

LEGAL HISTORY

Spravedlivost' or Samartlianoba: Language & the Reformed Courts in Georgia

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ABSTRACT

This essay explores the challenges of prosecuting crime in the borderlands of the Russian Empire, focusing on the Georgian provinces in the wake of the 1864 Judicial Reform. The requirement that all legal proceedings be conducted in Russian created significant obstacles to the administration of justice, as linguistic barriers hindered the effective evaluation of evidence and judicial decision-making. Georgian jurists, serving as investigators, lawyers, and judges, grappled with these complexities, advocating for solutions rooted in positivist legal principles. Though their efforts did not result in legislative change, their engagement with the legal system reflected an assertion of professional authority and a claim to judicial institutions within the empire.

Keywords: Russian Empire, Georgian legal history, criminal procedure, language

INTRODUCTION

“What help could be expected from the courts in which one’s own language was forbidden and people, thanks to their ignorance of a foreign language, fell into the clutches of every thief and rascal.”

- Akaki Tsereteli

In the October 1896 issue of the *Journal of the Ministry of Justice*, the Georgian jurist M.E. Gegidze recounted the story of a certain inhabitant of the mountainous region of Svaneti on trial in the Kutaisi Circuit Court, one of two circuit courts in the Georgian provinces of the Russian empire in the post-reform period. Gegidze does not provide the details of the individual or the criminal charge, but as the proceedings against him began, it became apparent that the Svan defendant understood only his native Svanetian. The one other individual in the courtroom with proficiency in Svanetian was an Abkhaz man, who knew only Svanetian and Abkhazian. A Mingrelian who knew Abkhazian was, therefore, engaged by the court, but he knew neither Georgian nor Russian. Finally, a Georgian-speaking Mingrelian was hurried into the courtroom to assist. Thus, at court, the Svan defendant gave testimony to the Abkhaz, who relayed it to the Mingrelian, who relayed it to the second Mingrelian, who relayed it to the Georgian interpreter, who finally rendered it to the judge in Russian (Gegidze, 1896, p.52).

This story illustrates an imperial problem understudied in the literature on legal reform in the Russian empire, namely, the problem of language in the administration of criminal justice in the post-reform Russian courts. At the same time, the story is significant for what it reveals of the role non-Russian jurists played in the discussion of Russian imperial law in the late nineteenth century. In the South Caucasus, Georgian jurists, such as Gegidze, were active participants in debates about judicial practice, and their position as both judicial official and indigenous inhabitant gave them particular insight into the operation of the new judiciary in the region.

Prosecuting crime in the borderlands of the Russian empire came with distinctive complexities in the post-reform era. The physical, linguistic, and cultural specificities of imperial environments regularly vexed Russian judicial personnel and bedeviled their efforts to administer justice according to the principles of criminal procedure enshrined in the Judicial Reform of Alexander II (1864). At the same time, local populations were often frustrated by what they perceived as a miscarriage of justice through the state’s inept handling of criminal evidence (Daly, 2000, p.360). In no region was this more apparent than in the Georgian provinces, where the Judicial Reform was enacted with numerous alterations. An especially problematic requirement of the new courts stated that all legal proceedings must be conducted in the Russian language. As few indigenous peoples spoke Russian and even fewer Russians understood the local languages, this requirement often thwarted Russian attempts to substantiate evidence at trial, in part, by preventing the judge from developing an “inner conviction” vis-à-vis culpability.

METHODS

In this essay, I examine how Georgian jurists engaged with the complexities of the Russian language requirement in the post-reform courts. Serving as investigators, lawyers, and judges, Georgian jurists in the late nineteenth century saw first-hand the difficulties that language could pose in the administration of justice. As part of the Russian empire's burgeoning legal profession, Georgian jurists were invested in the efficient operation of the new courts, and while they held divergent opinions on how best to mitigate linguistic barriers, they all drew upon modern principles of positivist law to support their position. Though their efforts ultimately failed to bring about significant legislative change in the Caucasus, I argue that their discussion of law is nevertheless significant as it illustrates an effort to assert their legal authority and to stake a claim to the new judicial institutions. Not merely a passive service class, Georgian jurists criticized the legal system both to improve it and to demonstrate their own sense of professional belonging.

The Crimean War (1853–1856) had revealed the limitations of the old imperial hierarchy. In its aftermath, Russian officials sought a new political culture in which subjects would no longer passively obey but actively understand and support the goals of the tsarist state (Steinwedel, 2016, p.116). As Yanni Kotsonis has described, this ethos of civic participation – *grazhdanstvennost'* – entailed engagement with social and cultural institutions provided by the state, including the reformed courts (Kotsonis, 2004, p.222; Jersild, 1997, p.108). Yet the Russian language requirement complicated the state's vision of participatory politics in the judicial context. The empire wanted its subjects to believe in imperial justice, but could they believe in justice when it was delivered in a foreign language? Alternatively, could the empire believe in its subjects' commitment to justice when it turned out that they did not even speak the imperial lingua franca? This was a basic tension in the imperial body politic and one the Georgian example helps us to consider at length.

Comparative perspectives underscore the distinctive nature of the Russian imperial model, particularly its commitment to legal monism – a uniform legal order anchored in the imperial language and rationality. This approach contrasts sharply with the legal pluralism that characterized British imperial rule, especially in India, where local customs and languages were systematically incorporated into judicial and administrative frameworks. Scholars such as Farina Mir (2006) and Bernard Cohn (1996) have demonstrated how the British administration not only tolerated but actively promoted the use of local languages, viewing such incorporation as essential to both effective governance and the legitimization of imperial authority.

By contrast, language played a far less prominent role in Russian imperial discourse. While many Russian officials did acquire local languages and employed them in the service of state objectives, this was typically a matter of individual initiative rather than institutional policy. Nathaniel Knight (2000, p. 75), for instance, has shown how Vasilii Vasil'evich Grigor'ev, a linguist and historian, used his knowledge of Central Asian languages to support Russian administrative aims. Yet such examples reflect personal enterprise rather than a systematic effort to cultivate linguistic expertise within the imperial bureaucracy. Thus,

despite the Russian Empire's long-standing reliance on a politics of difference to govern its diverse populations, the use of vernacular languages in provincial administration was never adopted as an official strategy.

Some scholars, such as Christian Burset (2023), attribute such a divergence in imperial strategies to the geographic and structural differences between empires: Britain, as a maritime and overseas empire, developed governance models suited to distant and culturally distinct colonies, while Russia's status as a contiguous, continental empire fostered a different approach to integration, centralization, and legal uniformity. This contrast highlights how legal regimes were not only instruments of control but also reflections of the spatial logic and ideological commitments of imperial rule. Given the enduring consequences of these divergent models of governance, further comparative legal study would be valuable. Such inquiry could illuminate the broader implications of legal structure for the negotiation of power, identity, and legitimacy in both imperial and post-imperial contexts.

RESULTS

The Russian language requirement unquestionably complicated the administration of justice in the Georgian provinces. The new Criminal Code's emphasis on witness testimony placed locals involved in criminal proceedings in an unprecedented position to subvert the adjudication process by exploiting linguistic diversity. In other words, it allowed them to obfuscate the truth advantageously during investigatory proceedings and at trial. At the same time, however, the challenges of administering justice in the Georgian provinces facilitated a greater articulation of legal principles by indigenous jurists. That is, to mitigate the negative effects of Russia's language policy, Georgian jurists were forced to think creatively and extensively about how to apply newly adopted positivist legal principles to their specific circumstances.

In her work on colonial law, Lauren Benton notes: "Cultural intermediaries of various types - including emerging groups of indigenous legal personnel - often played an active role in advocating change in procedural rules" (Benton, 1999, p.564). Georgian jurists were no exception and they worked on behalf of their compatriots to improve the operation of the new courts in the South Caucasus by responding to allegations of cultural backwardness by insisting instead on the need to address the fundamental problem of linguistic diversity.

DISCUSSION

The Judicial Reform of Alexander II established a court hierarchy. In the South Caucasus, the highest court was the Tiflis Judicial Chamber. Serving both as the court of first instance for crimes of official malfeasance, as well as the appellate court for cases of serious crime in the South Caucasus, the Tiflis Judicial Chamber held jurisdiction over circuit courts in Stavropol, Elisavetpol, Baku, Yerevan, Ekaterinodar, Vladikavkaz, and the two circuit courts in the Georgian provinces – Tiflis and Kutaisi. In 1885, the total area under the jurisdiction of the Tiflis Judicial Chamber reached approximately 270,000 sq. miles, with

a population of 7,284,548. For their part, the Tiflis and Kutaisi circuit courts had original jurisdiction over cases of serious crime in Georgia, which, in 1897, boasted a population of 2,109,273 and an area over 40,000 square miles. Finally, petty crimes were tried in the magistrate courts, which, after the acquisition of Abkhazia, Batumi, and Kars following the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, numbered 28 in total. Officially, then, any crime committed in the Georgian provinces, regardless of the social estate of the perpetrator, was to be tried under the general laws of the empire in one of the aforementioned courts.

The expansive territory of Georgia, along with its rugged topography, made access to justice a particular problem. Vast distances, poor roads, and extreme weather conditions frequently prevented legal parties from attending court sessions. As a result, *in-absentia* verdicts were a common, albeit contested issue. Not only did the rocky terrain of the South Caucasus make access to the new courts in the region difficult, but it also complicated the investigation of serious crime. In his assessment of judicial investigators in the Georgian provinces, Gegidze observed:

Thanks to insufficient transportation networks, the investigator in the South Caucasus completes his district business exclusively on horseback...We often see two horsemen riding their nags in thick forests along narrow paths or scrambling up the rocks of the wild mountains of the South Caucasus. They ride slowly, at a walking pace, like two tourists studying the nature of the region. We do not initially suspect that these riders are the judicial investigator and his translator, who are hurrying off to a place where a serious crime has been committed, such as a murder or robbery. Desiring to make haste, these riders can only cover 20-25 versts per day. Therefore, to get to a crime scene located 60 versts away, they only arrive on the third day (Gegidze, 1896, p.42).

In addition to topographical challenges, cultural norms also proved problematic to Russian legal practice in Georgia.

Numerous scholars have shown that blood feuds and kidnapping were not uncommon in the mountainous regions of the Caucasus, but even the more mundane aspects of culture could run afoul of the new laws and complicate the administration of justice in the reformed courts (Grigolia, 1939, p.142). For example, the dagger (*khanjali*) formed an integral part of national dress for men across the Caucasus, a custom that came into conflict with the Russian Criminal Code. According to article 1653 of the Code, a theft (*krazha*) would be considered aggravated “if, during the theft or the attempted theft, the culprit had on him any weapon or arms with which he could inflict death or serious injury.” Consequently, any theft committed by a local inhabitant in national dress could technically be considered an aggravated theft. When Muslim inhabitant Kerim olgi appealed such a conviction in 1870, the Governing Senate, the highest adjudicating body in the empire, maintained: “Article 1653 is applicable in cases where the weapon was possessed by the perpetrator according to local custom and thereby constituted, as it were, a part of his clothing.”

While cultural norms and geographic obstacles certainly complicated Russian legal practice in the late tsarist period, linguistic diversity was perhaps the peskiest barrier to the

administration of criminal justice in the Georgian provinces. The region boasted a panoply of languages, including Georgian and its dialects, Svanetian, Mingrelian, Laz, Ossetian, Armenian, Azeri, Turkish, Russian, and numerous North Caucasian languages. Given the diversity of languages spoken in the Caucasus, local jurists performed a crucial role in mitigating confusion during legal proceedings. As Valerie Kivelson has noted in her work on Muscovite cartography, “particularism and state centralization were linked in a mutually constitutive process of codifying knowledge but local knowledge when withheld, distorted or contested could undermine the functioning of the central government” (Kivelson, 1999, p.101). In other words, the state had no unmediated access to local “truth,” and, hampered by its own regulations, could resolve nothing without that truth. Similarly, in Georgia, local participation was necessary to render evidence legible at court. Without it, perjury could and frequently did emerge during criminal prosecution.

Georgia’s new courts reflected regional demographics, particularly in magistrate courts. In 1878, of 22 magistrates in Georgian provinces, seven were Georgian, three Armenian, and three “Turkic,” meaning 59% were local. This diversity remained stable until the Old Regime’s collapse, though ethnic Russians often held a plurality or majority. Higher courts, like the Tiflis Judicial Chamber, were staffed mostly by Russians, but Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and Ossetians also served. Notably, Georgian Prince N.D. Chavchavadze chaired the Tiflis Circuit Court for over a decade. Lower court staff, including secretaries and bailiffs, were often locals, while interpreters were almost exclusively native. Sworn attorneys also reflected local diversity – by 1899, over 20 of Tiflis province’s 55 sworn attorneys were non-Russian, and 16 of 23 in Kutaisi province were Georgian.

Without a local university under imperial rule, aspiring jurists from the Caucasus studied in Russia or abroad, encountering European legal philosophy, including Bentham and Beccaria. Returning home, they shaped Georgia’s judicial practice. Three jurists illustrate these paths. Mikhail Egorovich Gegidze, trained at Imperial Moscow University, served in the North Caucasus and Vitebsk before joining the Tiflis Judicial Chamber and contributing to the *Journal of the Ministry of Justice*. Giorgi Mikhailovich Tumanov, from an Arme-no-Georgian noble family, studied at Novorossiysk University, worked as a judicial investigator, and later became a journalist, co-editing *The New Review*. David Vissarionovich Kvirkelia, starting as an assistant justice of the peace in Zugdidi, later became a sworn attorney in Kutaisi and engaged in civic life, writing on legal inefficiencies. Like other late-imperial Georgian intellectuals, these jurists were staunchly pro-European and champions of the rule of law (Jones, 2005). They rejected opposition to Western legal traditions, as seen in an 1886 *Iveria* article criticizing *Moskovskie vedomosti* for portraying judicial reform as unpatriotic. They sought to refine criminal adjudication, recognizing the challenges of borderland justice.

When the new courts began operating in the Georgian provinces in 1868, the challenges of borderland justice became readily apparent and, consequently, generated much scholarly debate among professional jurists in the region. Engaging with an imperial audience, the legal opinions of these jurists frequently appeared in the Georgian and Russian periodicals of the South Caucasus, as well as the newspapers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The

Tiflis-based legal journals *The Judicial Review* (*Iuridicheskoe obozrenie*) and *Judicial Orders* (*Sudebnye poriadki*) provided an especially unique forum for Georgian jurists to voice opinions alongside their Russian peers. The Law Society of the Caucasus (*Kavkazskoe iuridicheskoe obshchestvo*) also provided a forum for Georgian and Russian jurists to come together to develop their views on relevant legal matters.

These forums encouraged robust debate about the problematic aspects of the Judicial Reform in the region, such as the non-application of the jury trial and the language requirement, with the hope that “once people begin speaking about [the Reform’s] shortcomings, which have been brought to light in our country through the activity of the new court, the Minister [of Justice] will pay close attention to them.” The primary remedies proposed by Georgian jurists in public debate centered on mitigating linguistic barriers in the adjudication process, most notably, by requiring judges to know the local language, improving the quality of interpreters, adopting trial by jury, and doing away with the Russian language requirement all together.

Russian imperial jurist D.G. Tal’berg praised Alexander II’s Judicial Reform, declaring that it introduced modern principles of justice to Russia, eliminated courtroom injustices, and fostered a sense of legality among the populace. His enthusiasm mirrored that of many liberal jurists who saw the reform as an application of scientific methods to justice (McReynolds, 2013, p.4). Historian Frances Nethercott notes that Russian criminal law theorists engaged critically with Western juridical science, moving from absolutist theories toward positivism, which emphasized individual rights in legal proceedings (Nethercott, 2009, p.190).

Alexander II aimed to establish a judicial system that was “swift, just, benevolent, and equal for all.” Focused on procedural rather than substantive law, the judicial reform transformed evidence collection and verification. Previously confined to inquisitorial procedures and rigid legal proofs, evidence was now debated in open court. However, the shift to an adversarial system raised questions about how judges should assess evidence. The *Judicial Review* countered concerns that abandoning formal evidence rules led to judicial arbitrariness, arguing that verdicts were instead grounded in scientific legal principles and thorough case examination.

John P. LeDonne observed that the previous system left judges bound to pass sentences even against their convictions (LeDonne, 1974, p.102). The new system replaced bureaucratic rigidity with judicial discretion, but its effectiveness was compromised in Georgia, where local exceptions abounded. Notably, jury trials – the cornerstone of the reform – were absent in the South Caucasus, deemed unsuitable due to perceptions of local backwardness (Afanas’ev, 1994, p.214; Frenkel, 1884, p.334). As a result, judges, often Russian, struggled to evaluate evidence fairly, hindered by linguistic and cultural barriers. This posed a particular problem, as the new code of criminal procedure required imperial judges to base their verdicts on their “inner conviction.”

The reliance on witness testimony made judges vulnerable to deception. Russian lawyer Alexander Frenkel noted that perjury became widespread, with witnesses often bribed (Frenkel, 1884, p.334). The *Judicial Review* reported that perjury was especially rampant in cases involving individuals of different nationalities or social classes, a common occur-

rence in the Caucasus. Newspapers like *Kavkaz* described false testimony as an entrenched local issue, while Russian officials viewed it as a sign of the population's supposed lack of morality. However, Georgian jurists contended that these claims were exaggerated.

To combat perjury, Russian jurists proposed stricter penalties, but enforcement proved difficult. In 1880, only five perjury cases were prosecuted in the entire South Caucasus, with similarly low numbers in subsequent years. Tumanov argued that the root of perjury lay in the alienation between local officials and the populace. He believed that the presence of native adjudicators would deter false testimony, as witnesses would be less inclined to lie before judges who understood their language and customs (Tumanov, 1886, p.169).

Recognizing the language barrier, tsarist officials provided court interpreters, but their skills were notoriously poor. Georgian prince Dimitri Kipiani criticized the lack of qualified interpreters, warning that mistranslations could lead to unjust convictions. An 1880 article in *Droeba* recounted how a Georgian insult was mistranslated as blasphemy, leading to exile in Siberia. Russian and Georgian jurists alike questioned interpreters' integrity, with some arguing that they wielded undue influence over verdicts. To improve justice, some jurists proposed elevating interpreters' rank and salary to attract more qualified candidates (Gegidze, 1896, p.56). Others suggested requiring judges to learn local languages to monitor interpreters and assess witness credibility more effectively (Tumanov, 1903, p.41).

Tumanov and his contemporaries also advocated for jury trials, arguing that local jurors could provide oversight of interpreters and bridge cultural gaps in adjudication. Many Georgians supported jury trials, viewing them as a way to integrate the region into the imperial legal framework. In 1892, twenty-four years after the Judicial Reform's adoption in Georgia, a group of Kutaisi nobles petitioned the tsar to introduce jury trials. Their request underscored the broader struggle to reconcile imperial legal principles with local realities in the South Caucasus.

Budget constraints limited potential reforms. The *New Review* reported in 1884 that the introduction of new courts in the Caucasus was contingent on minimal fiscal burden. As a result, judicial resources remained inadequate. Russian jurist A. Krasovskii lamented that cost-cutting measures undermined the courts' effectiveness, while A.S. Frenkel criticized the prioritization of financial savings over regional needs (Krasovskii, 1885, p.27; Frenkel, 1884, p.307).

Georgian jurists ultimately proposed eliminating language restrictions in legal proceedings, allowing cases to be conducted in local languages. Grigol Rtskhiladze, a key advocate, argued:

For legal consciousness to take root, the people – who already view the courts with suspicion – must hear and understand the language in which justice is rendered. Without this, no matter how lawfully a court functions, it cannot foster trust in the legal system. Most people do not understand the court's language and thus do not believe they will receive justice. This explains why lower-class witnesses often feel no obligation to tell the truth and instead fabricate testimonies (Rtskhiladze, 1904, pp.2-3).

Among the jurists championing this cause, D.V. Kvirkelia presented the most compelling legal argument in his essay *“Local Language in the Criminal Trial and the Principle of Immediacy.”*

The principle of immediacy, central to the new adversarial court system, required that all evidence be presented in its most original form. Kvirkelia contended that the use of interpreters – regardless of their skill – violated this principle. He noted that “modern legal science upholds the principle of immediacy, which opposes clerical, written proceedings and insists that no intermediary stand between the judge and the evidence. The judge must have a direct, unmediated relationship with everything that transpires in court” (Kvirkelia, 1881, pp.105-111). Kvirkelia reminded his readers that the outdated formal theory of evidence had been long discredited, replaced by the doctrine of “inner conviction.” He skillfully linked this to the immediacy principle:

A judge’s conviction can only be just when it arises directly from the evidence presented at trial, formed through the vivid drama unfolding before his eyes. Witness and defendant testimonies are crucial, but their value depends on their correspondence to reality. The judge must assess their sincerity and reliability.

To do so, Kvirkelia argued, the judge must perceive subtle external cues – facial expressions, gestures, and tone. Kvirkelia insisted that interpreters, no matter how competent, cannot fully convey these nuances, making them inadequate for ensuring just convictions:

An interpreter cannot translate the inner world of the defendant or the spirit of the witnesses – elements central to criminal justice. And if this challenge exists even for highly educated interpreters, consider the reality of our actual interpreters, many of whom have an inadequate command of both Russian and their native languages. In such cases, the immediacy principle is entirely compromised.

Few Georgian jurists articulated their case as eloquently as Kvirkelia. His essay remains the most cohesive and legally principled argument against the Russian language policy. At the same time, it underscores the broader challenge of judicial “inner conviction” in an imperial legal system. Yet, despite his persuasive reasoning and the broader push by Georgian jurists, substantive legislative change never materialized. By the Revolution of 1917, judicial practice in the South Caucasus remained constrained by exceptions to the Judicial Reform – most notably, the Russian language requirement.

CONCLUSION

This essay has examined how jurists in the South Caucasus engaged with the Judicial Reform. The empire’s new evidentiary principle required courts to assess all case circumstances, yet linguistic barriers in the Georgian environment impeded this process. Imperial judges struggled to form an “inner conviction” of culpability due to these obstacles. In response, late imperial Georgian jurists sought to mitigate the Russian language require-

ment's negative effects – improving interpreter quality, monitoring their behavior, or advocating for abolishing the requirement altogether.

Through their writings, these jurists contested claims of cultural backwardness, instead highlighting how the regime's failure to address linguistic challenges undermined the legal reform's own goals. Though largely ignored by the tsarist bureaucracy, their work demonstrated a sophisticated engagement with modern criminal procedure. They participated actively in judicial culture alongside Russian peers, critically assessing and shaping legal practices rather than simply serving as a loyal administrative elite. The Russian language requirement became a focal point for asserting their authority within the legal system.

More broadly, their discussions of criminal justice illustrate the role language played in shaping – or obstructing – an integrated Russian imperial society. While the Great Reforms encouraged public participation in state affairs, linguistic barriers often undermined this ideal. In the realm of justice, *grazhdanstvennost'* and the Russian language mandate came into direct conflict. After the Old Regime's collapse, the Bolsheviks took a different approach, recognizing that a compulsory official language "involves coercion," "sharpens antagonism," and "increases resentment and mutual misunderstanding" ([Lenin, 1914, p.1](#)). Their rejection of an official state language extended to the courtroom, where proceedings were conducted in local languages ([Comrie, 1981, p.22](#)). Yet, the Soviet approach to linguistic diversity would bring its own administrative challenges.

Ethics Approval and Conflict of Interest

This study was conducted in accordance with relevant ethical standards. The authors declare that there are no financial, personal, professional, or institutional conflicts of interest that could have influenced the design, conduct, interpretation, or publication of this work.

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