neologisms consists of lexemes that have only added one or more meanings without losing the old meaning; they represent the pragmatic attitude of polysemy.

It is worth mentioning that political speeches as well as hate speech used in political speeches are significantly becoming the source of neologisms. One of the vivid examples of creating neologisms based on political events is Donald Trump and the speeches made during his presidency.

1. Clicktivism (N.) - a policy of using the internet to take direct and often militant action to achieve a political or social aim.
2. Haterade (N.) - excessive negativity, criticism, or resentment.
3. Otherize (V.) – to view or treat (a person or group of people) as intrinsically different from and alien to oneself.
4. Herd mentality (Idiom) - The tendency of people to adopt or be influenced by the urges, behaviors, or inclinations of their peers, often in contrast to or in spite of their feelings as individuals.
5. Covfefe (N.) - a viral typo for “coverage” from a tweet by Donald Trump. The meaning and intention of the mysterious word was the source of much internet discussion and humor.
6. Nambia (N.) - combining the names of two real African countries, Zambia and Namibia.
7. Two Corinthians (Noun phrase) - referring to “Second Corinthians.”
8. ‘The blacks,’ ‘the gays,’ ‘the Muslims’ (Noun phrase) – distancing people from the group in question while highlighting their differences.

The language used by politicians, as well as the language used to describe and evaluate political persons or events, has specific characteristics.

The group of political neologisms, which carries more weight from the national or

international point of view, becomes an integral part of the language. Hence, those neologisms are not exception. They will become a part of the Standard English in the future.

### *Conclusion*

Based on the conducted research encompassing different means of social platforms, public speeches, interviews and publications, we can say that hate speech has plenty of manifestations related to the animosity or disparagement of an individual or a group on account of a group characteristic such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability, religion, or sexual orientation.

Metaphors and neologisms are integral part of hate speech. English is rich in terms of political metaphors and neologisms. We can find vast metaphors related to anger, hatred, discrimination, bullying in the English language. The use of such metaphors is conditioned by various factors:

1. grasping the listener's attention in order to strengthen belief, to manifest own strength and turn against the opponents;
2. emphasizing the intensity of the situation;
3. diverting attention to the behavior of the opponents and the actions taken by them.

Neologisms are created based on political rallies, speeches and sometimes they are associated with public figures. Three types of neologisms can be distinguished:

1. Completely new words;
2. A completely new flavor of old words;
3. New sense in the existing word.

In order to consider a word as a neologism, it must meet one of the criteria for defining the concept of neologism:

1. Psychological definition;
2. Lexicographic definition;
3. Exclusive definition;
4. Diachronic definition;
5. reference corpora definition;

In short, the generalization of the linguistic features of metaphors and neologisms depicted on social media emphasized the fact that most of them have negative shades of value.

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# MIXED METHODOLOGY IN THE RESEARCH OF THE CONCEPT “PATRIOTISM” IN MODERN ENGLISH

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## ABSTRACT

The article deals with the problem of integrating the results obtained through different methods. The mixed methodology is considered to be the most effective method for an in-depth and detailed description of the semantic structure of the word and the conceptual content of the concept.

Mixed methodology revealed some hidden associative potential in the words and expressions relating to the concept “patriotism”. This potential was revealed through the experiment in which certain word-stimuli are actualized. By identifying, generalizing, summarizing, and extracting the connections between word-stimuli and reactions, the combination creating the associative dimension of the concept was formed.

The study of the associative dimension of the concept is impossible without considering the correlation between common approaches and trends in linguistics and the humanities. Anthropocentrism, as an approach to the study of language, society, and the human, recognizes the relevance of the study of “living” knowledge. The recognition of the relevance of the study of the “living” knowledge implies the recognition of the necessity of the study of the possibilities of the research of the essence of the “living” knowledge, as well as the recognition of the necessity of the study of the means of representation of the structures of knowledge and consciousness.

The conceptual sphere of the nation is determined by the specifics of the cultural markers that are valid within the premises of the nation’s worldview at a definite stage.

Since the dictionary meaning of the word neither reflects the “life” of the word marked by temporal and spatial shifts, determination of the real psychological meaning of the word should involve the analysis of its associative meaning. The necessity of the analysis of the associative meaning of the word determines the relevance of the research.

*Keywords: mixed methodology, associative experiment, “living” word, cognitive signs, linguocultural, lingo cognitive, and semantic analysis*

## *Introduction*

The information existing in the lexicographical sources is not sufficient for creating an adequate and reliable lexical database reflecting the full potential of the language.

The relevance of the problem of synthesizing quantitative and qualitative methods in linguistic research is evident today. This problem involves solving the difficulties associated with applying the mixed methodology.

Construction of the associative dimension of the concept allows for determining the place of the content of a particular concept and the meaning of a particular word in the hierarchy of the meanings and thoughts of native speakers.

The completeness of the concept analysis is ensured by an integrative methodology. The mentioned type of methodology unites the linguacultural, lingo-cognitive, and experimental components of the research.

Conceptualization is one of the most important processes in human cognitive activity, which implies understanding the information received. Understanding of this information results in the creation of concepts, conceptual structures, mental representations, new quanta of knowledge, and the entire human conceptual system. Conceptualization refers to organizing - "packaging" - of chaotic information about the external world.

In the modern cognitively oriented linguocultural direction, the lingual conceptualization of the world is realized as an organized process of cognitive modeling of reality. The main result of this process is the creation of the "linguistic worldview."

A purely linguistic methodology is not enough to analyze linguistic phenomena - the need to apply new approaches is evident.

The anthropocentric paradigm has enabled linguists to apply the conceptual and methodological apparatus of various sciences. The conceptual-categorical apparatus of psychology turned out to be the most relevant for our research. The mentioned apparatus is the only one providing access to the essence of conceptualization.

In psycholinguistic methodology, concepts are realized as dynamic formations that form segmented conceptual chains. The combinations of the components of these chains determine the content of the concept.

The concept is a discrete mental formation that has an orderly internal structure. The concept is the result of the cognitive activity of an individual and a community. The concept shows the attitude of the lingual community towards an object or event.



The minimal structural element of the conceptual content is considered to be the cognitive sign - the discrete unit constructed as a result of the componential or distributional analysis, analysis of lexical definitions, contextual analysis, and psycholinguistic experiment.

The combination of the cognitive signs creates the conceptual content. Cognitive signs differ from each other in proximity to the prototype - some cognitive signs are closer to the prototype, while others are more distant to the main content of the concept. Cognitive signs form a certain hierarchy.

The conceptual sphere is a hierarchically organized set of concepts of national culture formed as a result of the nation's cognitive and evaluative activity. The mentioned activity is focused on accessing the world and understanding the existing information about the world.

### *Methodology*

In the research, the analysis of the specifics of methodology and methods is focused on: revealing the peculiarities of the data organization and processing through the use of the quantitative research methods; analysing the methodological foundations and peculiarities of the qualitative research; identifying the specifics of the qualitative content analysis; defining the determinants of reliability and validity of the research; realizing mixed methodology and triangulation as a central methodological concept; analysing the specifics of the free association experiment as a tool for the study of the content of the linguistic consciousness (Bryman, 2007).

Understanding the essence of the research requires the knowledge of its methodological foundations based on the relevant paradigms. Understanding the essence of the research paradigm requires answering three fundamental questions: What can be understood about a particular fragment of the worldview? What is the relationship between the researcher and the research object? How should a researcher explore what he/she wants to understand?

These interrelated questions define the specifics of the research.

Unlike quantitative research based on a positivist paradigm, qualitative research is based on a constructivist paradigm - a qualitative researcher perceives the research reality not as an objective fact but as a socially constructed phenomenon. Quantitative researchers consider reality to be objective, while qualitative researchers believe that reality is intersubjective because it is shared by individuals (Litosseliti, 2018).

According to Irwin Goffman, any person tries to fit his action into a "frame" that

fits the given context. By doing this, a person tries to make the desired impression on the audience (Goffman, 1956).

It is through this type of “frame” that the interaction between the researcher and the research subject takes place. In order to make the desired impression, both parties must play their “role” properly. In contrast to quantitative research, in which the ethical approach is dominant (vision of reality from the perspective of an external actor), qualitative research is led by an internal approach (vision of reality from the perspective of an internal actor) (Litosseliti, 2018).

Since the reconstruction of the semantic and conceptual structures without identifying associative connections is impossible, the study of the concept “patriotism” required to conduct a free-associative experiment.

In the research, the methodology of conducting a psycholinguistic experiment is based on the ideas of linguocognitive modeling and the principles of the experimental analysis of the concept.

The technology of conducting the experiment is based on a free association method aimed at identifying typical association links.

### *Results and Discussion*

Ranking the cognitive signs embedded in the structure of the concept revealed core and peripheral cognitive signs. One of the most important steps in analyzing the data of the free association experiment is to determine the compliance/in compliance of these data with the cognitive signs.

As a result of the textual analysis, categories were formed and given the appropriate codes:

- Category I. Perception of patriotism;
- Category II. Perception of the patriot;
- Category III. Symbolism;
- Category IV. Perception of non-patriotism;
- Category V. Perception of non-patriot;
- Category VI. Symbolism.

In the category of perception of patriotism, some subcategories were identified and given the appropriate codes: 1.1 Unconditional love for the homeland; 1.2

Loyalty to the homeland; 1.3 Responsibility to the homeland and the people; 1.4 Willingness to make sacrifices for the homeland; 1.5 Protection of freedom and independence; 1.6 Pride in the history of one's own country; 1.7 Service of the country; 1.8 Active citizenship; 1.9 Professionalism; 1.10 Supporting the decisions of the country leaders; 1.11 Voicing oppositional attitudes towards government activities; 1.12 Protection of identity and culture; 1.13 Adherence to the democratic and individual values; 1.14 Arbitrariness, illogicality, and irrationality of patriotism; 1.15 Challenge for multicultural communities; 1.16 Neglecting the ideal of equality.

In the category of the perception of the patriot the following subcategories were identified and given the appropriate codes: 2.1 Veteran; 2.2 Soldier; 2.3 Warrior; 2.4 Hero; 2.5 Professional; 2.6 Doctors.

In the category of symbolism, the following subcategories were identified and given the appropriate codes: 3.1 Flag; 3.2 Hymn; 3.3 Places and monuments; 3.4 Traditions and rituals; 3.5 Monarchy; 3.6 Queen; 3.7 President.

In the category of perception of nonpatriotism, the subcategories were given the following codes: 4.1 Jingoism; 4.2 Nationalism; 4.3 Chauvinism; 4.4 Cosmopolitanism; 4.5 Extremism; 4.6 Pseudo patriotism; 4.7 Reactionism; 4.8 Blind patriotism; 4.9 Authoritarianism; 4.10 Monarchical patriotism; 4.11 Racism.

In the category of perception of nonpatriots the identified subcategories were given the following codes: 5.1 Extremist; 5.2 Pseudo patriot; 5.3 Cosmopolitan; 5.4 Racist.

In the category of symbolism, the identified subcategory was given the appropriate code: 6.1 Waving the flag.

The analysis of the textual material revealed that the age and gender characteristics influence the perception of the respondents. The mentioned fact is manifested in the quantitative content analysis.

### *Category I*

The texts constructed by the older generation are dominated by the perception of patriotism and nationalism as two sides of the same coin. The number of cases of using nationalism with a positive connotation is – 15.

In the texts constructed by the representatives of the older generation, there are 17 cases of perception of nationalism as a necessary factor for the development of the country.

Between patriotism and cosmopolitanism, the choice of patriotism is made by the majority of the older generation - 14 cases.

For most of the younger and older generations, the essence of patriotism lies in the fight against extremism - 32 cases.

Pride in one's own country is considered patriotism by the majority of the younger and older generations - 29 cases.

The service of the country is considered patriotism by the majority of the representatives of the younger and older generations - 26 cases.

Loyalty to the homeland is equated with patriotism by the majority of the younger and older generations - 28 cases.

Unconditional love is associated with patriotism for the majority of the older generation - 17 cases.

Unconditional love is equated with patriotism by the minority of the young generation - 3 cases.

Patriotism is associated with the responsibility to the homeland and the people for the majority of the younger and older generations - 32 cases.

Some representatives of the older generation - 11 cases - see the essence of patriotism in the readiness to make sacrifices for the homeland.

The number of the cases of associating patriotism with the willingness to sacrifice for the homeland is much lower among the younger generation - 6 cases.

For most representatives of the older generation the essence of patriotism lies in the fight against extremism and extremists - 16 cases.

The protection of freedom and independence is considered to be patriotism by the majority of the young and older generations - 35 cases.

Active citizenship is associated with patriotism for the majority of the younger generation - 17 cases.

Active citizenship is equated with patriotism by the minority of the older generation - 5 cases.

For some representatives of the younger generation the essence of patriotism lies in professionalism - 18 cases.

No case of associating patriotism with professionalism was identified in the interviews with the representatives of the older generation - 0 cases.

Some representatives of the older generation view patriotism in support of the decisions of the country leaders - 11 cases.

The minority of the younger generation believe that it's patriotic to support the decisions of the country leaders - 3 cases.

The texts constructed by the younger generation are dominated by the perception of patriotism as an expression of the oppositional attitudes towards the activities of the government - 18.

Protection of the democratic and individual values is considered to be patriotism by the majority of the young and older generations - 31 cases.

The idea of arbitrariness, illogicality and irrationality of patriotism is observed among the representatives of the younger generation - 5 cases.

The idea of arbitrariness, illogicality and irrationality of patriotism is not observed among the representatives of the older generation - 0 cases.

The idea of perceiving patriotism as a challenge for multicultural societies is observed among the younger generation - 7 cases.

Two cases of perceiving patriotism as a challenge for multicultural societies are recorded among the older generation.

For a minority of the younger generation, patriotism is associated with the neglect of the ideal of equality - 7 cases.

The case of associating patriotism with the neglect of the ideal of equality was not observed in the interviews with the representatives with the older generation - 0 cases.

### *Category II*

The texts constructed by the representatives of the older generations are dominated by the perception of veterans, soldiers, warriors and heroes as patriots - 19 cases.

Veterans, soldiers, warriors and heroes are perceived as patriots by a minority of the younger generation - 8 cases.

14 cases of perception of professionals and doctors as patriots are recorded among the representatives of the younger generation.

Professionals and doctors are perceived as patriots by a minority of the older generation - 4 cases.

### *Category III*

Rituals, traditions and symbols are considered an important factor in maintaining a patriotic spirit by the majority of the older generation - 15 cases.

Most of the young generation do not attach much importance to rituals, traditions and symbols to maintain a patriotic spirit - 16 cases.

### *Category IV*

The texts constructed by 22 representatives of the younger generation are dominated by the idea of the need to protect patriotism from nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The number of cases of using nationalism and cosmopolitanism with negative connotations is - 18.

The texts constructed by 22 representatives of the younger generation record 15 cases of perceiving nationalism as a threat to international relations and progress.

The majority of the representatives of the younger generation chooses between patriotism and cosmopolitanism over cosmopolitanism - 18 cases.

For most of the representatives of the younger and older generations, patriotism rules out extremism, reactionism and racism - 31 cases.

Negative perceptions of blind patriotism are observed among the representatives of the younger and older theories - 22 cases.

### *Category V*

The texts constructed by the representative of the younger and older generations are dominated by the perception of extremists and racists as non-patriots - 39 cases.

Cosmopolitan people are perceived as non-patriots by some representatives of the older generation - 11 cases.

### *Category VI*

For the majority of the representatives of the the younger generation, the “flag” is used with the negative connotation as it is associated with “flag waving”, which, in turn, is perceived as false patriotism - 12 cases.

Some representatives of the younger generation (4 cases) associate the “flag” with the negative aspects of the country’s history, namely, slavery and injustice.

No case of associating the “flag” with negative aspects of the country’s history was recorded in the interviews with the representatives of the older generation - 0 cases.

There are two types of validity with regard to the content of the texts:

Selection Validity - texts adequately reflect the set of texts to which the results of a given study should be applied;

Semantic Validity - categories accurately describe meanings integrated into texts, in other words, the constituent units of the categories created within a given study have exactly the meaning they were assigned.

The results of quantitative content analysis, in fact, replicate the results of conceptual content research of the concept “patriotism”, in other words, the categories and subcategories formed in quantitative content correspond to the semantic components of the concept content - cognitive signs (“love of country”; “pride in homeland”; “desire to preserve cultural characteristics”; Readiness ‘’, etc.). The correlation between the results of the quantitative content analysis and conceptual analysis is particularly sharp in the case of the core repertoire of the categories identified through quantitative content analysis and the cognitive signs identified as a result of conceptual analysis.

The results of the quantitative content analysis correspond to the data obtained from the analysis of the semantic volume of the concept “patriotism” in lexicographical sources; in other words, the categories and subcategories formed in the quantitative content correspond to the components of the meaning of the word “patriotism” (“Loyalty to the country, the people”; “Responsibility to the homeland and the people”; “Willingness to make any sacrifice for the interests of the homeland”; “Loyalty, fervent love”, etc.). The correlation between the results of the quantitative content analysis and semantic analysis is evidenced in the core repertoire of categories identified through the quantitative content analysis and semantic analysis.

The results of the quantitative content analysis also correspond to the continuum of the associative dimension of the concept “patriotism” constructed as a result of a free association experiment.

On the periphery of the associative dimension the following associations were placed: “Pride of Culture”; “Attributes, Symbols Related to Patriotism” (capital, anthem, flag); “Political and moral principle, the content of which is the love of the homeland and the willingness to sacrifice for the homeland”; “Ideology and state policy aimed at preserving national identity, national ideals and values, traditions and culture”.

Associations with militarization, politicization, and ideology were also placed on the periphery of the associative dimension.

Modeling of the associative dimension ensured the possibility to represent the content of the word “patriotism” as well as to identify the stable components of that content. Due to the mentioned possibility the construction of the associative dimension is considered to be a tool for analyzing the word meaning.

While providing the possibility to reveal the national peculiarities of the linguistic consciousness of the representatives of a particular ethnos, the associative dimension is considered to be not only a fragment of human verbal memory, but also a fragment of the worldview embedded in the consciousness of a particular ethnos.

The analysis of the data of the free association experiment revealed the actual psychological meaning of the word “patriotism” and the range of its associativeness. The latter represents the psychological meaning of the “living”word. The psychological meaning of the word goes beyond the dictionary definitions of the word.

### *Conclusion*

The content of the concept “patriotism” is marked by the specifics of time and space. This fact is revealed in the presence of the chronotopic markers – variables in the content of the concept.

The mentioned markers ensure the dynamism, variability and discretion of the content of the concept, in other words, the mentioned markers ensure the emergence of free positions in the content structure of the concept.

It is thanks to the constants that the concept acquires the status of moral and ideological dominance in the linguistic consciousness of the language speakers.

The similarity of the data obtained by different methods and approaches points to the reproducibility and intersubjectivity of the research data.

The practical realization of the integral approach implies overcoming the dictionary definitions, revealing the associative potential embedded in the concept, defining the place of the concept in the consciousness of the native speakers, in other words, defining the place of the concept in the the system of the cultural meanings of the lingual society.



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# THE CONCEPT OF BEAUTY IN OSCAR WILDE'S "THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY"

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## ABSTRACT

Any lingual item can be considered in two different dimensions. These dimensions integrate conceptual and semantic spheres. Semantic knowledge is a special type of conceptual knowledge. Different aspects of the concept are lexicalized through this type of knowledge. Any language is a synthesis of man and the world. Therefore, contemporary linguistics maintains its internal connection with previous paradigms of linguistics. From this point of view, the internal connection of the modern linguistic paradigm with the systemic-semiotic paradigm of language is particularly significant. The article is devoted to the study of the conceptual sphere integrated into a literary text. The subject of study is the verbal representation of the concept of "Beauty" in O. Wilde's novel "The Picture of Dorian Grey."

While analyzing the conceptual continuum of a literary text, the markers of the conceptual sphere of the novel were considered; the basic concept in the novel was highlighted; lexical units representing the concept were identified and analyzed.

*Keywords: beauty, conceptual sphere, conceptual analysis, semantic analysis, frame semantics, the knowledge representation structures*

## *Introduction*

The perception of beauty is variable in time and space. Its markers and criteria are determined by the specifics of the environment, culture, history, stereotypes, norms and standards of beauty.

The relevance of the research is conditioned by the significance of the study of concepts in cognitive linguistics, as well as by the enduring interest in the work of O. Wilde.

The term “concept” has been used for a long time by scientists who work in the field of cognitive linguistics. However, the content and structure of the concept have not yet acquired an unambiguous interpretation. Moreover, linguists to this day disagree on the definition of the term “concept,” the methodology for describing its structure, the typology of concepts (good” and “evil,” “beauty,” “life” and “death,” “freedom,” “will”,”, “creativity,” “love,” “crime” and “art”). Differences in the understanding of the concept are explained by the fact that this term is considered at the junction of a number of disciplines, each applying it for its own purposes. The concept is “a unit of memory, mental lexicon, conceptual system and language of the brain,” “an operational meaningful unit of thought or a quantum of the structured knowledge.”

## *Methodology*

Recently, the cognitive approach to the study of the text associated with the knowledge representation structures has become increasingly widespread. The vector of the analysis has been directed at the problem of conceptualization of the world and the study of concepts from the point of view of cognitivism.

Considering linguistic phenomena in a broad cognitive context has set scientists the task of creating new knowledge representation structures.

The concept “Beauty” has not yet been subjected to a comprehensive linguistic analysis on the example of the novel “The Picture of Dorian Grey”. As a result of the analysis of the frame organization of the concept “Beauty” was identified. Having considered the verbal realization of the concept “Beauty” in the analyzed novel, the dominant frames were identified.

At the first stage of the research, we analyzed definitions from dictionaries in order to identify the core of the concept, as well as its peripheral markers. While analyzing the structure of the concept, we processed the text by constructing the semantic frame - “a package of knowledge describing typical and non-typical markers” in

order to determine the etymology of the concept “beauty” as well as to identify the verbalizers of the concept in the novel.

In order to determine the place of the concept “Beauty” in the linguistic worldview of the English language, we analyzed the dictionary definitions of the concept.

The Dictionary of the English Language names the following meanings for beauty: 1) a delightful quality associated with harmony of form or color, excellence of craftsmanship, truthfulness, originality, or another property; 2) a quality or feature that is most effective, gratifying, or telling; 3) an outstanding or conspicuous example; 4) beautiful people - wealthy, prominent people, especially in international society.

The Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary displays the following meanings of the word beauty: 1) the beauties of something are its qualities and features (nature); 2) beauty is used of things and people that are involved in make-up and treatments that are considered to make people look beautiful. (Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, 2001)

The MacMillan English Dictionary gives the following definitions of beauty: 1) the beauties of something - the features of something that are beautiful to look at; 2) mainly journalism a beautiful woman; 3) a quality that something has that gives you pleasure; 4) (informal) something that you think is very good or a good example of its type; 5) the beauty of something - the advantage or good quality that something has. (MacMillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, 2002)

Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary gives the following definitions of the concept under consideration: 1) a quantum characteristic that accounts for the existence of the upsiion particle; 2) beautiful people - wealthy or famous people whose lifestyle is usually expensive and well-publicized. (Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2001)

The analysis of the dictionary definitions revealed that the essential components of beauty are “pleasing and impressive qualities”, “beautiful person, especially woman”, “pleasing personal appearance”, “beautiful people”.

As a result of the analysis of the beauty lexeme, we identified general and special semes. General semes, being the integral markers of the concept, constitute its core. These include the components of the meaning presented in most English dictionaries:

## Beauty

Pleasing and impressive qualities (property of the beautiful)	Beautiful person, especially woman (beautiful appearance)	Beautiful places (beautiful places)	Fine example of its kind (something very good, impressive, amazing)
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Due to the fact that other semes are used in narrower contexts, they constitute the periphery of the concept. We identified the following differential markers presented in the English lexicographic sources: 1) pleasing personal appearance (due to cosmetics, make-up and special treatment); 2) beautiful people.

Since the main purpose of the research is to trace the verbalizers of this lexeme in the novel of O. Wilde “The Picture of Dorian Grey”, we conducted the component analysis of the concept “Beauty”.

The Longman Dictionary contains a number of synonyms for beauty. Synonyms for the word beautiful, according to this dictionary, are pretty, handsome, good-looking, attractive, gorgeous, stunning. Next, we identified the semantic components of the concept “Beauty”: “appearance”, very attractive, pleasant, enjoyable, happy, nice, friendly, polite, feeling, good, satisfied, lovely, charming, sweet, adorable, like, correct, social, emotion, happiness, high, standard, quality, right, true, gentle, love, to enjoy, suitable, formal, level, acceptable, attitude, careful, morally, opinion, romantic.

The realization of the set goal required implementing the following research stages:

1) Identification of lexical units denoting “beauty”;

2) Identification of the passages in which the concept “Beauty” is objectivated.

As a result of the componential analysis, we found out that the lexeme of “Beauty” consists of 36 components. Having considered the concept of “Beauty” from the point of view of structural semantics and identifying its (core and peripheral) components, we directed the vector of the research on the frame semantics. In the concept “Beauty” we have identified the following semantic frames:

### Beauty

Beautiful Things	Beautiful People	Beautiful Feelings	Appearance
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The verbalizers of the constructed semantic frames reflect the specifics of the author’s perception of the concept “Beauty”.

### *Results and Discussion*

The conceptual sphere of the novel "The Picture of Dorian Gray" is exceptionally rich and diverse: the concepts "good" and "evil", "beauty", "life" and "death", "freedom", "will", "creativity", "love", "crime" and "art" constitute the conceptual sphere of Oscar Wilde's novel.

Beauty", since the hero's desire to preserve it at any cost, led to the moral decay of his personality.

In the British worldview, the external and internal beauty is inseparable. The British believe that outer beauty should be indicative of inner beauty, but they also recognize that appearances can be deceptive.

Being a concept with an evaluative component, the concept "Beauty" implies the opposition: beautiful - ugly. The words with a positive aesthetic evaluation in English literary texts coincide with their dictionary definitions. General evaluative and aesthetic positive qualifications of objects overlap, more precisely, words denoting "Beauty" express a general positive assessment, and general evaluative words in specific contexts express an aesthetic assessment.

Beauty is a formal manifestation of nature in which the beautiful things are being attached the significance that is attracted by the visual sensors. It was Plato who stated that "if we denominate beauty what gives us pleasure, or rather, not every kind of pleasure, but only those which can be reached by sight and hearing, in which ways could we defend ourselves? [...] Beauty, dear friend, is what delights us through the eyes and the ears". In *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, Lord Henry Wotton says that Beauty "needs no explanation" and "it is one of the great facts of the world, like sunlight, or springtime, or the reflection in dark waters of that silver shell we call the moon. It cannot be questioned. It has its divine right of sovereignty."

*The Picture of Dorian Gray* begins with a preface in which the author talks about art, its significance and practical benefits, as well as about the creators of art. Wilde says that: "The artist is the creator of beautiful things". He believes that people who find and appreciate beauty are beautiful themselves. An artist can be called a wonderful person, as he is able not only to see, but also to create beauty. People who cannot see beauty are ugly: "Those who find ugly words in beautiful things are corrupt without being charming. It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors".

Let's consider the verbalizers of the semantic frame "Beautiful things". The mentioned frame integrates the language units, with the help of which beautiful things are described. Beautiful things are more expensive than ordinary ones; the high price provides them with exclusivity and inaccessibility. Only wealthy people have enough money to acquire them, therefore rich people are beautiful due to the possession of beautiful things. The author compares beautiful sins with beautiful things: "Beautiful sins, like beautiful things, are the privilege of the rich". A cigarette is a wonderful item because it can give pleasure: "A cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite". Lord Henry notes that a person with a vision of beauty opens up the ability to see it: "... in his soul who sought for her there had been awakened that wonderful vision to which alone are wonderful things revealed; ... as though they were themselves patterns of some other and more perfect form" (Wilde, 2011).

Lord Henry considers Dorian an excellent study material, able to entertain him: "He would be a wonderful study". The author uses such a stylistic device as a comparison. The novel is compared to the Persian carpet, which is known for its extraordinary beauty and rarity: "I should like to write a novel certainly, a novel that would be as lovely as a Persian carpet and as unreal". Lord Henry calls medieval art charming: "mediaeval art is charming".

Thus, we have identified in the text the following lexical units that objectivate the semantic frame "Beautiful things": beautiful, rich, perfect, pleasure, exquisite, wonderful, lovely.

According to Oscar Wilde, the ability to see beauty generates cultured people: "Those who find beautiful words in beautiful things are the cultivated; they are the elect to whom beautiful things mean only beauty". The mentioned idea molds the semantic frame "Beautiful people".

Lord Henry had the ability to speak beautifully and charm listeners: "He was brilliant, fantastic, irresponsible." Here is another example: "No one talks as wonderfully as you do. Mr. Erskine makes me forget you and all your wrong, fascinating, poisonous, delightful theories". People admired his way of reasoning: "A delightful theory! Good-bye, Lord Henry, you are quite delightful and dreadfully demoralizing". The Lord had a special relationship with beautiful people: "I never interfere with what charming people do". Duchess Harley has a pleasant appearance and character perhaps that is why she is loved by everyone who knew her: "... a lady of admirable good-nature and good temper much liked by everyone who knew her". The elderly but charming and cultured Mr. Erskine "who had fallen, however, into bad habits of silence", is also a

pleasant person: "... an old gentleman of considerable charm and culture".

The protagonist of the novel is described using evaluative adjectives: a young man of extraordinary personal beauty; a wonderful young man; he was good-looking; he was very earnest and had a beautiful nature; he must be a good-looking chap. "He is very good-looking, assented Lord Henry; He was a marvelous type".

Here are a few more examples illustrating the beauty of the protagonist of the novel: "And how charming he had been at dinner the night before, as with startled eyes and lips parted in frightened pleasure he had sat opposite to him at the club, the red candle shades staining to a richer rose the wakening wonder of his face." Using an epithet, the author emphasizes the beauty of youth: "Grace was his, and the white purity of boyhood, and beauty such as old Greek marbles kept for us" (Wilde, 2011). In *Dorian*, people see the ideal of beauty, and some the ideal of a person: "Charming boy; And how did Lady Brandon describe this wonderful young man? Oh, my beautiful love! As a rule, he is charming to me ". The author uses an allusion that reflects the strength of Sybil's feelings: Prince Charming. To express the beauty of Dorian's mother, the author uses the epithet: "A beautiful woman risking everything for a mad passion"; superlative adjective: "And his mother was very beautiful? - Margaret Devereux was one of the loveliest creatures I ever saw, Harry"; intensifying seme: an extraordinarily beautiful girl. When describing Dorian's beloved, the author used comparative adjectives: "Oh, she is better than good - she is beautiful, she had never seemed to me more exquisite"; metaphor: "Her hair clustered round her face like dark leaves round a pale rose". The beauty of a young girl cannot be overshadowed even by shabby men's clothes: "When she came on in her boy's clothes, she was perfectly wonderful. She had all the delicate grace". Dorian himself loves and considers her beautiful: "Dorian says she is beautiful...; I loved you because you were marvelous "(Wilde, 2011). To reflect the tenderness and fragility of Sybil, the author compares her to a white daffodil: shook like a white narcissus.

The verbalization of this semantic frame emphasizes the extraordinary beauty of the protagonist. His beauty "lies on the surface", it is obvious and is noted more than once by other heroes of the novel. This frame is verbalized by adjectives with a positive connotation, comparative and superlative adjectives, intensifying semes, epithets, comparisons, allusion, metaphor using the following lexical units: beautiful, cultivated, the elect, beauty, brilliant, fantastic, charmed, charming, charm and culture, wonder, wonderful, wonderfully, smile, fascinating, delightful, marvelous, purity, old Greek marbles, love, lovely, Prince Charming, exquisite, rose, white narcissus, admirable, good- nature, good- looking , good, extraordinary.



In Oscar Wilde's novel "The Portrait of Dorian Gray", beauty is the driving force in the lives of the three main characters: Dorian, Basil and Sir Henry.

This novel embodies the relationship between beauty and morality. Dorian Gray's life is dominated by physical attraction. His beauty lies in his youth. Dorian's perception of beauty allows him to love. He believes that because of his beauty, he can achieve whatever he wants regardless of the consequences and still be loved by his friends. He uses his beauty to soften his evil deeds. Dorian said, «I don't want to know anything about her. I like other people's scandals, but I'm not interested in my own. For Dorian, youth and beauty are the most precious things. Beauty is the most important thing in his life.» He then saw the image of him painted by Basil reflecting his sins and this changed his view. «I hope it's not about me. I'm tired tonight. I want to be someone else,» Dorian said. Dorian's moral beauty lies in his own portrait. The portrait imitated his life. Eventually he realized that beauty would not help him escape from his evil deeds.

Oscar Wilde's novel "The Portrait of Dorian Gray" is a story of moral corruption through aesthetic beauty. In this novel, Basil Hallward gave young Dorian Gray a portrait of himself. After speaking with Sir Henry Wotton, Dorian expressed a wish to change his life forever. Dorian's love of physical beauty and his carefree lifestyle destroy the lives of everyone he comes into contact with. It is the physical obsessions that destroy the lives of all the characters in this novel.

### *Conclusion*

The analysis of the specifics of the verbal representation of the concept "Beauty" in O. Wilde's novel "The Picture of Dorian Grey" revealed the existence of exceptionally rich nominative continuum of the concept "Beauty". The mentioned continuum is marked by contradictoriness manifesting the variety in the perception of the phenomenon of beauty.

Contradictoriness of the rich nominative continuum of the concept "Beauty" is objectivated in the integration of the contradictory concepts "good" and "evil", "life" and "death" in the conceptual sphere of the concept.

As a result of the componential analysis of the lexeme of "Beauty" in the text of Oscar Wilde's novel "The Picture of Dorian Grey" the targeted components were identified. The mentioned components vary in their status, in other words, some of them are core, while others being peripheral.

As a result of the conceptual analysis 4 semantic frames (Beautiful Things;

Beautiful People; Beautiful Feelings; Appearance) were constructed.

The analysis revealed that in Oscar Wilde's novel "The Picture of Dorian Grey" the semantic frame "Beautiful people" is most clearly represented, since it reflects the deep essence of the concept "Beauty".

The analysis revealed that the perception of beauty and the doctrine of taste reflect the dynamics of the development of humanity.

The contradictoriness of the verbalizers of the concept "Beauty" helps the reader to trace the process of the moral decay of the hero's personality, the transformation of the hero from an innocent and talented young man into a vicious monster.

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# LINGUISTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SLOGANS IN PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE

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## ABSTRACT

This research paper intends to analyze and identify the role of slogans and their linguistic characteristics in professional discourse. As far as we are concerned, the usage of the word in the slogan text is so meaningful. In most cases, the meaning of the word in the slogan has a figurative meaning and serves commercial purposes in professional discourse. A wide range of English slogans as the object of the research found in different professional discourses has been analyzed in this research.

We would like to explain the formulation of the problem.

1. What are the most common figurative language used by the producer in making an English slogan seen from the figurative language and stylistics?
2. And What are the meanings of the slogans used in an advertisement in professional discourse?
3. This research paper focuses on the qualitative method as well as the quantitative one. The collected data of English slogans advertising from English newspapers or English magazines are analyzed qualitatively based on related theories or approaches, such as Semantics and stylistics.

*Keywords: slogans, frequency of occurrences, functions, syntactic forms, discourse, figurative meanings*

## *Introduction*

Over the past few decades, professional discourse, including tourism, business, and medical discourse, has been growing fast. When it comes to types of advertising for professional discourse, one of the most effective methods usually includes a slogan. The word of the slogan of advertising usually has special characteristics, like persuasive characteristic.

According to Sukini (2005, p. 162), “the meaning of a slogan is a short sentence that has persuasive character, and the arrangement in sentences is not as usual. ”As we know, a slogan is an example of linguistics. Many times, people find it difficult to comprehend the slogan, as the advertiser usually puts the meaning implicitly. In the effort to understand the meaning of what the advertiser or producer means in the slogan, a deep understanding is required. The slogan is a very important element for a brand/ product because it makes much easier to attract consumers and increase consumers’ desires. The slogan can be found in almost all professional discourse through mass media such as TV, radio, newspaper, and magazine. As a slogan must be concise while informative and persuasive, making a successful slogan can be a challenging task in terms of syntactic construction. Professional slogans are produced carefully by slogan creators, it is interesting to explore how the syntactic patterns of such slogans are constructed. To gain an insightful understanding of this matter, this research aims to focus on the frequency of syntactic occurrences in slogans in professional discourse moreover to identify their syntactic forms, linguistic characteristic, and communicative functions.

As for tourism slogan, it is regarded as a verbal vehicle to transmit a good meaningful message to persuade prospective tourists (Crisan & Berariu, 2013). For tourism advertising, a slogan has been one of the most effective tools used to increase a market in the tourism industry (Salehi & Farahbakhsh, 2014). Tourism slogans are also most often used in advertising because they communicate very well the unique values using a branding strategy for a country’s tourism (Özdemir & Adan, 2012). According to Pike (2004), a destination slogan is expected to make propositions based on one or more of the following key values: functional destination personality, affective qualities, travel motivation benefits, and symbols of self-expression.

### *Slogans in Tourism*

- There's no place like it (New South Wales)
- The Mediterranean as it once was (Croatia)
- Kansas, as big as you think (Kansas)
- Feels like coming home (Mississippi)
- There's no place like home (Kansas)
- It's like a whole other country (Texas)
- A world of treasures (Cambodia)
- A whole world on a single island (Cyprus)
- Soul of the earth (Guatemala)
- Little big country (Slovakia)
- Come as you are. Leave different (Louisiana)

In the business professional discourse, slogans are believed to be a driving force to rival competitors. An ordinary consumer buys what he is influenced by directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously. All these effects contributed together are considered as the final criterion of the advertising slogan—selling power. According to Qusheng and Weiwei (2013), one of the effective ways to maximize the benefit of selling power is to make a product appear unique.

A slogan seems to be a short and memorable catchy phrase usually used to advertise or promote something. In product, a slogan has become a brand slogan that has the meaning of a small set of words or a short phrase that a business uses to make its company and product attractive to a number of consumers. As Smetoniene assumes that advertising slogans can make it easier to memorize the advertisement itself, as they consolidate ideas represented in the introduction and, at the same time, clearly express the main idea of the advertisement.

In today's marketplace, almost all brands employ slogans; they enhance a brand's image, aid in its recognition and recall, and help create brand differentiation in consumers' minds. While there is general consensus on the importance of the device itself, little agreement exists as to what constitutes a successful slogan. As such, although marketing managers use slogans extensively, they are often at a loss when it comes to creating them. Based on our investigation, we propose in this article a series of slogans used in Business discourse.

*Slogans in Business discourse*

- Just Do It – Nike
- Think different - Apple
- A Diamond is Forever - De Beers.
- When you care enough to send the very best - Hallmark.
- I'd walk a mile for a Camel - Camel.
- Quality never goes out of style - Levi's.
- Finger Lickin' Good – KFC
- - Finger lickin' good (KFC)
- - For everything else, there's MasterCard (MasterCard)
- - Eat fresh (Subway)
- - Save money. Live better. ...
- - Have a break. ...
- - Red Bull gives you wings (Red Bull)

Based on the empirical research, we have provided a list of some unique and catchy slogans in medical discourse to inspire and motivate whoever reads or listens. Slogans motivate readers to encourage people to keep healthy and stay in shape.

*Slogans in medical discourse*

- Improving Lives Together
- Health Equity, Always
- Reach your health potential
- You will feel well nurtured here. What is this? Report Ad
- Healthy does not mean expensive
- Don't take health for granted
- Health is the first step to prosperity
- Healthcare is wealth.
- 5-Star Care.
- Advanced Medicine, Trusted Care.
- Always Caring. Always Here.
- Amazing Things Are Happening Here.
- Because Your Life Matters.
- Believe in We.
- Depend on Us for Life.
- Doctor to the Community.

- Every life, every moment, every day.
- Feel better.
- First. Best. Always.
- Focused on You.
- Healing experiences- for everyone, all the time.
- Healing Hands. Caring Hearts.
- Healing health care. Together.
- The name you know. The doctors you trust.
- The region's only catholic health system.
- Time. It's the cornerstone of excellent health care.
- Total Care. Inside and out.
- You get better because we are better.
- Your Hospital for Life.

### *Methodology*

This study aims at responding to the following research questions:

- What is the frequency of occurrences of slogans' syntactic forms in professional discourse?
- What are the syntactic forms and communicative functions of slogans in professional discourse?
- What type of figurative language is used in English slogans in professional discourse?

After collecting enough slogans, a linguistic analysis was conducted. Syntactic, structural, and grammatical, as well as lexical features of the slogans, were examined mostly qualitatively but also quantitatively where appropriate. Qualitative research is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions and dive deeper into the problem. We used qualitative research to collect and analyze the data.

This study is descriptive research that adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches to analyze slogans used in professional discourse for advertising and promotion. First, a quantitative approach is used to identify and demonstrate the frequency of occurrence of syntactic structures employed in country tourism, business, and medical slogans. Second, the study employs a qualitative approach to describe the analyzed data focusing on forms and communicative functions found in professional discourse.

The methods below were used to examine the study: 1) Theoretical literature anal-

ysis and concepts were used to provide some theoretical backgrounds for the problems. 2) The quantitative approach was used to explain and identify the number of words and keywords frequently used in business advertising slogans.

It was a research design to describe what types of figurative language and the contextual meanings of figurative language are found in English slogans of commercial products, destinations, or medical services. Stylistic features were mostly excluded from the analysis as they were beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, extralinguistic factors, such as typography and layout, may also influence the consumer's perception of the advertisement, but they were also excluded from this research, as the focus was purely linguistic. The syntactic, structural, grammatical, and lexical features examined were mostly selected based on what were considered the most distinguishing qualities of advertisements by Leech (1966).

### *Result and discussion*

#### *Analysis of Medical slogans*

##### Syntactic, structural, and grammatical features

The data analysis in this study was carried out in three major stages. In the first stage, the focus was on identifying the syntactic structures used in medical slogans. In the second stage, those structures were analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. At this stage, the analysis investigated further the relation between syntactic forms and communicative functions. In the final stage, the most used patterns (both form and function) found in the slogans were discussed.

- According to empirical research, the scarcity of passive constructions in advertising language can be confirmed. Advertisers seem always to avoid the passive voice unless some specific conditions demand it.
- According to the present data, modal verbs are not frequently used in medical corpus, with the exception of *can*, which was found in four slogans altogether, and one instance of *will*, all modal verbs were absent. The modal *will* occur in a sentence expressing a promise:

Examples: You won't believe your eyes.

The slogan could be paraphrased as: "You cannot help but disbelieve your own eyes"



- Judging from the data from the research, pronouns are used in a very clear manner in advertising language of medical discourse because advertisers face the challenge of personalizing the message for the mass audience in a way that leaves the impression of addressing the consumer individually. The present data seem to confirm this claim as the pronoun you, which is very common in informal, face-to-face communication, abounded in the corpus. The findings are presented in the table below:

The number of pronouns found in the corpus of medical discourse.

*Table № 1*

	<i>The UK SAMPLE</i>	<i>THE US SAMPLE</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
I	0	1	1
You	14	44	58
He	0	0	0
She	0	0	0
it	5	3	8
we	4	4	8
they	0	2	2

The slogans in the corpus of medical discourse were generally not very long but nevertheless often consisted of more than one sentence (1.33 sentences on average). They included approximately 7.3 words, and the average number of words per sentence was 6.43. The slogans collected from the websites of the clinics in the United Kingdom were slightly longer than those of the clinics in the United States: the former had approximately 1.39 sentences and 8.12 words in a slogan, while the numbers were 1.26 and 6.29 for the latter. The British slogans also tended to have more words in a sentence than their American counterparts (5.89 vs. 4.99). The average number of words and sentences in the slogans and the average number of words in each sentence are presented in the Table below:

	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>SENTENCES/ SLOGANS</i>	1.39	1.26	1.33
<i>WORDS/ SLOGANS</i>	8.12	6.29	7.3
<i>WORDS/SENTENCE</i>	5.89	4.99	6.43

*Analysis of Tourism slogans*

As a tourism slogan is always accompanied by its logo to highlight the tourism image of the country, it could be argued that a tourism slogan does not really work without a logo. In addition, the analysis of syntactic structure is prioritized, and therefore punctuation marks such as exclamation marks, which could be regarded as a crucial element of a slogan, are not taken into account. (See the Chart on p. 146).

Overall, four types of syntactic forms were identified in the 100 tourism slogans. There were 59 phrases, 38 sentences, two clauses, and one lexical word. For a closer look, noun phrases appeared most frequently (47 slogans), followed by declarative and imperative sentences (19 and 18 slogans, respectively). Other types of phrases (VP, AdjP, PP) were not popular forms of tourism slogans. For sentences and clauses, only one slogan used an interrogation, and 2 used adjectival clauses. Interestingly, despite what the literature on slogan conciseness states, there was only one slogan with a single word. Note that the creative use of language was discovered in 4 slogans. They do not follow traditional English grammatical structures, the details of which will be discussed in the next section. Among other rhetorical devices often used in tourism slogans, the following can be observed: repetition (anaphora, epiphora), simile, hyperbola, Oxymoron and hyperbole. (see Table 2)

*Repetition:*

Great Faces. Great Places (SOUTH DAKOTA)

Big County, Big Skies, Big Future (LINCOLNSHIRE)

*Simile:*

There is no place like it (New South Wales)

Kansas, as big as you think (Kansas)

Feels like coming home (Mississippi)

There is no place like home (Kansas)

It is like a whole other country (Texas)

*Hyperbola:*

A world of treasures (Cambodia)

A whole world on a single island (Cyprus)

Soul of the earth (Guatemala)

*Oxymoron:*

Little big country (Slovakia)

Come as you are. Leave different (Louisiana)

*Table № 2. Frequency of occurrences of tourism slogans' syntactic forms*

Syntactic form	Type	Frequency	Examples
Phrase		59	
	Noun phrase	47	Pure Russia Turkey Unlimited the smiling coast of Africa
	Adjectival phrase	3	stunningly different so much more Truly Mediterranean
	Verb phrase	4	Arrive and revive experience, explore & enjoy Best enjoyed slowly
	Creative use of language	4	Definitely Dubai truly Asia Travellers welcome Fiji Me
	Prepositional phrase	1	for the best moments of your life
Sentence		38	
	Declaratives	20	I need Spain There's NOTHING like Australia You have to feel it
	Imperatives	17	See it! Feel it! Love it! let's explore Jump into Ireland
	Interrogatives	1	And you think you've done it all?
Clause		2	
	Adjectival clause	2	where it all begins where dreams come to life
Lexis		1	
Total	Adjective	1 100	Sensational

### *Analysis of Business slogans*

#### Adidas – “Impossible is nothing”

Adidas introduced its mainstream marketing slogan “Impossible is nothing” in the year 2004 with the intention to capture the essence of the Adidas brand in one catchy short phrase. The slogan became the concept behind their brand positioning, “forever sport,” and aimed to communicate Adidas’ passion for sport emotionally. Adidas’ advertising slogan was a cleverly chosen phrase that says, “*Of course, I can do the impossible. That’s nothing for me!*” The slogan not only encourages athletes participating in championships like the Olympics to break records that were considered to be impossible to break but also communicates Adidas’ belief that professionals and hobby sportsmen can go beyond the impossible.

#### Nokia – “Connecting People”

Although the slogan consists only of two words, it clearly communicates the company’s vision – to connect people with each other, no matter how far the distance is between them – in a straightforward manner that is easy to remember.

#### Apple – “Think Different”

Apple’s “Think Different” advertising slogan was a turning point for the company as a whole, and it became a cult – or even a lifestyle if you so want – to think differently than the vast majority that was using Microsoft’s products.

After the data was collected and organized in the table by using Microsoft Excel, the words in each slogan were counted. The results are shown in the following table;

The number of words used in slogans

Number of words used in slogans												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Slogan	2	30	72	63	47	20	16	7	6	2	1	1
Percentage	0.75	11.24	26.97	23.60	17.60	7.49	5.99	2.62	2.25	0.75	0.37	0.37

### *Conclusion*

This research paper analyzed and identified syntactic structures and linguistic characteristics of slogans frequently used in tourism, medical, and business discourse. As for the tourism slogan, the findings show that noun phrases and simple declarative and imperative sentences

were the most frequent syntactic forms. In all types of syntactic forms, the name of the country seems to be an obligatory constituent.

With the main purpose of tourism slogans to advertise and invite tourists and holidaymakers to their countries. To make it more attractive, the name of the country needs modifiers. There are several techniques found in the production of tourism slogans in this research. For example, a slogan can be made simple by providing common positive attributes or arousing by presenting unexpected contrasts. Furthermore, as a tourism slogan never appears without its logo, an integration of semiotic aspects into a linguistic study can help complete the full understanding of tourism advertisement.

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# LINGVUOCOGNITIVE AND LINGVUCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONCEPT “LIFE” IN MODERN ENGLISH

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## ABSTRACT

The article deals with the problem of exploring the specificity of linguo-cognitive and linguocultural dimensions of the concept “Life” in Modern English.

Some integral and differential markers of cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology have been identified.

In the given paper conceptual analysis has been considered to be the most effective way to determine the structure of the concept. The mentioned type of analysis provided: (Barsalou, L. W. (1992). *Frames, concepts, and conceptual fields* in Lehrer A. & Kittay E. F. (eds.) *Frames, fields, and contrasts*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum), (Eugene, H. (1996). *Cognitive Linguistics in the Redwoods: The Expansion of a New Paradigm in Linguistics*).

- Determination of the most complete repertoire of the linguistic means, objectifying the concept;
- Adequate description of the semantics of the mentioned linguistic means;
- Cognitive interpretation of the results of the analysis of the semantic space of the concept;
- Representation of the concept as a global mental unit imprinted with national specifics.

Conceptual analysis of the concept “Life” revealed its great significance in the communication of the representatives of the English-speaking culture and its special status in the language system.

*Keywords: concept; worldview; cognitive linguistics; linguoculturology; conceptual analysis; componential analysis*

## *Introduction*

One of the tasks of modern linguistics is the study of the specificity of the results of cognition in language. This type of research should imply the research of human cognitive activity and should reflect the specificity of lexicological, historical-cultural, economic-geographical, and social data.

Investigating linguistic problems, scientists research human nature, more precisely, emotional and mental spheres, ethical and aesthetic origins, the system of values, world perception and cognition. Humanity's spiritual experience is reflected in language. (Croft, W., Cruse, D.A. (2004). *Cognitive Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.).

The content of the concept "Life" comprises all the main aspects of human existence. The metaphorical connections of "Life" are determined by associative links. The mentioned fact testifies to the linguistic value of this concept.

Language and the world are constantly changing. New realities change the world, shape the style of our speech, and determine the specificity of our perception of the world. When reflecting the new reality, the results of our perception are objectified in words. New realities influence the vocabulary and enrich it with new associations. (Kearney, M. (1975) *World View Theory and Study.*"Annual Review of Anthropology).

The continuity of the associative field of a concept varies in time - new realities shape and transform the continuum of the associative field. We interpret the transformation occurring in the continuum of the associative field of the concept as a continuous reproduction (interpretation and reinterpretation) of reality.

Associations are not stored in human consciousness and memory in isolation from each other. Sometimes the connections between different entities seem paradoxical and contradictory. However, the specificity of the interpretation and reinterpretation of reality by the language speakers is revealed in the paradox and contradiction of the mentioned connections.

In the process of interpretation, we explore the meaning, understand the phenomenon and form an opinion about it. Understanding implies adjusting the opinion formed about the phenomenon, integrating it in the network of knowledge. During interpretation, the new knowledge structures are connected to the existing ones. The mentioned structures create the network of representations of the world and reflect the specificity of the forms of its functioning. (Hiebert, G. (1997). *Conversion and Worldview Transformation*. *International Journal of Frontier Missions*).



Conceptual analysis of “Life” was based on the study of the specificity of word agreement, which provides the opportunity of exploring the surface expression of the deep associative contours of the name. Through the conceptual analysis, the representations of language and culture carriers were identified. The mentioned representations are “hidden” in the word agreement. They reflect the logical connections of the denotatum and reveal the results of the human’s irrational, emotional and individual perception of the world.

The knowledge about the world is made up of the individual’s own knowledge, which is formed in the course of direct, sensory perception of the surrounding world and from the transmission of the results of scientific and everyday perception of the world by generations.

A person’s worldview is formed during his life, as a result of all his contacts with the world. A person feels, perceives, realizes, and reflects the world. In this process, a person imagines “possible worlds”. Worldviews are nationally determined - speakers of different languages see and segment the world in different ways.

Interpreting the world, a person “removes” from the model of the world everything that he considers to be superfluous and odd. A person restores the lustre to what is “faint” and corrects what is “wrong”. Man perfects the model of the world until it takes an ideal form. In the process of perfecting the model of the world, man also perfects himself.

The idealized model of the world does not comprise all the components and parameters of the object. Only what is needed by humanity is subject to evaluation. It is evaluation that makes a person the vector on which the world is oriented. The idealized model of the world integrates not only what already exists, but also what a person aspires to. (Wierzbicka, A. (1992). *Semantics, culture, and cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press), (Long, J. L.(1989). *World View and Meaning in Life*. M. A. Thesis, University of Houston).

The worldview materializes the cultural and philosophical hypostasis of the language. The worldview captures both the national character and the national worldview.

The research proved that it is important to use a complex research methodology for the analysis of the specifics of the worldview. The mentioned type of methodology enables an in-depth analysis of the linguistic objectifiers of the fragment of the worldview.

The integrative approach - the synthesized version of the approaches generated

within the framework of cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology has been applied in the research.

Naturally, the question arises: what unites cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology? - The answer to this question sounds the following way:

- Cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology are developed within the framework of one common thinking space;
- The dyad “language-human being” is relevant for cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology, both operate with an integrative approach;
- Since linguistics is an interdisciplinary field of thought, it is quite natural that it applies both linguistic and non-linguistic methods. Since the interaction of language and culture is carried in the human mind, any linguocultural research represents cognitive research at the same time.

What is the difference between cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology? - The answer to this question sounds the following way: the subject of the study of cognitive linguistics is the cognitive concept, while the subject of the study of linguoculturology being the linguocultural or cultural concept.

In cognitive linguistics, the concept is understood as a unit of memory, mental lexicon, conceptual system and language of the mind (*lingua mentalis*), the unit the worldview imprinted in the human psyche. (F. Sharifian, G. B. Palmer, *International Cognitive Linguistics Conference*, & ebrary, Inc (Eds.)). John Benjamins.).

From the point of view of cognitive linguistics, the concept is localized in consciousness: concepts are complex discrete units of consciousness, with the help of which the human thinking process is carried out. A concept acts as a “repository” of human knowledge.

The difference between cognitive and linguocultural concepts imply the following factors:

- In cognitive linguistics, one language unit corresponds to one concept; In linguoculturology the concept can be objectified and is objectified through a number of linguistic units;
- In cognitive linguistics each word corresponds to its own concept; In linguoculturology the word-identifier of the concept is represented by limited number of culturally significant units;
- In cognitive linguistics special attention is paid to the types of concepts, their systemic organization and relationships. Linguocultural concept is a structure of consciousness, in which typical values for society are represented.

Value is always at the core of the linguocultural concept. Linguoculturology tries to determine the value orientations of society.

The cognitive interpretation of the concept has a certain drawback: with this interpretation, it is quite difficult to separate the concept from other types of mental formations. (Cienki, A. (2007). *Frames, idealized cognitive models, and domains*. The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics. New York: Oxford University Press.).

According to the mentioned point of view, a person thinks not in a national language, but by means of the universal subject code of the mind. Concepts represent a kind of “building material”, elements of the thinking process from which complex conceptual pictures are formed.

First, the proposed definition can be applied to the term “notion”. Secondly, we cannot agree with the viewpoint that the national language does not influence a human being’s thinking process, perception of the world and interpretation of reality.

Language does not exist outside culture, just as culture does not exist outside language. The fact that culture is “included” in language is an indisputable fact, because language as a means of communication includes everything related to the cultural-traditional competence of its bearers. The mentioned competence is transmitted from generation to generation through language.

Naturally, people think through the universal subject code, but this does not mean that their national language is “excluded” from the thinking process. (Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Steven Seidman, eds. *Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.).

Linguistic categories, to some extent, give direction to the thought in the mind of the speaker. Thus, a concept is not simply a unit of thought imprinted with value markers. In the process of understanding values, linguoculturalists concentrate on the worldview representing values.

When analysing the specifics of the worldview representing values, linguoculturalists rely on the following statements:

- The worldview marked by values includes both general and specific aspects;
- The worldview marked by values is reconstructed in the language in the form of a set of interconnected evaluative judgments, correlating with the fields of law, religion and morality, as well as with typical folklore stories;
- In the worldview marked by values, the important ideas for the given culture, value dominants, the combination of which creates a specific type of culture preserved in the language, are evidenced in the worldview;

- Within the premises of one specific language culture, the worldview is a heterogeneous phenomenon, as different social groups have different values;
- The worldview marked by values exists in both collective and individual consciousness. (Long, J. L.(1989). *World View and Meaning in Life*. M. A. Thesis, University of Houston)

The research is based on the following provisions:

1. Any natural language reflects a specific form of perception and organization (conceptualization) of the world;
2. The meanings in the language are united in a specific integral system and form a collective philosophy;
3. The specific form of conceptualization of reality characteristic of language is partly universal, and partly determined by national specificity;
4. Both in naive and scientific worldviews, a person absorbs all the information through the cognitive system. Thanks to the mentioned system a person realizes the essence and specificity of reality, gains knowledge, forms a point of view and plans his/her actions;
5. There is no full identity between the world discreteness and the reflection of reality in language, although there is a certain correspondence between them, without which language would not be able to perform its communicative function;
6. The presence of certain limits in the material world leads to a certain universalism in the form of linguistic segmentation of reality;
7. The structural peculiarity and content specificity of the nominative field formed around the concept is determined by the status of the concept (dominant/peripheral) in the linguistic worldview constructed by the nation;
8. Defining the concept continuum is possible only through the integration of the units fixed in the dictionary, the texts and the data encoded in the consciousness of the informants;
9. An important component of the concept continuum is the associative dimension of the concept, in which the specificity of the “value marking” of the concept in the consciousness of the nation is evidenced.

Cognitive Linguistics and linguoculturology apply an integrative approach. This is completely justified, since in most cases to obtain objective research data, it is necessary to synthesize the knowledge obtained from different thinking spaces.

Thus, cognitive linguistics and linguoculturology consider both purely linguistic and interdisciplinary research data.

When describing any linguistic research, it is essential to justify the effectiveness of the method applied in it. The effectiveness of the method is determined by the extent to which the research method meets the goal set in the research. (Croft, W., Cruse, D.A. (2004). *Cognitive Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.).

Implementation of the set goal is related to solving such tasks as:

1. Revealing the linguistic mechanisms of actualization of the concept “life” in English-language texts;
2. Exploring universal and unique (culturally determined) markers of the concept “Life”;
3. Identifying ideas about life in the consciousness of English native speakers;
4. Determining the relevant metaphorical models for the meaning of life;
5. Analysing the meaning of life in lexicographical sources;
6. Defining the repertoire of the relevant phraseological units for the meaning of life.

The goals of the conceptual analysis of the concept are:

- Determination of the most complete composition of the linguistic means, providing objectification of the research concept;
- Full description of the semantics of the mentioned linguistic means;
- Cognitive interpretation of the results of the analysis of the semantic space of the concept “Life”;
- Modelling the content of the concept “Life” as a global mental unit imprinted with national specificity.

Due to its lexical basis, conceptualization is integrated into the terminological system of linguoconceptology. Linguoconceptology is considered to be the continuation of classical, structural and functional semantics. Linguoconceptology is enriched with the data from cultural studies, cognitive science, sociology, history, and other disciplines. Moreover, linguoconceptology is a specific type of semantics, which aims at studying culturally determined elements of the mental lexicon.

The main research methods - componential analysis and field theory - were transferred from structural semantics to linguoconceptology: semantic signs of the concept obtained as a result of the componential analysis are located in different segments of the semantic space - in the core and in the periphery.

However, the difference between semantics and linguoconceptology is evident: the research object of semantics is represented by meaning, while the research object (concept) of linguoconceptology is much broader: it has a “penetrating” charac-

ter and includes the semantics of textual and discourse formations. The semantic features of the mental units are identified in the textual and discourse formations. (Coulson, S. (2001). *Semantic Leaps; Frame – shifting and Conceptual Blending*. Cambridge University Press.).

Linguoconceptual studies are mainly focused on the study of those specific mental units that are imprinted with cultural specificity and have expression in language.

Language is an integral part of culture, as well as a means of acquiring, transmitting, and storing culturally meaningful information. Language can accumulate and convey what has been recorded over the centuries in the form of set word combinations and cognitive models. Therefore, conceptual analysis provides the identification of the archaic knowledge about the world. The analysis of the worldview's fragments is based on the selection of the linguistic units through which concepts are represented.

Since the linguistic worldview, limited by the framework of national culture, reflects the people's worldview, the methodology of the analysis of the concept of a person's inner world comprises the following principles:

- Interpretation of the meanings of the constructions, providing objectification of the markers;
- Identification of the taxonomic marker of frequency, characteristic of many concepts;
- Determination of common typological signs of the concept according to taxonomic markers;
- Generalization of characteristics of the concept;
- Exploration of the conceptual structures, cognitive models, and schemes of the linguistic actualization of the concept in language.

The study of the conceptual structure provides the opportunity of exploring the deeper and more essential features of the subject or phenomenon.

Comprising a complex of signs, the concept has a heterogeneous structure. From this point of view, the lexical level is most informative. It is by concentrating on the mentioned level that it becomes possible to reveal the signs through which the structure of the concept is formed.

In the research, the model of the linguistic expression of the concept "Life" was constructed through the componential analysis of the linguistic objectifiers of the concept.

The performed analysis ensured the segmentation of the meaning into its compo-

nents. The mentioned procedure involves not only revealing the relations between the elements included in a particular meaning, but also identifying the relations between different linguistic units.

The componential analysis revealed the integral connections between the elements, which, in turn, ensured the economy and adequacy of the descriptive system.

Thus, the implementation of the componential analysis provided a detailed, exhaustive, accurate, and specific description of the linguistic objects of the concept.

### *Results and Discussion*

The analysis of the data revealed that the concept “Life” is characterised by:

- Multidimensionality due to the presence of semantically heterogeneous components;
- Ethno-specificity;
- Nominative density due to the variety of means of verbalization;
- Discursive (sociocultural, gender and axiological) variability;
- Centring on the discourse - the ability to perform the function of the initial organizer of the discourse.

The analysis of the results of the actualization of the meaning - the shift from the abstract unit of the dictionary to the speaking individual - revealed the following regularities:

- As the unity of lexical meanings fixed in dictionaries and individual forms realized in speech, the unit “Life” represents the whole cognitive structure, revealed as a result of the analysis of the means of actualizing the meaning;
- Lexicographic sources indicate that life is a fact of existence, a period of time, conditions of life, biography;
- The multiplicity of the concept “Life” manifests the variety of human life. The factor of subjective interpretation is especially important – it is related to the individual perception of the word and subjective attitude to it;
- The continuum of the concept “Life” is much more diverse in the English-speaking culture than in lexicographic sources;
- In the consciousness of English language speakers, the essence of life is determined by the place of residence, living environment, purpose of life;
- English language speakers give a dominant status to work, love, family, home, personal and public life;
- The metaphorical and phraseological continuum associated with the research

concept is quite diverse – metaphors and phraseological units objectify: correlation of money, time and life; Desire for novelties and discoveries; Fullness of life's with surprises and the possibility of doing the unexpected; The need to move forward; People's tendency to make mistakes in life; The difference between reality and perception of reality; Incorrect view on the reality; Probability of unexpected development of the situation in case of mistakes; The need to make efforts to achieve the goal; The alternation of success and failure in a person's life, as well as a person's inability to control his own life; Filling one's own life with important things and events; Alternation of calmness and excitement; Stabilization of the situation after excitement and difficulties; The need to use opportunities; The need to make efforts to achieve a goal; The need for movement, action and change in life; Coexistence of light and dark, positive and negative sides; The need for constant effort to overcome obstacles; The need for hard work and effort to achieve a goal; the need to restore energy; The need to move forward and move towards the goal; The difficulty of being at a crossroads and choosing one of the available roads; The need to anticipate the future and the inability to predict other people's actions; Finding your own place in life; The need for patience and effort to discover the beauty of life; Compliance with moral principles in life and the need to make the right choice; The need to make efforts to maintain relationships; The alternation of competition, winning and losing in life; Perceiving life as a mission; Happiness caused by discovering new things; The need for constant movement; Inability to exercise control over one's life and make choices; Circularity of life - dependence of life stages on each other; Consideration of life as a gift; Coexistence of comedy and tragedy in life; Perceiving life as a temple; The fate of a person's life; The opportunity to gain new knowledge and experience;

- The configuration of the concept "Life" is defined as a result of the analysis of the entire conceptual space;
- The multidimensionality of the concept is indicated by the variety of possibilities for the "agreement" of the element "life" with other elements;
- Not only the assessment but also the social status can be seen in word combinations;
- Attributes include evaluations of a moral-aesthetic nature;
- The personal experience of the individual plays an important role;
- English language native speakers give subjective content to life according to individual factors (age, gender, experience, origin, education, upbringing, profession, social status, faith, physical or spiritual condition, mood). (God-



dard, C., & Wierzbicka, A. (2014). *Words and meanings: lexical semantics across domains, languages, and cultures* (First edition). Oxford University Press.).

### *Conclusion*

The concept “Life” belongs to several core concepts. That is natural, since, from the existential point of view, it is the most significant phenomenon for any person. The universality of life is determined by the unity of the principles of human perception of the world and the similarity of the reflection of perception. This fact determines the formation of universal categories or semantic constants.

The specificity (nuclearity) of the status of the concept “Life” is explained by the following fact: when orienting in the world, a person relies on the principle of his/her own existence (“I am”), and for a person, “being” means, first of all, “being alive”.

The objectifying units (words) of the concept “Life” carry part of human experience. Therefore, it can be assumed that an individual’s vocabulary (lexis) corresponds to the autonomous worldview relevant to his/her linguistic personality. In such a case, any national-linguistic worldview should be viewed as a generalized form of worldviews of the individual-social and linguistic worldviews of all members of a specific ethnos. (Hiebert, G. (1997). *Conversion and Worldview Transformation*. *International Journal of Frontier Missions*).

The concept “Life” actualizes the social-historical practice of a person and the experience of being a human. Life is a multidimensional phenomenon; man has been trying to explain the secret of life for centuries. On the one hand, life is a form of biological existence of all living beings, on the other hand, it is much more than physiology - life is a value of the highest order.

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# DEFEATED EXPECTANCY – EFFECT OR SITUATION?

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## ABSTRACT

The article deals with the problem of exploring the essence of the phenomenon of defeated expectancy. The multidimensionality of the mentioned phenomenon provides the possibility of viewing the effect of the defeated expectancy from different perspectives.

It seems that there is no clear definition of the status of the defeated expectancy: the question - what is the defeated expectancy – is it an effect or a situation? - is still waiting to be answered. We consider the reason for this to be the fact that a complex analysis of the means of realizing the defeated expectation has not been carried out.

The conducted research gave us an opportunity to answer the mentioned question.

The factors causing the phenomenon of defeated expectancy have been integrated into two groups:

1. The factors related to the speaker,
2. The factors related to the situation.

*Keywords: expectations and anticipations; defeated expectancy; language game; lingo-cognitive modeling.*

## *Introduction*

The definition of the phenomenon of expectation by linguists differs according to the types of expectation. This fact leads to the aspectuality of the analysis of the mentioned phenomenon.

The majority of linguists distinguish communicative expectation (representing the principles of the relationship) from linguistic expectation (characterized by the language system). The definitions of the phenomenon of expectation differ according to different genesis of expectation, in other words, a specific definition is relevant only for an expectation with a specific genesis. The mentioned approach cannot provide a comprehensive view of the phenomenon of expectation in general.

The effect of the defeated expectancy, as a problem of an individual's emotional reaction to the perceived object (text), is observed in various fields of knowledge.

In the use of language, the speaker reveals his/her creative potential which implies the intentional violation of the linguistic norms as well as the manipulation through the misuse of the linguistic norms. It is through manipulation that the effect of the defeated expectancy is created.

The effect of the defeated expectancy occurs when the essence of the utterance turns out to be unexpected, in other words, when the generated version of the utterance turns out to be different from the predictable version. The effect of the defeated expectancy is observed on the basis of the two psycholinguistic phenomena - predictability and unpredictability.

In the research, the situation is viewed as the scheme that serves to describe mental representations. According to this model, the speaker dealing with this or that situation constructs an alternative situation - a counter-situation, which allows overcoming ambiguity and predicting the further development of the situation.

The factors affecting the production of the counter-situation are grouped into the factors:

1. That are related to the speaker's age, gender, social status and profession, degree of physical and moral maturity, language competence, presence, or absence of sense of humour, degree of emotionality.
2. That are related to the situation.

The situational factors comprise:

1. Composition of the text fragment.

2. The frequency of characters and situations of the text in the context of the given culture.
3. The means of perceiving the text (auditory or visual).
4. The language of narration (native or foreign).
5. Overcoming the ambiguity related to the sufficiency of the context.
6. Understanding the stylistic features of the text.

Constructing the counter-situation includes three main stages:

1. At the initial stage, the recipient is informed of a fragment (section) of the text, which includes an ambiguous (polysemantic) element.
2. The recipient produces an option to resolve the situation.
3. The recipient contrasts the counter-situation with the original scenario.

The incompliance between the counter-situation constructed by the recipient and the original situation creates the effect of the defeated expectancy. The main pillars that guide the recipient's thought are:

1. Relying on the previous context.
2. Relying on a similar situation.
3. Relying on a stereotype.

Text comprehension relies on peculiar forms of storage and functioning of socially significant knowledge. At first, a polysemantic word is perceived in a context that, at first glance, seems to be the only one. Only the node, in which the other meaning of the word is activated, reveals its multiple meanings and the possibility of developing a completely different scenario.

Defeated expectancy is related to the language game, in other words, there are points of intersection between defeated expectancy and the communication game: in order to adequately understand the language game, it is necessary that the recipient has experiential knowledge; in addition, the addressee must also take into account the cultural space in which communication takes place. Thus, defeated expectancy is precisely a communication game. Intentional creation of the situation of the defeated expectancy implies the deviation from the norm. Like any game, communication game requires considerable effort.

### *Methodology*

The knowledge and ideas about the world are organized in human consciousness. This fact ensures the quick availability of meanings in the process of perceiving and interpreting the message. Any act of interpretation involves relating information to the knowledge schemes. We can argue about the existence of an internal (mental) context. Obviously, this context is the basis for the generation and perception of the expression.

The success of the perception process is ensured by the constant correlation of the information coming from the external (textual) context with the internal context of interpretation. So, the cause of misunderstanding is not only ignorance of the meaning of words but also the difference in the mental lexicon of the communicators, which implies a discrepancy between the background knowledge, representations, associations, and mental images of communicators. The latter is determined by the peculiarities of the communicators' perceptual, cognitive and affective experience at the moment of perception.

The analysis of the phenomenon of defeated expectancy is focused on the search for conceptual constructs that have the ability to represent knowledge, emotion, and feeling in the form of an integral representational space. One of the possibilities for implementing the mentioned approach is the linguo-cognitive modeling of the situation of the defeated expectancy.

The research on the phenomenon of defeated expectancy is carried out at the intersection of cognitive linguistics and psycholinguistics. Therefore, defeated expectancy is discussed in connection with such psycholinguistic phenomena as the ambiguity of the text, expectation, prediction, and probability.

In the research, the features of the functioning of the cognitive mechanisms in the situation of the defeated expectancy are presented as the models of integration of mental spaces of expectation, explaining the strategic nature of the process of speech perception, taking into account the principle of probable prediction.

The ability to generate new models is significantly conditioned by the functioning of the anthropocentric paradigm in linguistics and the validity of the tools of cognitive psychology for psycholinguistic research.

An experiment was conducted in order to identify the causes of the situation of the defeated expectancy and to study its different aspects. The experimental research represents a description of the linguo-cognitive model of the defeated expectancy.

There is no model that covers all the features of the modeled object. However, this

is not necessary either since the task of modeling is to identify the essential features of the phenomenon of the defeated expectancy.

The process of the data processing of the experimental research involves “replaying” the situation or event presented by the text stimulus in the mind of informants. The next stage of the experimental research implies recording the informants’ reactions. Composition, completion, and elaboration affect the nature of the counter text (Coulson, S. & Fauconnier., G. 1999., *Fake Guns and Stone Lions: Conceptual and Privative Adjectives // Cognition and Function in Language* / B. Fox, D. Jurafsky & L. Michaelis (Eds.). - Palo Alto, CA: CSLI).

The representations of the same situation or phenomenon differ from individual to individual. The mentioned difference is conditioned by the difference between the life experiences of individuals. In the counter texts constructed by different individuals, different knowledge schemes are identified. The mentioned constructs are determined by the specifics of the individuals’ past experiences.

The analysis of the counter texts obtained as a result of the experimental research revealed that when understanding a verbal message and constructing an alternative verbal message, the speaker predicts the probability of this or that end of the situation. Probabilistic prediction is based on the expectations formed by matching the knowledge, viewpoints, external and internal contexts.

The phenomenon of the defeated expectancy, and therefore its empirical research, is quite specific: on the one hand, defeated expectancy is a psychological state, on the other hand, the effect of the defeated expectancy often appears in the dialogic speech and is evidenced in the verbal reaction of the individual perceiving the text.

In order to study the specifics of the text perception, we applied the method of completing the linguistic sign – the method of completion of the expression (Taylor, J.R., 1995., *Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory* [Text]. - 2nd ed / J.R. Taylor. - Oxford Clarendon Press, p. 327).

The method of completing the linguistic sign is based on the predetermined deformation of the text.

The full version of the text stimulus sounds the following way: The only difference between the saint and the sinner is that every saint has a past, and every sinner has a future.

The informants were asked to complete the text stimulus: The only difference between the saint and the sinner is that \_\_\_\_\_.

The informants produced the following counter-texts:

1. The saint is in heaven after death, while the sinner is in hell.
2. The saint is close to God, while the sinner is close to Devil.
3. The saint is dead, and the sinner is alive.
4. The saint is alive in Heaven, and the sinner is alive in Hell.
5. The saint is alive in Heaven, and the sinner is alive on Earth.
6. The saints are in the majority, while the sinners are in the minority.

The analysis revealed that the majority of the produced counter-texts are based on the following:

- The association of neighboring locations in space: “saint in heaven; the sinner in hell; saint with God; sinner with Devil.
- The association of contrast: dead-alive; Heaven-hell; majority-minority; heaven-earth; God-Devil.

Among the counter-texts produced by informants, the version of the original text was not evidenced.

In an “ordinary” text stimulus, the sequence of events is predictable. The “unpredictable” text stimulus is characterized by a certain “incompatibility” or “contradiction,” although here we are dealing not with the fantastic development of events but with the unexpectedness typical of real life.

When selecting the text stimuli, we relied on the idea that the proposed texts should describe more or less typical situations for real life so that the informants could easily imagine this or that situation and think of the end of the scenario.

Another important criterion for the selection of the material is the condensity of the form of the text stimuli since our goal is to minimize the influence of the external textual context and to identify the internal context of interpretation.

According to the creative cognitive approach, despite the mood, intention, and readiness for creative thinking, informants cannot suppress the influence of their past experiences. The mentioned experience determines the more or less typical ending of the text stimuli. The data analysis of the experiment confirmed that creative thinking can overcome the boundaries of one’s own knowledge and viewpoints, although a person can never be freed from his own knowledge and viewpoints.

The special interest of our research is to identify the impact of the human mental lexicon, the impact of human cognitive experience on the specifics of the percep-



tion of this or that text stimulus. Identifying the mentioned influence provides an opportunity to explain the reason (basis) for the formation of this or that expectation.

When perceiving and completing the text stimulus, informants operate with concepts that form certain groups during the experiment. The interaction of the elements of the reasoning process corresponds to the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier, G., 1994., *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language* [Text] / G. Fauconnier. – Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 190) as well as to the theory of conceptual blending (Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M., 1998., *Conceptual Integration Networks* [Text] / G. Fauconnier, M. Turner // *Cognitive Science*. 22 (2), VC: San Diego, p. 133-187). The mentioned theories are the basis of the research carried out in the paper.

According to the mentioned theories, the individual's ability to perform different types of activities (reasoning, forming a conclusion, etc.) is based on conceptual integration as the most important type of mental operation. In the mental space, information is combined according to its characteristics. This means that the elements of information are integrated into the mental space.

Mental space serves the conceptual organization and occupies an intermediate position between the situation to be described, linguistic structures, and its descriptors (Fauconnier, G., 1994., *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language* / G. Fauconnier. - Cambridge etc.: Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 190).

Thus, mental space is a temporary “storage” of relevant information (Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M. *Conceptual Integration Networks* [Text] / G. Fauconnier, M. Turner., 1998., *Cognitive Science*. 22 (2), VC: San Diego, p. 133-187.). Mental space, as conceptual integrity, is created in order to identify the peculiarities of perception and action.

In the paper, the linguistic structure is discussed in the context of the theory of mental spaces (Coulson, S. & Fauconnier, G., 1999., *Fake Guns and Stone Lions: Conceptual and Privative Adjectives* // *Cognition and Function in Language* / B. Fox, D. Jurafsky & L Michaelis (Eds.) - Palo Alto, CA: CSLI). According to the mentioned theory, incoming information is a kind of support for communicators to relate linguistic information to their own background knowledge and external context. It is with the support of this connection that understanding and processing of the verbal situation takes place.

### *Results and Discussion*

We don't consider the problem of an individual's emotional reaction to the perceived text to be a purely linguistic one – the mentioned problem intersects in the fields of cognitive psychology, discourse philosophy, and cybernetics, within which speech is considered to be the type of the probabilistic process.

Expectations for the correct development of communication manifest themselves in the situations of defeated expectancy, which arise on the basis of the two psycholinguistic phenomena - predictability and unpredictability. Defeated expectancy is related to the breakdown of social, behavioral, and linguistic stereotypes and is the basis of communicative expressiveness.

In cognitive psychology, expectations are explained in terms of prediction, in other words, in cognitive psychology, the effect of the defeated expectancy is related to the least expected outcome of the situation.

It should be noted that the events characterized by approximately the same probability of occurrence do not always surprise us with equal strength. Thus, surprise can be caused not by the low probability of the occurrence of this or that event but by the degree of the contrast between unexpected and expected but unoccurred events, in other words, surprise can be caused by the degree of the contrast between the expectation and the original development of the scenario.

Meyer and Schvaneveldt believe that the phenomenon of surprise arises when the expectations based on previously constructed schemas are disconfirmed (David E Meyer; Roger W Schvaneveldt., 1971., Facilitation in recognizing pairs of words: Evidence of a dependence between retrieval operations. *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 90(2):227-32).

Some scientists believe that the generation of expectations and anticipations is determined by the influence of implicit memory, while others think that the generation of expectations and anticipations is determined by the influence of the priming effect.

In the assessment of the implicit memory during priming, preference is given to a previously heard word or seen situation. This is a change that manifests itself under the influence of past experiences. Priming is carried out independently of the will of the individual and without the intervention of consciousness.

Priming may occur when one word is associated with another. Meyer and Schvaneveldt showed that one word can facilitate the processing and recognition of the next word. This effect is called associative priming and may arise as a result

of purely semantic connections between words or because specific words are often used together and are thus associated with each other (David E Meyer; Roger W Schvaneveldt., 1971., Facilitation in recognizing pairs of words: Evidence of a dependence between retrieval operations. *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 90(2):227-34).

In cognitive psychology, the priming effect is interpreted as an indirect assessment of the influence of past experience on a particular intellectual operation. Priming is related to implicit (unconscious) memory. It should be noted that priming is a stable indicator of memory.

Experiments confirm that accessing the effect of priming on text perception, in other words, accessing the specifics of the relationship between expectation and surprise, is not an easy task.

The expectancy-disconfirmation hypothesis is associated with the attempt to deal with this complex task. According to the mentioned hypothesis, the phenomenon of surprise occurs when expectations based on the previously constructed schemas are not confirmed.

In many studies, the concept of the mechanism of “guessing” (constructing a hypothesis) appears. The functioning of the mentioned mechanism is provided by the connection between the text and the background knowledge. Due to this connection, it is possible to predict the possible scenario of the development of the situation. According to R. Shenk and R. Abelson, the ability to predict is based on the ability to recall typical schemas (Schank, R.C. & Abelson, R., 1977., *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding*. Hillsdale, NJ: Earlbaum Assoc.).

The ability of probabilistic forecasting is related to the specifics of the organization of memory – the information about events and their sequence is stored in the past experience of an individual. If we humans lived in a strictly deterministic environment of events, forecasting would not require special effort.

From a psycholinguistic point of view, context exists “in the hearer’s mind” since the act of interpretation cannot take place without the connections between the lingual information integrated into the text and the knowledge schemas. The mentioned schemas create associative internal contexts.

The participation of the mechanism of probability in the process of speech production and perception implies the construction of mental models of the perceived objects. The mentioned models are determined by the specifics of the recipient’s conceptual sphere and the volume and quality of his/her background knowledge.

According to scientists, the relationship between expectations and surprise is not as simple as it seems. The results of the conducted experiments showed that the representations constructed by the recipients while understanding the sections of the text have a direct impact on the perception of subsequent events. The ability to recognize and retrieve an object from memory changes properties as a result of the priming effect.

During the entire process of perception, an individual perceiving speech evaluates the messages intended for him. In this process, the willingness to accept this or that stereotype is observed. But when expectations are not confirmed, the recipient does not immediately realize the error.

The perception of the message depends not only on the situational context but also on the whole complex of internal cognitive contexts. In the process of interaction, the formation of the new cognitive model with new elements and objects of reality implies relying on the closest internal contexts for constructing the cognitive representation. Therefore, the process of identification is never carried out in a de-contextualized vacuum. Even an unknown word presented to a person outside the context calls out certain information in his cognition.

Thus, the basis of misunderstanding lies not only in such factors as ignorance of the additional meanings of words and parallelism of the thought process but also in the qualitative differences of the internal lexicon of communicators, the variety of the connotative fields of the lexeme and, accordingly, the lack of some associations - the lack of non-verbal images and implications in the mind of the communicator. The mentioned factors provoke the emergence of the effect of the defeated expectancy.

The specific organization of an individual's memory provides information not only about the storage of past events but also the information about the sequence and frequency of these events. The mentioned feature of human memory determines the ability to predict. Our reality is a probabilistically organized environment, so our memory is only capable of predicting future events. When predicting, an individual chooses one of several alternative messages stored in long-term memory. This message is the most acceptable one for a given context.

Obviously, without probabilistic prediction, any activity would be impossible: probabilistic prediction is the approximate modeling of the world by an individual living in this world.

In the process of perceiving and processing the text, the common elements of the incoming mental spaces are identified. This is how a "generic space," projecting

the characteristics of one space onto another space, is created.

Projection of elements of incoming spaces is characterized by selectivity:

1. Not all elements are projected into the merged unit.
2. There may be elements in the merged unit that are not evidenced in the incoming spaces.

The existence of these elements is observed in frames and knowledge schemes. Thus, the processing of incoming information is a multi-stage process of integration.

The main mechanisms of conceptual integration are composition, completion, and elaboration. Each mechanism affects the nature of the processed information. The mechanism of composition performs an attributive function - it matches the information of one mental space with the elements of another mental space.

The mechanism of completion functions when the projection of the incoming information corresponds to the data accumulated in the long-term memory.

Processing involves the mental construction of a situation or phenomenon resulting from conceptual integration. It means that when a "collision" with the elements of the new information occurs, the individual perceiving speech can model the situation through the elements that are already familiar to him/her.

We believe that the word is a key to the integral informational base of a person. The mentioned information base stores the data obtained as a result of the processing of the past (rational and non-rational, individual and social) experiences of the individual. Thus, in the paper, the completion of the text stimulus begins with the identification of words. In the paper, the word is understood as a necessary and sufficient unit for a multifaceted and functional reflection of reality.

In the process of perceiving and understanding the situation represented by the text, the meaning of the word is actualized in the context of the given situation, which is the only one for the individual at the given moment. Then other lexical meanings are activated, and the individual tries to find out how important these elements are for decoding the given situation. As soon as the individual's attention is focused on some feature, this feature acquires the status of an independent object, which, in turn, also has a certain repertoire of features.

A person himself can create new characteristics by projecting existing knowledge and previously acquired connections to a new situation. Thus, it can be assumed that at this stage, we are dealing with the space of expectations, the main element

of which is the contextual meanings of words. The latter creates the text of the situation, certain structures of knowledge and experience (concepts, schemes, scenes, frames, prototypes) that are accumulated in memory. The elements of the space of expectations are projected onto the elements of the incoming spaces, resulting in a generic space.

The process of perceiving the situation represented by the text is governed by associative connections. This fact reveals the influence of semantic priming. Association is carried out in parallel in several directions, and one association “calls” another. The forms of knowledge that make up the mental model of the situation exist in the individual’s consciousness before the activation of the process of perceiving the text. In order to understand a specific fragment (episode) of the text, the individual should transfer the representation of a scene similar to the event described in the given episode of the text from long-term memory to working memory.

The incoming information in the situation of the defeated expectancy corresponds to the individual’s knowledge schemas, which are formed based on the individual’s past experiences. In the situation of defeated expectancy, the incoming information is categorized according to the associative connections of a particular informant. Then attention is focused on the external verbal (textual) context.

As a result of the data analysis, the following regularities were revealed:

- Despite all their originality and individuality, even the most atypical expectations do not go beyond the framework of the individual’s perceptual-cognitive-affective experience.
- Atypical and unpredictable counter texts are only as atypical and unpredictable as the informant’s knowledge, and experience allow them to be atypical and unpredictable.
- Defeated expectancy is created by the difference between the mental representations of the elements of information to be perceived.
- The difference between the representations of the elements is the reason for the incompatibility of the informants’ expectations.
- All types of expectations are united by an integral feature – an individual’s stereotyped attitude towards the expected object. In other words, all types of expectations are based on the existence of the knowledge about the peculiarities of the agreement between the linguistic units, the representation of the speakers about the “ordinary development of the situation,” or the knowledge about the principles of effective communication.

- In the situation of the defeated expectancy, the incoming information corresponds to the individual's knowledge schemas, which are formed based on the individual's past experiences. In the situation of the defeated expectancy, the incoming information is categorized according to the associative connections.
- In the process of understanding the verbal message and constructing an alternative verbal message, the subject "replays," predicts, and evaluates the probability of this or that end of the situation represented by the text. Probabilistic forecasting is based on the expectations, which are formed due to the compliance between the knowledge and viewpoint of the informant, the external (textual) context, and the output information.
- The quality and the volume of the mental spaces of expectation are determined by the degree of the priming effect, in other words, the influence of "foreseeing". The data analysis of the experimental research revealed the dominance of the influence of semantic priming, which implies the involvement of associative thinking and the establishment of associative relations in the process of constructing the text.
- In addition to the external context, the internal context of interpretation is included in the process of perceiving the situation represented by the text, in other words, the result of the multidimensional cognitive-affective-receptive experience of the informant is included in the process of perceiving the situation represented by the text.
- The analysis of the obtained counter texts showed that in the process of perceiving the situation represented by the text, the following components of mental activity are distinguished: concentration on the signs (words) representing the semantic nodes of the given text. The mentioned component involves moving to the level of mental representations.
- Expectations, as a "repository" of the individual structures of knowledge, differ from individual to individual. This fact explains the reasons for communication failure. It is communicative failure that causes the effect of the defeated expectancy in both interpersonal and intercultural communication.

### Conclusion

The quality and structure of the mental spaces of expectation are determined by the influence of the priming effect and are based on formal motivational elements. The creation of the effect of the defeated expectancy is dominated by the semantic type of priming, implying the participation of associative thinking in the process of constructing the text.

The conducted research gave us an opportunity to explore the essence of the phenomenon of the defeated expectancy. We consider the mentioned phenomenon to be a game, the main principle of which is the inconsistency of predictable (expected) and unpredictable (unexpected) versions, where the mentioned inconsistency is created by the violation of conventionalism.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET  
PERFORMANCE THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

This study compares two theories of financial market efficiency. In this regard, we have proposed parameters for assessing the state of the market, depending on the speed of absorption of this information received. Further, we have determined the specific boundaries of application of the presented theories. It is proposed to determine the degree of stability of a particular financial market using the maximal Lyapunov exponent.

*Keywords: stock market, financial instruments, martingale.*

## *Introduction*

Financial markets represent key elements of the economic system. The dynamics of the markets' behaviors are directly connected to the problems of investments and concentration of capital.

The mechanism of transformation of savings into investments is conducted through financial markets. In addition, the participation of the population in the activities of financial markets fills with the reality of the right of individuals to have the means of production (Taghiyev, Gasanov, 2017, pp. 298–301). Thus, the dynamics of the behavior of financial markets are related to the problems of investment and, accordingly, economic growth. In addition, according to the behavior of financial markets, certain forecasts can be made, predicting economic crises, as well as determining the degree of integration of the local economy into the global world economy. In this regard, the issue of the effectiveness of the functioning of financial markets is relevant.

The efficient-market hypothesis introduced by Louis Bachelier and further developed by Eugene Fama proceeds from the existence of the multiple accidental factors influencing market price of the financial instruments and the assumption to use first differences or increments of the financial instruments in the formation of the statistical arrays as opposite to the prices of the financial instruments (Taghiyev, Gasanov, 2017, pp. 298–301). In my opinion, this is the main factor that represents the “longevity” of this hypothesis.

The first differences suppress significant deviations from the average values bringing temporary arrays closer to the stationary ones. Let's consider some definitions to analyze the dynamics of market efficiency. The perfectly efficient market is the market where the price of every security is always equal to its investment cost (Taghiyev, Gasanov, 2017, pp. 298–301). The investment cost represents the current cost of the security with the allowance for an expected profit. There is no financial formula explicitly determining the future price of the financial instrument and accounting for the current price. In the absence of the determined calculation formula, the methods of stochastic analysis shall be applied. In such case, tomorrow's price of the financial instrument is to be considered as the current market price fluctuating within a certain range. The nature of such fluctuation is random, but it is fluctuating within the mathematical expectancy (average ) value.

All the foregoing factors are described in the probability theory and mathematical statistics. The theory of probability describes processes with a zero mathematical expectancy as the martingale or “game with zero-sum” or “fair game.”

Therefore, the market is efficient if it quickly adapts to new information. A quick reflection on the price of the financial instrument determines the level of market efficiency. The investor operating by such market rules cannot expect excessive profits and accepts only the average market profitability. Market efficiency is evaluated as weak, average, or strong, depending on the level and speed to absorb information. The weak efficiency form means that the cost of the market asset includes all historical information, whereas the same cost comprises full market information in the case with the strong efficiency form. The full information is understood as the accumulation of historical, current, and insider data. The insider data includes information accessible by the narrow circles related to the particular project. The average market efficiency stands between the weak and the strong forms. In this case, all public information related to the market is fully reflected in prices, and hence, there is no chance of getting additional profit.

The efficient-market hypothesis, as well as other mathematical methods based on this hypothesis, fails in the economic globalization environment. The recent cascade of world economic crises doubts the normality of the probabilistic distribution of the financial instruments' prices. Most methods of technical analysis are acceptable in the existence of the obvious market trend. With the change of the stationary character of the temporary arrays in the prices of the financial instruments, the need appears to sum and analyze only those sections of the temporary arrays, which have stable elements of mathematical expectancy and dispersion, hence bringing these temporary arrays closer to the stationary type arrays. However, the accuracy of such calculation is negatively affected. The longer the temporary array, the less the forecast precision.

While stochastic approaches question the normality of the price distribution of the financial instruments in the absence of stationarity, the modeling of quick and spasmodic profitability changes of the financial instruments in the determined cases does not accept the linear paradigm in the analysis of securities. This does not imply a full inconsistency of the efficient-market theory, it just outlines boundaries for its application. In my view, the classical methods of stock markets analysis based on the efficient market theory shall be used for the developed and stable markets. However, in the long-term conditions of the unstable markets, caused by both internal and external problems, as well as in the global economic crisis environment, the application of models based on the efficient-market theory is not rational. Then the fractal market theory can be used as an alternative to the efficient market theory.

B. Mandelbrot's hypothesis about the dependency of the prices of the financial instruments at the current markets upon the previous day's prices has become a


crucial point in changing the paradigms in the analysis of the financial markets. It has introduced the notion of the financial markets' memory. B. Mandelbrot has identified that the prices at the financial markets can be persistent and anti-persistent. Persistency means market memory. It means that the current auctions start from the prices of the previous day's auctions, and today's events at the market cannot be considered in isolation from yesterday's events. The anti-persistent markets do not have this capability.

B. Malbrot's hypothesis has replaced the efficient-market hypothesis of L. Bachelier and is based on specific principles. These principles lie in that the financial market consists of investors with different investment prospects. The difference creates demand for various assets and determines their liquidity. When the proportion of investors with long and short-term investment prospects changes in favor of short-term investors, the market starts losing its stability. Other important statements of B. Mandelbrot are about the lack of a correlation between the liquidity of the financial market and the volume of sales of the financial instruments. The level of importance of the information obtained by the market can be evaluated based on the change in the lengths of investors' prospects. Investors react differently to the information obtained from the market.

It should not be disregarded that each investor evaluates the information obtained as a result of the purchase and sale in his own way. This is what is called the irrationality of the investor's behavior. If all investors made the same conclusions based on the received information, their actions would be mono-directional. And the market would have lost its liquidity.

The non-stationarity in the dynamics arrays, the sensitivity to the initial conditions, the irregularity of the temporary arrays - all these are the pre-conditions making the application of the traditional linear principles in the modeling of the financial markets based on the efficient-market theory inefficient. The theory of non-linear dynamics, laying the basis for the determined chaos theory, successfully resolves many problems related to the complexity of the financial markets' behaviors. The stability of the financial markets' behaviors depends on the sensitivity to the initial conditions. It means that the two close points of the phase space have trajectories significantly diverging in the course of time. In the process of such movement, even the minimum difference in the initial conditions may lead to the exponential recession of these trajectories in the course of time. Identifying the speed of such exponential recession is the important goal of the analysis. I believe that the application of the Lyapunov exponent is convenient in the identification of the speed of the trajectories exponential recession and further detection of the system stability.

Consider the point  $x(t_0)$  defining the status of the system in the initial point of time ( $t_0$ ). Let's define some positive number  $\varepsilon(t_0)$  at the system attractor, where there is a point  $\tilde{x}(t_0)$  in accordance with the following correlation  $|\tilde{x}(t_0) - x(t_0)| = \varepsilon(t_0)$ . After time  $\Delta t$  points  $x(t_0)$  and  $\tilde{x}(t_0)$  move to points  $x(t)$  and  $\tilde{x}(t)$  accordingly, and let's define the distance between them as  $\varepsilon(t)$ , where  $t = t_0 + \Delta t$ .



$\varepsilon(t) = \varepsilon(t_0)e^{\lambda \Delta t}$ . This translates into the maximal Lyapunov exponent  $\lambda = \frac{1}{\Delta t} \ln \frac{\varepsilon(t)}{\varepsilon(t_0)}$  (Sharp, 2012, pp. 108-109).

It would be necessary to apply some restrictions while analyzing technical systems, for example, to introduce certain correlations between the parameters and diameter of the attractor. However, this is not critical for the economic analysis due to the small diameters of the attractor.

There are several Lyapunov exponents. We are interested in the exponent which is, being positive, reflects chaotic processes. In my opinion, it is not reasonable to model based on the efficient-market hypothesis with the positive value of the maximal Lyapunov's exponent. It is necessary to apply fractal analysis of the financial market based on the B. Mandelbrot's hypothesis.

### Conclusion

The article presents comparative analysis of the two theories describing efficiency of the financial markets. These theories are efficient-market theory by L. Bachelier and more recent theory of fractal market by B. Mandelbrot. Fractality lies in the fact that the movement of financial markets (using the example of the Dow Jones

indices), where even the shortest section of the charts is self-similar (or close to self-similarity) with the longest sections. As stated by B. Mandelbrot:

*A fractal is a geometric shape that can be separated into parts, each of which is a reduced-scale version of the whole. In finance, this concept is not a rootless abstraction but a theoretical reformulation of a down-to-earth bit of market folklore— namely, that movements of a stock or currency all look alike when a market chart is enlarged or reduced so that it fits the same time and price scale. An observer then cannot tell which of the data concern prices that change from week to week, day to day or hour to hour (Mandelbrot, 1999).*

The results of the comparative analysis testify that neither of the theories can be rejected. However, the boundaries should be introduced to apply each of them. The author proposes to use maximal Lyapunov's exponent as a criterion of selection. If the exponent is positive, the application should include models based on the fractal theory. In case of negative exponent, the choice is for models, based on the efficient-market hypothesis.

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# EVALUATION OF “HIGH POTENTIAL” INDICATORS

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## ABSTRACT

**Purpose** – To identify and evaluate high potential indicators in employees by the organization’s management team and HR professionals.

We are identifying implicit criteria used in practice by HR professionals to improve assessment tools for potential indicators.

**Methodology** – Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are used. Questions to identify/assess high-potential indicators are developed based on familiarity with existing practices worldwide. Top managers of Georgian companies participated in the research - 162 respondents in total. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were also used in the research, which was conducted with HR professionals of 21 Georgian companies. The purpose of the interview was to reveal the differences that may exist between HR professionals’ implicit evaluations of high potential and verbally expressed criteria during selection.

**Limitations/results of the study** - The size of the sample is a limitation; therefore, the conclusions drawn from the study results of the should be treated with caution.

**Practical implications** - Detection and assessment of high potential indicators; Identifying high potential, recruiting, promoting, and developing training strategies by top managers and human resource management specialists in organizations.

*Keywords: High potential, selection, indicators, leadership*

## *Introduction*

Only flexible companies that actively learn and adapt can sustain themselves in an ever-changing environment (Collins, 2001). Learning ability is widely accepted and important in determining high potential (Ready, Conger, Hill, 2010). Human resource management practices indicate that the success of an organization is related to its demonstrated ability to learn. The vital capacity of an organization to learn and adapt can potentially be achieved by:

- By maintaining competent, qualified personnel;
- By promoting the development of these skills in employees;
- By selecting competent, qualified human resources (Sloan, E.B., Hazucha, J.F. and Van Katwyk, P.T. 2003, p. 235-274).

Today, one of the main goals of organizations in the world is to identify high-potential individuals, and future leaders, provide opportunities for their development and retain them (Hay Group 2014, 'Best Companies for Leadership 2014). As the researchers indicate, filling the vacant positions in organizations with new competent employees during the next two decades will become more and more problematic under current economic conditions (Sloan, Hazucha, Van Katwyk, 2003). Identifying and managing employees with high potential has become a new strategy of organizations, an essential task of human resources management (Mellahi, and Collings, 2010). The organization's goals create new requirements for practicing HR professionals; They should be able to help organizations identify individuals (at an early stage of their careers) who will be able to lead the organization in the future. Although in published research on leaders in workplaces, attention is focused on variables that are closely related to effective leadership, it is worth noting that today the interest is directed to the research of high potential predictors of leadership, as well as to predicting who will be an effective leader in the future (Boyatzis, 2007).

One of the main goals of the research is to reveal individual variables in the form of high-potential predictors, which will help to practice HR professionals and top managers of the organization select and promote influential leaders and highly qualified employees. Recruiting plays a vital role in attracting and retaining high-potential employees by organizations. Therefore, HR professionals must develop strategies that are guaranteed to recruit the best employees, regardless of how and to what degree they define a high-potential employee.



According to some researchers, an individual with high potential is an employee who contributes to the organization's development; According to some, a high potential is an employee with competencies, etc. (Kim, Scullion, 2011). In light of these different approaches, the definition and management strategies of high potentials proposed by researchers and practitioners somewhat obscure the selection procedures used by practitioners, as often the decisions made by practicing HR professionals regarding high potentials are based on implicit assumptions and evaluations. Such ambivalence is unfortunate because a framework of high-potential dimensions is vital for assessment accuracy. During selection/evaluation, HR practitioners often do not use the criteria they verbalize, so it is important to examine their implicit assumptions about the high potential (Guenole, Chernyshenko, Stark, Cockerill, Drasgow, 2013). Understanding the basic criteria HR professionals use is especially important because it is their job to use valid evaluation tools. Thus, the study aims to reveal the criteria that HR practitioners use to identify high-potential employees.

### *Definition and assessment of high potentials*

Researchers offer several versions of the definition of high potential:

According to the Harvard Business Review article, "high potential is an individual's ability to succeed in roles with greater scale and scope of responsibility," where large scale and scope is defined as "managing a company with a larger budget and more human resources in the same line of work, as well as substantially increased by carrying out responsibilities and more difficult activities" (Fernández-Aráoz, C., Groysberg, Nitin, 2011, pp. 75-83).

In the Business Strategy Review article, the authors describe a high-potential employee as: "a successful, high-performing employee who works in alignment with the company's values." The authors add another "X-factor" to this definition, which refers to the support of colleagues, initiative, and dynamism (Ready, Conger, Hill, Stecker, 2010, pp.52-55,).

Contemporary literature discusses the core competencies that are important to the definition of the term "high potential."

According to Silzer and Church's model, the main indicators characteristic of high potential were named. The presented indicators include three dimensions determining a person's potential:

1. Fundamental dimension:

- a) cognitive: conceptual, strategic thinking, cognitive skills, and experience in solving complex issues;
- b) Personality: interpersonal skills, sociability, dominance, emotional stability, flexibility.

2. Dimension of growth and development:

- a) learning: adaptability, learning orientation, acceptance of feedback;
- b) motivation: drive, energy, achievement-oriented, career growth ambition, risk-taking, result-oriented;

3. Career (early indicators of future career skills):

- a) Leadership: leadership qualities, the ability to manage people, the ability to develop others (employees), the ability to influence others, the ability to manage changes;
- b) performance: relevant career achievements, successes, and work experience;
- c) Knowledge: technical/functional skills and knowledge;
- d) cultural framework: values and norms relevant to the career (Silzer, R. and Church, A. 2009, p. 377-412. ).

*Method*

The purpose of the research was to reveal the variables and indicators that the organization's management team and HR specialists prefer in selecting and evaluating high potential. Respondents were asked their opinion on the definition of high potential. A quantitative research method was used. 162 top managers of Georgian companies participated in the research (84 female, 78 male). Based on existing practices, a questionnaire for identifying/evaluating high-potential indicators was developed. During the study, managers filled out two questionnaires. Questionnaires serve to identify and evaluate high-potential indicators. High potential is manifested in work performed by a person in the organization, his abilities, character, and motivation (Hewitt, Aon. 2013). One of the questionnaires consists of four domains: performance, character, capability, and motivation. Each characteristic includes several

questions, which are evaluated using a five-point scale. For the first questionnaire, the alpha coefficient for the 32 items is .816. Through the second questionnaire, company managers rated themselves according to specific factors characteristic of high potential using a five-point scale. In the case of the second questionnaire, the alpha coefficient for 15 items is .712. According to studies, in most leading organizations, management team representatives are considered leaders. Top managers are typical of the qualities characteristic of leaders; therefore, those qualities associated with success, achievements, career growth, and advantages of internal intellectual or personal indicators are considered indicators of high potential qualities.

The indicators identified in the present study will enable practicing psychologists, organization managers, and other interested parties to identify the company's future leaders and high-potential employees at an early stage.

The study of the above features characteristic of high potential was also carried out using a qualitative research method. HR managers from different companies participated in the research who, in addition to defining high-potential traits, had to discuss the assessment tools they use for high-potential recruiting. To achieve this goal, 21 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted. HR managers of companies representing various fields (production of construction materials, medical services, education, banking, software, sales, and services) participated in the research. During the interview, questions were asked to clarify the factors that HR professionals prioritize when selecting high potential. They could use projective techniques in addition to verbally expressed criteria, in particular, describe high potentials with pictures, eg, draw an animal; They were then asked to describe specific characteristics of high potential. A semi-structured interview format was created to collect data on existing practices, processes, and value systems that determine the impact of environmental factors and business strategies on recruiters' practices, beliefs, and attitudes and on recruiting itself as a process. During each interview, a certain issue was elaborated upon, and additional questions were asked as needed.

### *Sampling and procedure*

This study used purposive sampling techniques. 165 top managers and 21 HR heads of Georgian companies were interviewed. Table №1 presents data on HR managers (See Table №1. p. 187).

Table №1

Respondent	Field	Work Experience
№ 1	Sales	3
№ 2	Banking - financial	3
№ 3	Service	4
№ 4	Education	5
№ 5	Feed	4
№ 6	Administration / Management	3
№ 7	Law	4
№ 8	PR / Marketing	3
№ 9	Logistics / Technical	2
№ 10	Education	3
№ 11	Sales	4
№ 12	PR / Marketing	2
№ 13	Banking - financial	4
№ 14	Education	1
№ 15	Sales	3
№ 16	Feed	2
№ 17	Law	5
№ 18	Banking - financial	2
№ 19	Healthcare	3
№ 20	Sales	4
№ 21	IT	2

### Results

According to the research, it was found that in the selection, which top managers of Georgian companies represented, learning was considered as a significant and priority indicator of high potential for top managers ( $M=4.63$ ,  $SD=.28$ ). When assessing high potential, the skills to learn correctly are preferred by the interviewed managers. The next factor is motivation ( $M=4.60$ ,  $SD=.20$ ), which is a little behind learning skills. Managers also consider the motivational factor as an important indicator when evaluating high potential. According to the statistical parameters, leadership was identified as the next factor ( $M=4.45$ ,  $SD=.30$ ). Other factors such as job performance ( $M=4.40$ ,  $SD=3.13$ ), personal skills ( $M=4.35$ ,  $SD=.39$ ), knowledge ( $M=4$ ,  $SD=.73$ ),

cognitive skills (M= 4.27, SD= .39) and fit with culture (M=4.23, SD= .79) were determined with approximately equal relevance among respondents, which indicates that all these factors are equally important for respondents in the process of evaluating high potential indicators (Table 2).

Based on the analysis of the second questionnaire (assessment of high potential), it was found that the important factor for the managers of the organization is called opportunities (M= 4.65, SD= .24), then motivational factors (M= 4.52 SD= .37) and performance (M= 4.32 SD= .38) (Table 3).

*Table №2.*

*Detection and assessment of high potential indicators by mean and standard deviation*

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Cognitive	4.27	162	0.39
Personal	4.35	162	0.39
Educational	4.63	162	0.28
Motivation	4.60	162	0.20
Leadership	4.45	162	0.30
Job performance	4.40	162	3.13
Knowledge	4.31	162	0.73
Cultural fit	4.23	162	0.79

*Table №3.*

*Evaluation of high potential by mean and standard deviation*

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Performance	4.32	162	0.38
Character	4.30	162	0.36
Abilities	4.65	162	0.24
Motivation	4.52	162	0.37

Table №4. Identification of high potential indicators and correlational analysis of assessment

		Tools	Motiva- tion	Leader- ship	Job per- formance	Knowl- edge	Cultural fit
Perfor- mance	Pearson Correlation	-0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.10	-0.06	0.10
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.41	0.75	0.54	0.22	0.46	0.23
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Charac- ter	Pearson Correlation	0.06	-0.03	-0.11	0.10	-0.01	0.04
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.49	0.68	0.15	0.21	0.86	0.61
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Abilities	Pearson Correlation	0.06	0.11	-0.01	0.15	0.05	-0.12
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.48	0.15	0.94	0.05	0.54	0.13
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Motiva- tion	Pearson Correlation	0.10	0.08	-0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.07
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.22	0.34	0.83	0.63	0.61	0.39
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Cogni- tive	Pearson Correlation	-0.04	-0.01	-0.05	0.15	,168*	0.13
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.60	0.95	0.54	0.06	0.03	0.10
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Personal	Pearson Correlation	0.08	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	,160*	-0.01
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.34	0.88	0.88	0.94	0.04	0.95
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
Educa- tional	Pearson Correlation	-0.10	,163*	0.14	0.05	-0.10	0.10
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.20	0.04	0.08	0.51	0.20	0.20
	N	162	162	162	162	162	162
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).							
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).							

It is essential to consider the correlation between detecting high potential indicators and the self-esteem of top managers (Table 4). Based on statistical analysis, it was revealed that motivation has a positive correlation with learning ( $r = .163$ ,  $p=.04$ ,  $n = 162$ ), this means that top-level managers who highlight motivation in their own capacity, this factor led to name motivation as an important factor in the selection of high-potentials. The statistical relationship between the variables presented in the table indicates that the learning process increases with the increase in motivation. Therefore, these two variables are interdependent. As for cognitive skills and knowledge, according to the data, these two variables are positively correlated with each other ( $r = .168$ ,  $p=.003$ ,  $n = 162$ ), it is significant that cognitive skills play a big role in the process of gaining knowledge and experience. Knowledge is also positively correlated with interpersonal skills ( $r = .160$ ,  $p=.04$ ,  $n=162$ ). Based on this data, a certain type of chain is created, which helps us to see the complete picture, where it is evident, the advantages defined by the managers and the connection between these advantages and the factors determined by them, which necessarily take into account in the process of identifying high potential.

As part of the survey, senior managers were given the opportunity to identify the most acceptable and frequently used method to identify high potential. The frequency analysis of the data showed us (Table 5) that 85% of managers use the interview method when selecting high potential. Only 7.5% of managers use business simulations in this process, and 4.3% prefer leadership-style research tools. As seen from the table in this direction, the variety is less, the almost absolute majority uses the interview method, and the relevance of other tools and methods is low in the existing sample.

*Table №5. Frequency analysis of high potential assessment tool*

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Leadership style tools	7	4.3	4.3	4.3
Interview	137	84.6	84.6	88.9
A personality research instrument	4	2.5	2.5	91.4
360 degree assessment	2	1.2	1.2	92.6
Business simulations	12	7.4	7.4	100.0
Total	162	100.0	100.0	

After the semi-structured interview with HR managers, thematic coding of the received data was done, and thematic categories were separated based on this.

1. Determination of high potential (description)
2. Challenges related to high-potential selection
3. High potential value in the organization
4. High potential management and retention strategy

At the next stage of thematic analysis, the obtained data were typologized, interview transcripts were created, and respondents' familiar and different views were separated from the research issue. As a result of the analysis, specific trends were identified, the main characteristics and regularities were determined, and general conclusions were made.

The analysis of the interviews shows that the research participants use more or less different criteria and characteristics to describe the high potential. HR professionals in sales and training education indicated that one of the top skills a high-potential employee should possess is effective communication and presentation skills.

“A person may be distinguished by deep knowledge of the subject, but the ability to transfer knowledge is not properly developed. It should be noted that an ineffective presentation can become an obstacle in the teaching process.” Respondent #4

An IT HR professional cites teamwork as a key high-potential skill, among other qualities. It is important for him that a high-potential employee can work with a team because important goals of the organization can only be achieved as a team.

For [...], a high potential is associated with leadership and promotion. The respondent believes that a person with high potential should have the desire for career development in addition to capabilities. According to him, a high potential is characterized by constant striving for development. Respondent #7.

According to all the respondents in the study, the main characteristics of high potential are universal for all professions. Respondents are characterized by such basic characteristics of high potential as the ability to perform the work in the best way, drive and motivation to achieve more success, social skills and relationships, adaptability in a changing environment, the ability to deal with stressful situations, detail orientation and the ability to think globally.

During the assessment of high-potential indicators, the projective method was offered to the respondents. In particular, they had to show high potential in the form of an animal or bird drawing. The use of this method would give the respondents an opportunity to further analyze the indicators characteristic of high potential and to understand the characteristics on the basis of which they select high potential.



A certain part of the research participants drew a lion, they characterized that “high-potential employees are characterized by the qualities that we perceive as a lion.

Lion is brave, fighting, strong, and most importantly, the king of animals.

The lion is the king of animals, and even one glance will convince a person that it is really this and that name was not given in vain, no animal can compare to the lion in terms of appearance and strength. For me, the lion is associated with dignity, patience, bravery, and leadership.

In the appearance of a lion, all its qualities can be read, its strength, bravery, and fighting ability” it is the king of animals, which says a lot. Respondent# 18

Also, the main part of the respondents drew a tiger as a symbol of courage and strength.

A tiger is a strong, brave, fighting animal, and it will never back down from anything, it is not afraid of opposition, as soon as you look at it, you know exactly what it is like, its appearance, its claws say everything. Respondent # 2

Respondent # 8 drew an elephant, for him, the elephant is associated with wisdom and intelligence.

As a result of the analysis of the interviews, it is clear that appearance, dress, manners, modesty, and reasonableness are also important for the respondents. It should be noted that this issue was not mentioned by any respondent when describing high-potential properties. However, these may be indicators by which the respondents are guided in the assessment and selection of high potential.

When asked what criteria they use in selecting high potential, a small number of the respondents indicated that they attach great importance to academic qualifications and work experience in a specific position. The respondents could not give a clear answer to the question of which is the more important criterion when deciding about high potential, personal characteristics, academic qualifications, or work experience. Therefore, during the research, the respondents were provided with an additional specific case (“case”), according to which they had to choose between several candidates. During the analysis of interviews and cases, it can be seen that work experience is one of the main selection criteria. Several respondents participating in the research confirmed that they prefer a candidate with experience in a specific field. According to them, selecting an inexperienced employee is associated with excessive waste of time and energy. However, a small part of the respon-

dents has a different opinion. They give great importance to the skills and qualities of the person rather than qualifications and work experience.

Analyzing cases and interviews, it is clear that when describing high potential, HR professionals focus a lot on personal characteristics and talk less about academic qualifications and work experience. However, most consider work experience the main criterion during selection.

The analysis of the interviews shows that the attraction and employment of high-potential employees is an important value for the company's success. As a result HR managers emphasize the value of high potential in the process of organizational development.

An excerpt from the interviews is given as an illustration:

In order for our company to be able to develop in the long term, it is important to have the "right" people in the company; therefore, our company spends much time on the selection process of employees, and we have more or less predetermined criteria based on which the selection is made. Respondent #9

Analyzing the interview, it becomes clear that one of the determining factors for hiring high-potential companies is globalization and the high level of competition in the market, under which companies need strong, capable, and highly qualified human capital to succeed.

When asked whom they would promote from among the employees actually working in the company, the majority of respondents choose an employee who, according to them, stands out from his colleagues with positive results and takes on more responsibility than it seems at first glance. Another important factor was revealed during the interview process; The respondents of the research believe that the employee who will be promoted should enjoy loyalty among colleagues, sociability, and trust and goodwill from colleagues.

Identifying high-potential employees is based on their results and achievements in the company.

I would promote the cashier-operator of one of our branches because, first of all, he has exceptionally positive results in contrast to his colleagues, and also has the relevant skills: purposefulness, leadership, fairness and more. Respondent #8.

Another interesting issue was revealed during the interview process; In particular, most respondents believe that the existence of a match between high-potential

employees and companies is important. All respondents note that for a long-term relationship, it is necessary to be in harmony with the values of the company and the applicant.

According to the research conducted in 2020 as part of my Master's thesis at the University of Georgia, it was found that in the conditions of high competition in the labor market, the issue of long-term maintenance of high potential is very relevant for companies participating in the research. Unfortunately, 95% of the research participants do not currently have a talent management system in place, but the majority of them are going to solve this issue. The remaining 5 still need to implement a talent management system. It is also worth noting that the management of high potential in such companies was introduced only 1-2 years ago, and the system is still in the process of refinement and structuring.

As a result of the research, it was found that: In the selection of Georgian organizations, the exact indicators of identifying high potential and their career development plans need to be clearly established. Moreover, the indicators that HR professionals use to select and/or describe high potential often need to be more consistent.


However, research has shown that top managers rate their performance and abilities as leaders the highest on the following variables: motivation, ability, and performance. In selecting high potential, they consider learning, motivation, and leadership as important factors.

Analysis of the unstructured interview revealed that when describing high potential, respondents in the study focused on the individual's personal characteristics and less discussed academic qualifications and work experience. However, it is worth noting that in the selection process, HR professionals attach great importance to the applicants' work experience. To describe high potential, HR professionals focus on such qualities as the ability to do the job in the best way, drive and motivation to achieve more success, purposefulness, social skills and relationships, adaptability/response in changing environments, ability to navigate in stressful situations, orientation to details and ability to think globally. As for the direct selection criteria, they implicitly or clearly attach great importance to academic qualifications, work experience, appearance, dress, and manners.

As a result of data analysis, a model of high potential was formed: analytical skills (intellectual curiosity, strategic views, ability to make decisions and solve problems, ability to think globally), ability to learn (willingness to learn, adaptation),

desire to develop (orientation on results, persistence, and commitment, self-awareness, motivation to move to a higher level), and finally management/leadership (effective communication skills, empathy, self-confidence, delegation skills, ability to persuade others) Table N6.

Table №6. High potential characteristics



*Conclusion*

This study aimed to investigate the implementation of talent identification. Research findings make several significant contributions. As a result of the research, it was revealed that organizations do not have clearly established criteria according to which they select a high-potential employee, which may put us in front of the problem of selection bias because HR professionals and top managers are guided in the process of high-potential selection and evaluation based on subjective opinions. HR professionals’ assumptions about high potential also influence the personnel selection they make.

HR professionals' implicit assumptions about high potentials influence the selection of potential employees for future recruitment stages, certain development decisions, and employee promotion decisions.

Rigorous definitions of high-potential characteristics represent objectivity and impartiality in the hiring process.

Organizations can benefit from the discussion presented in the study on selecting high-potential or identifying the ideal profile of a high-potential employee.

Alignment between management and HR functionaries remains a prerequisite for a functioning high-potential management system, influencing potentially all aspects from recruitment to training to retention.

Identifying high potential in an organization should be rigorous and based on good practice.

Limitations and recommendations for future research

The size of the sample is a limitation. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the study's results should be treated with caution.

This study demonstrates the need to further explore the key characteristics of high potentials and how they are related to their future performance, given the importance of recruiting key people.

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