

The Question of Ideological Domination and the Georgian Printed Media in 1990-1991

Khatuna Maisashvili
Ilia Chavchavadze State University

Based on quantitative research methods, descriptive statistics and factor analysis, the article aims to show the extent of the question of the ideological domination in the Georgian media of the early 1990s after their coming out from Soviet censorship, after passing through the glasnost period and having pretension to be free in Independent Georgian nation-state.

იდეოლოგიური დომინაციის საკითხი და ქართული ბეჭდური მედია. 1990-1991 წლები

ხათუნა მაისაშვილი
ილია ჭავჭავაძის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი

კვლევის რაოდენობრივ მეთოდებზე, - აღწერით სტატისტიკასა და ფაქტორულ ანალიზზე, - დაყრდნობით, წინამდებარე სტატია მიზნად ისახავს, წარმოაჩინოს იდეოლოგიური დომინაციის საკითხის ჩარჩოები საბჭოთა ცენზურისგან თავდაღწეულ, გლასნოსტგამოვლილ 1990-იანი წლების დასაწყისის ქართულ ბეჭდურ მედიაში, რომელიც თავისუფლებაზე აცხადებდა პრეტენზიას დამოუკიდებელ ქართულ ერ-სახელმწიფოში.

The Conceptual Changes in the Georgian Media during the 1990s

The main question to be investigated is an attribution of the Post-Soviet Georgian media to ideological domination. It is widely known that with the gradual collapse of the Soviet-Communist system, the functioning model of the media started to be changed some years earlier prior to the official abolishing of the USSR. In 1987-1990, by the admission of the Soviet Government, the control of media content for political and cultural reasons changed its nature. This change is known under the name of *glasnost*. For the phenomenon of *glasnost*, it was characteristic to maintain the main features of the Soviet-Communist model of press. That model was characterized by a large-scale society, an atomized public, a centralized media, one-way transmission. Moreover, there was a top down perception that the receivers depend on media for identity. Media was used for manipulation and control. *Glasnost* partly solved the problem of the lack of coverage of tabooed themes in the late Soviet media. This circumstance (being planned or unplanned by the initiators of *glasnost*, under their control or out of it) changed the impression about the receiver and attitude towards him. The receiver was less considered as an individual unable to act or to make a decision independently.

In light of the question of ideological domination it is very important to underline that the Georgian media of the early 1990s existed in parallel to Soviet media which played an important role in the whole post-Soviet society and which provided anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist discourses. This paradoxical ideological characteristic of the media highlighted the conflict between the name (Soviet) and its context, valence and directionality of the media activities (anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist).

Approximately a year earlier prior to state independence, i.e. during the period of *glasnost* (1989), the space of the Georgian media changed. It narrowed down, from the scale of the Soviet space to the new nation-state Georgia. The 'Soviet homeland' was divided into different components in the Georgian public conscience and reflected in identical duality, *here* and *there*, *ours* and *theirs*. The media had to create the definition of a nation and nationality, the definition of nationalism as an ideology and as an identical phenomenon for its readers.¹ Besides the traditional Soviet newspapers, legal printing bodies of the political parties and societies involved in the National Liberation Movement of Georgia appeared. The titles of the most of them contained the terms and elements of national identity and references to freedom. For example: *Sakartvelo* (which means 'Georgia,' was a printing body of the Popular Front of Georgia), *Mamuli* ('Fatherland,' was a body of Rustaveli Society), 'Iveria' (the ancient name of Georgia, was a body of the Ilia Chavchavadze Soci-

ety), *Tavisupali Sakartvelo* ('Free Georgia,' was a body of the political block 'Round Table – Free Georgia'), etc. The similar practice was common not only for the Post-Soviet but for the whole Post-Communist space. As Slovenian researcher Zala Volcic wrote, 'As in any other nation-state, the national media in Slovenia provide a very powerful basis for the processes by which members of a nation 'unite' and 'homogenise'... As such, media ideology can be understood as the 'glue' of the social world, binding people to the concrete practices of daily life that reproduce a shared sense of national identity'.²

After the elections of 28 October 1990, which resulted in the nationalist forces coming to power, the official bodies of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia and of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of Georgia, *Komunisti* and *Akhalgazrda Komunisti* changed their names into *Sakartvelos Respublika* and *Akhalgazrda Iverieli*. The change of names highlighted not only the changes in the social categories of identity - from partial solidarity to national solidarity, but it reflected a shift in dominant ideology.

As some Georgian scholars mentioned, in 1990 nationalist themes and issues were those topics in frames of which the whole Georgian media were acting, replacing Marxist-Leninist ideology with highly nationalist ideology, and this unavoidable conjuncture reflected new shifting inside quasi-culture (Andronikashvili, Z., Maisuradze, G. (2007). But some scholars (Surguladze, R., Iberi, E. (2003), Maisashvili, K. (2008)) argued that if one ideology was replaced with the other, for the media it might mean only facade change rather than structural innovation. In this reference the most important item was whether media did free itself from ideological domination, or just replaced one ideology with the other. The same scholars argued that all the attributions to freedom of press, such as themes and issues, dosage of freedom, questions for discussions, type of sources, privileged communicators, were admitted by the ideological conjuncture of transitional period. This conjuncture is evident in emphasis on creation of master-identity for the members of the society - to be a Georgian. Despite the importance of the individual identity for the Post-totalitarian society, creation and evolution of the *collective identity* was one of the challenges of the Georgian media in 1990.

To refer to the media practices of other Post-Communist countries, in Georgia, like in other Post-Communist nation-states, the 'nationalization of discourse' was aimed at reducing different scales of individual identity to mostly national or ethnic belonging (Volcic, 2005. p. 293).

In the early 1990s, the entire Post-Soviet space was marked with the growth of newspaper circulation and with the gradually growing impact of printed media. The quality, influence and freedom of the printed press made

it the unconditional leader in the media. It was characterized by trust of the readers, creative innovations, and the craving and efforts to overcome Soviet inertia. It was in the printed media where new media leaders were formed. By the Census of 1989, the literacy rate in Georgia was higher than 90%. As the rating researches and polls in the field of media conducted in 1990-1992 showed, the only state-owned television (1st channel of the Georgia television) was not able to compete with the printing press upon the degree of in-depth analysis, by freedom and diversity.³

What are the New Roles and Functions of the Georgian Media of 1990. The Theoretical Arguments.

I posit that: a) the presence or the absence of the ideological domination in media would be highlighted in examination of the perception by the new Georgian media leaders of that period of the roles and functions of the media, and b) the presence of ideological domination affirms the perspective of the relationship of media and society to be media-centric than society-centric.

Under the construct 'new media roles and functions' are unified the following: new principles of agenda-setting and new communication effects. The issues of the ideological domination of media can be best examined exactly through examination of these principles because of its high internal and external validity. The signification 'new' distinguishes between Soviet and Post-Soviet practices. As for the need for ideological domination, I assume that for the Georgians nationalist leaders and the nationalist intelligentsia in Post-Soviet Georgia, the intervention in the sphere of media production was so crucial as for the Georgian Communist leaders and nomenclature intelligentsia who relied on the media as a provider of state propaganda.

As for the term 'media-centric' I use it in the meaning of the classic theory of mass communication according to which media-centric approach sees mass media as a primary mover in social changes ⁴.

The Hypotheses

Based on the above analyzed theoretical arguments, concepts and constructs, I guide two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. The examination of perception by the new Georgian media leaders their new roles and functions is more likely to affirm the presence of ideological domination in media than to affirm existence of free (from ideology) media.

Hypothesis 2. In case of affirming ideological domination in media the model of media-society relationship is more likely to be media-centric than society-centric.

The method

The research method was collapsed into three techniques: descriptive statistics, chi-square and factor analysis.

The number of respondents: 18

Volume of the questionnaire: 6 questions.

Type of questionnaire: half structured questionnaire

The structure of the questionnaire: 2 blocks.

1) New roles and functions of Georgian media during period of 1990-1991 in light of presence of ideological domination; the editorial policy of a publication and its main principles;

2) Media-centric or society-centric perspectives and views of the interrelations between media and society;

The respondents were chosen with mixed principle in order to represent all the hierarchical levels and competencies in the most widely circulated, popular and influential Georgian publications of the early 1990s: editor-in-chief (2), editor (1), deputy editor-in-chief/deputy editor (2), co-editor (2), publisher/ member of the board of the publishing body (2), head of department (3), reporter (6).

Publications with different communication structures are represented: *Kommunisti* (an official body of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia); *Sakartvelos Respublika* (an official body of the Supreme Council of Georgia), *Tbilisi* (a municipal evening daily newspaper), *Sakartvelo* (a printing body of Popular Front of Georgia), *Mamuli* (a bi-weekly publication of the Rustaveli Society), *7 Dghe* (a body of the Independent Union of Journalists of Georgia), *Droni*, a private publication, *Tavisupali Sakartvelo* (a body of the political block 'The Round Table – Free Georgia'), *Sarbieli*, a private publication.

The research collected data via face-to-face interviews. Data were analyzed according to descriptive statistics methods.

With the purpose to test hypothesis 1, on the second stage of analysis the same respondents were asked to classify the results of the block 'New roles and functions of Georgian media' by the criterion of presence in the responses the ideological dominative meanings (evident or latent). The data of descriptive statistics were passed through chi-square to calculate the probability of deviation.

With the purpose to test hypothesis 2, on the third stage of analysis, in order of sub-gradation of data, an additional standardized questionnaire (including 18 questions) was suggested to the same respondents. The respondents had to evaluate on a 7-point scale the new media roles and functions according to the responses indicated by themselves to the questionnaire (18 references) on the first stage of the research. The data of this block were analyzed by scaling and factor analysis methods.

Results

Descriptive Analysis and Factor Analysis For Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2

1. What factors determined motivation of maintenance of the ideological domination in the media? (because the respondents could choose more than one, per cents are calculated beyond 100)

	In per cent
Professional education principles	27,8%
Political and historical moment	55,6%
Ideological domination – the only possibility for impact on society	33,3%

2. How do You characterize dimensions of media-society interrelatedness

	In per cent
Media-centric	27,8%
Society-centric	72,2%

3. The new functions and roles of the Georgian media of 1990s

	In per cent
Destroying of the principles of Communist press	8,7%
Pluralism, objectivity	21,7%
Coverage of National Liberation Movement's activities	4,3%
Full commitment in practical politics	4,3%
Supporting the creation of free society	4,3%
Supporting the construction of new state ideology	4,3%
Indefinite and unclear. Only the destiny and founding principles were changed	8,7%
Comprehension of national identity	4,3%
Independency of a journalist from the political elite	4,3%
Nomination (signification) of social phenomena	4,3%
Spreading of knowledge and education	4,3%
Social-political movement	4,3%
Critical views up events	4,3%
Reinforcing of public opinion	8,7%
Stage for political struggle	8,7%

4. What kind of factors does provide freedom of press?

	In per cent
Ownership structure	25%
Editorial policy	25%
Journalists elite	11,1%
State policy	11,1%
Public opinion	22,2%
Law	5,6%

5. Founding principles of editorial policy

	In per cent
Restoration of national values, reinforcing national kernel	11,1%
Professionalism	5,6%
Non-partisan press, objectivity, truth	16,7%
Freedom of speech	5,6%
Pluralism	5,6%
Collective nature of management	5,6%
Support for state policy	5,6%
Distribution of knowledge and analytical texts	16,7%
Managing and manipulating with public opinion	16,7%
Coverage of social problems	5,6%
Flexible policy	5,6%

6. In which way did the editorial policies support the ideological domination in media?

	In per cent
Conceptually conceived	66,7%
Spontaneous	16,7%
Intuitive	16,7%
Reactive	5,6%

As it is seen from descriptive statistics, the maintenance of the ideological domination is affirmed by the respondents by the following reasons: a) according to their opinion, the professional education principles of the Soviet journalists were based on the ideological domination; b) the political moment of transitional period required journalism to be a kind of ideological labor; c) presence of ideological domination in the media was considered as the only possibility for impact on the society. As we discussed in the introduction of the article, the leading ideological discourse as in the society so in the media was the nationalist discourse. So, the respondents posited that only ideologically affirming journalism could be effective in that political moment. More than 66% of the respondents pointed out that this ideological labor was done 'conceptually conceived' by the media leaders.

Upon completing descriptive analysis the respondents were asked to classify by nominal level of measurement the new roles and functions of the Georgian media in 1990-1991 according to the criterion of presence in their responses ideologically dominative meanings (clear and hidden).

Table 1. Clear and hidden ideological domination in the structure of the new media roles and functions.

<i>Clear ideological dominative roles and functions</i>	In per cent
Destroying of the principles of Communist Press	8,7%
Coverage of National Liberation Movement	4.3%
Full commitment in practical policy	4.3%
Supporting the construction of the new state ideology	4.3%
Comprehension of national identity	4.3%
Social-political movement	4.3%
Stage for the political struggle	8.7%
<i>Hidden ideological roles and functions</i>	In per cent
Pluralism, objectivity	21,7%
Reinforcing of public opinion	8,7%
Spreading of knowledge and education	4,3%

Table 2.

The presence /absence of ideology domination in the new media roles and functions

Ideology-affirming (clear/ hidden) roles and functions	73.6%(38.9%/34.7%)	n=13(7/6)
Roles and functions free from ideological domination	17,2%	n=3
Unclear and indefinite	8,7%	n=2
X ² =1.9, df=1, p<0.01		

If clear signs of the ideological domination are beyond of explanation, the roles and functions recognized as hidden attribution to the ideological domination in the media need some more comments. The comments of the respondents can be generalized as follow: a) the terms ‘pluralism’ and ‘objectivity’ were the ideology- carrier terms brought by glasnost ideology and directed to mask quasi-democratic processes in the late Soviet media; b) spreading of knowledge and education by the media was also the specific glasnost and post-glasnost project, when the learning from the newspapers concerned the knowledge with the widest sense of the term: signification and explanation of the social, political and historical phenomena, inter-replacement of the false (official, Soviet, Stalinist) history with the its ‘true’ (unofficial) versions; creation of definitions if ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’, ‘homeland’ and ‘state’, ‘democracy’ and ‘independence’, etc.; c) *knowledge* was an crucial factor that provided re-enforcing the public opinion.

Calculating chi-square and probability coefficient proves that hypothesis 1 is accepted.

As for hypothesis 2, the descriptive analysis doesn’t affirm the assumption about media-centric nature of the Georgian media in 1990-1991. Saying more exactly, the descriptive analysis doesn’t accept the causal and determinative links between ideological domination and media-centrism. In descriptive statistics only five respondents from 18 appreciated the nature of relations between media and society in the plane of coverage limitation as media-centric, 13 respondents considered it as society-centric. But while taking into account that presence of any form of ideological domination, as a rule, created media-centric, or quasi-society-centric perspective in relations between media and society, in the case of each respondent was hypothetically assumed a probability of deviation between the spontaneous choice for

media-centric or society-centric perspectives (Q.2) and comprehensively determined roles and functions of the new Georgian media (Q.3). This hypothetical deviation was conditioned by the assumed conflict between the respondents' Soviet experience and their glasnost and post-glasnost media practices. This deviation would be examined by factor analysis for testing hypothesis 2 and its statistical significance.

A standardized questionnaire was formed, in which the respondents had to evaluate on 7-pointed scale new media roles and functions identified by themselves in the previous questionnaire. Point 1 was considered as the lowest, point 7 as the highest. The questionnaire included 18 categories for evaluation.

The media's function and role in:

1. Political struggle (F1);
2. Strengthening new societal thinking (F2);
3. Establishing free society (F3);
4. Distributing education and knowledge (F4);
5. Creating and maintaining national identity (F5);
6. Establishing pluralism (F6);
7. Establishing liberal principles and values (F7);
8. Creating a press antagonistic to the Communist press (F8);
9. Reflecting social changes (F9);
10. Calling for social changes (F10);
11. Reminding about national identity (F11);
12. Restricting writing with exaggerated nationalistic pathos (F12);
13. Writing about society without compromise (F13);
14. Reflecting ideas and messages of National Liberation Movement (F14);
15. Writing the 'true' history (F15);
16. Mobilizing and unifying society (F16);
17. Reinforcing public opinion (F17);
18. Creating 'the hero of new times' (F18).

Output 1. Descriptive Statistics of variables

	f1	f2	F3	F4	F5	f6	f7	f8	f9	f10	f11	f12	f13	f14	f15	f16	f17	f18
Mean	6,11	5,00	4,06	4,61	5,89	4,28	3,17	6,22	5,50	5,50	6,00	2,11	3,56	6,39	5,28	3,33	4,56	4,56
Std. Deviation	0,758	1,328	1,514	1,243	1,451	1,074	1,581	1,003	1,295	1,383	1,414	1,079	1,790	1,195	1,364	1,645	1,790	1,617
Analysis N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

Output 2. Correlation Matrix (R matrix)

Correlation	f1	f2	F3	f4	f5	f6	f7	f8	f9	f10	f11	f12	f13	F14	f15	f16	f17	f18
f1	1,000	-,117	,046	-,263	-,042	,032	-,114	,430	-,120	-,112	-,274	-,376	-,265	-,310	-,202	-,503	-,352	-,197
f2	-,117	1,000	,790	,712	,397	,660	,420	,000	,513	,416	-,031	,205	,742	,000	-,065	,431	,569	,055
f3	,046	,790	1,000	,637	,244	,605	,488	-,047	,435	,520	-,192	,320	,748	-,208	,049	,488	,422	,131
f4	-,263	,712	,637	1,000	,464	,702	,484	,121	,713	,701	,067	,297	,605	-,090	-,037	,326	,605	,114
f5	-,042	,397	,244	,464	1,000	,247	-,043	,665	,501	,323	,373	-,142	,138	,026	,135	,263	,388	-,098
f6	,032	,660	,605	,702	,247	1,000	,768	,103	,444	,574	-,155	,073	,527	-,318	-,377	-,089	,313	-,094
f7	-,114	,420	,488	,484	-,043	,768	1,000	-,321	,101	,471	-,368	,230	,464	-,503	-,487	-,023	,173	-,268
f8	,430	,000	-,047	,121	,665	,103	-,321	1,000	,408	,127	,290	-,568	-,138	-,027	,081	-,190	,025	,028
f9	-,120	,513	,435	,713	,501	,444	,101	,408	1,000	,772	,225	,000	,457	-,019	,117	,276	,533	,309
f10	-,112	,416	,520	,701	,323	,574	,471	,127	,772	1,000	,211	,276	,452	-,196	-,109	,259	,475	,184
f11	-,274	-,031	,192	,067	,373	-,155	-,368	,290	,225	,211	1,000	,193	-,232	,696	,458	,430	,535	,592
f12	-,376	,205	,320	,297	-,142	,073	,230	-,568	,000	,276	,193	1,000	,210	,147	,138	,442	,423	,232
f13	-,265	,742	,748	,605	,138	,527	,464	-,138	,457	,452	-,232	,210	1,000	-,217	-,091	,453	,394	,131
f14	-,310	,000	-,208	-,090	,026	-,318	-,503	-,027	-,019	-,196	,696	,147	-,217	1,000	,760	,439	,526	,612
f15	-,202	-,065	,049	-,037	,135	-,377	-,487	,081	,117	-,109	,458	,138	-,091	,760	1,000	,559	,463	,593
f16	-,503	,431	,488	,326	,263	-,089	-,023	-,190	,276	,259	,430	,442	,453	,439	,559	1,000	,693	,568
f17	-,352	,569	,422	,605	,388	,313	,173	,025	,533	,475	,535	,423	,394	,526	,463	,693	1,000	,538
f18	-,197	,055	,131	,114	-,098	-,094	-,268	,028	,309	,184	,592	,232	,131	,612	,593	,568	,538	1,000

It is clear from the correlation matrix that we have high correlation among the following factors:

1. F2 (function and role in strengthening new societal thinking) is correlated with the following factors:
 - F3 (function and role in establishing free society)
 - F4 (function and role in distributing education and knowledge)
 - F13 (function and role in writing about society without compromise).
2. F3 is correlated F2, F13.
3. F4 is correlated with following factors:
 - F2 and F6 (function and role in establishing pluralism)
 - F9 (function and role in reflecting of social changes)
 - F10 (function and role in calling for social changes).
4. F6 is in correlation with factors F4 and F7 (function and role in establishing liberal principles and values).
5. F7 is correlated with F6.
6. F9 is in correlation with F4 and F10.
7. F10 is correlated with F4 and F9.
8. F13 is correlated with factors F2 and F3.
9. F14 (function and role in reflecting ideas and messages of National Liberation Movement) is in correlation with F15 (function and role in writing the 'true' history).
10. F15 is correlated with F14.

Thus, we have five groups of correlation: the first – among F2, F3, F4, F13, the second – among F2, F6, F9, F10, the third – among F4, F6, F7, the fourth – among F4 and F10; the fifth – among F14 and F15.

Factor 4 (function and role in distributing education and knowledge) from the point of view of correlation ability and correlation breadth is the most active factor.

One more notable and interesting aspect is that each factor in each group is highly correlated with other factors of its own group and with certain tests of other groups. Thus, the factor reflected by these groups is not completely independent. The interpretation of this pattern of correlations in the R matrix indicates that each factor group does not depend on one dimension, and it involves the main trends reflected in factors of another groups.

Output 3. Modified table of statistics of the extracted components


Component	Initial Eigen values		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6,026	33,480	33,480
2	4,233	23,515	56,995
3	2,553	14,182	71,177
4	1,155	6,415	77,593
5	0,953	5,296	82,889
6	0,755	4,197	87,086
7	0,676	3,754	90,840
8	0,434	2,410	93,250
9	0,395	2,193	95,443
10	0,260	1,445	96,888
11	0,194	1,075	97,963
12	0,154	0,854	98,817
13	0,109	0,606	99,423
14	0,048	0,265	99,689
15	0,030	0,166	99,855
16	0,018	0,099	99,954
17	0,008	0,046	100,000
18	0,000	0,000	100,000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

The initial total Eigenvalues include the characteristic features of the correlation matrix and determine which factors stay in the matrix. The factors Eigenvalues of less than 1 will be extracted. The Eigenvalue is the number of variance of the whole questionnaire determined by each factor, where the total variance of each test is represented as 100%. The percentage of variance supplies information about responsibility of concrete factor for the certain percentage of variance. Thus, the first three factors are represented as having more responsibility.

Here is graphically represented the meaning of each extracted factor. The variance conditioned by the factors sharply skewed with extraction of each of them. We are interested in which point the curve becomes a straight line. In this case this is the space between the third and the fourth factors. Notably, the fourth factor meaningfully is more importance than the first, so it would be involved in factor analysis discussion.

Figure 1. Graph of the results of factor analysis



Output 4. The meanings of rested tests on four extracted factors.

Component Matrix (a)

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
f1	-0,315	-0,342	0,463	0,370
f2	0,825	-0,188	-0,005	0,300
f3	0,789	-0,256	-0,110	0,442
f4	0,880	-0,170	0,107	-0,148
f5	0,457	0,097	0,669	-0,052
f6	0,669	-0,546	0,103	-0,134
f7	0,480	-0,648	-0,323	-0,227
f8	0,040	0,053	0,963	0,064
f9	0,734	0,034	0,444	-0,109
f10	0,754	-0,159	0,159	-0,372
f11	0,209	0,773	0,257	-0,389
f12	0,393	0,196	-0,637	-0,241
f13	0,749	-0,264	-0,214	0,339
f14	0,051	0,893	-0,049	0,026
f15	0,121	0,827	0,018	0,303
f16	0,605	0,568	-0,277	0,235
f17	0,779	0,470	-0,022	-0,070
f18	0,322	0,706	-0,064	0,084

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. a 4 components extracted

Vertically placed factors which are not in correlation with each other represent correlation coefficients between the variables and factors. Thus, how much high is an absolute value of meaning (which cannot be more than 1), so much valuable is the contribution of factor in variance of points of the variable. As it has been shown in the correlation matrix factor analysis, four factors have been extracted.

Output 7. The matrix of rotated components.
Rotated Component Matrix(a)

	Component			
	1	2	3	4
f1	-0,290	0,024	-0,174	-0,673
f2	0,049	0,812	0,378	0,039
f3	0,006	0,918	0,224	0,045
f4	-0,020	0,536	0,721	0,175
f5	0,192	0,117	0,665	-0,418
f6	-0,417	0,507	0,580	0,088
f7	-0,586	0,433	0,295	0,435
f8	0,104	-0,141	0,476	-0,824
f9	0,166	0,334	0,768	-0,142
f10	-0,082	0,292	0,788	0,210
f11	0,700	-0,376	0,467	0,092
f12	0,189	0,189	0,068	0,762
f13	-0,037	0,848	0,202	0,171
f14	0,867	-0,192	-0,025	0,123
f15	0,881	0,039	-0,098	-0,055
f16	0,704	0,460	0,116	0,317
f17	0,584	0,361	0,531	0,281
f18	0,754	0,088	0,118	0,156

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 9 iterations

The aim of rotation is to achieve a new position for an axis (factor) in order to interpret more easily from a psychological point of view. This matrix makes it possible to indicate which factors have high correlation (near to 1) with the first four factors. Besides F2, F3 and F4 which were extracted, these factors are:

- F8 - function and roles of the press antagonistic to the Communist press
- F9 - function and role in reflecting social changes
- F10 - function and role in calling for social changes
- F11 - function and role in reminding about national identity
- F12 - function and role in restricting writing with exaggerated nationalistic pathos

F14 - function and role in reflecting ideas and messages of the National Liberation Movement

F15 - function and role in writing the 'true' history.

Discussion

The descriptive analysis, chi-square procedure and factor analysis affirmed the hypothesis 1: the perception by the new Georgian media leaders of their new roles and functions was more likely to highlight the presence of ideological domination rather than to affirm the existence of free media. The four factors extracted in a result of the factor analysis: 1) political campaign and propaganda (political struggle), 2) establishing free society, 3) strengthening free societal thinking, and 4) distributing knowledge and education, from the perspective of relations between the media and society, are more media-centric than society-centric. So, the hypothesis 2 is also accepted.

The activeness of the factor 'distributing of education and knowledge' (F4) can be explained from the *general* and *particular* perspectives. The general perspective can be traced back to the classical theory of mass communication, according to which 'a central presupposition relating to questions both of society and of culture, is that the media institution is essentially concerned with the production and distribution of *knowledge* in the widest sense of the word.'⁵ The particular perspective concerns this factor as a *specific project of the transitional period*. In that period when the old system (the Communist system) codes were broken, the media created anew definitions of the political, social and cultural phenomena. Spreading of knowledge, as a factor of the new Georgian media roles and functions, as a factor of construing the new media policy, captured in other correlated factors. For example, the meanings and importance of the following factors, such as making the press antagonistic towards the Communist press principles, reminding about nationalism as an ideology and identity, hypothetically assumed as having a certain importance in the new media roles and functions, were highlighted only in the rotated component matrix as having correlation (near to 1) with the extracted factors.

The results of factor analysis make it possible to retrace the impact of glasnost on opinions of the Georgian media leaders of the 1990s. The extracted factors are characteristic of the glasnost policy, having imposed on the media features of media theory of social changes and development.⁶ The media were considered an 'engine for change' in the context of development.

Despite that glasnost did not aim to awaken national self-consciousness, 'the engine of social change' made national ideology work as one of the main

themes of media under the umbrella of declared principles. For example, in the 1990s coverage of messages, ideas and activities of new political forces and movements and of political campaigns and propaganda was not possible without reinforcing nationalistic thinking. Writing about establishing free society was not possible without considering ethnic and citizenry aspects of human rights. The distribution of education and knowledge was not possible without considering the inter-replacement of official and unofficial histories, etc.

Conclusion

The conclusion captures the overall argument of this article: the Georgian printed press served as a transmitter of 'knowledge and truth' for the Georgian society, kept the ideology-affirming nature and media-centric perspective. Replacement one ideology with the other, for the media didn't mean conceptual and structural innovation.

With simply replacing one ideology with other, the totalitarian principles of structuring of media space were preserved.

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Footnotes

¹ Maisashvili, Khatuna. (2008). 'Homeland's Soil and State Territory in Media Representations', in *'Sitkva' (5)*. p. 75-95

² Volcic, Zala (2005) 'The Macihne that Creates Slovenians': The Role of Slovenian Public Broadcasting in Re-affirming and Re-inventing the Slovenian National Identity', in 'National Identities', Vol.7, No. 3, September, pp. 287-308

³ Sources: media rating of the TV program 'Meotkhe' (1991-1992); 'Survey on the issues of freedom of press in 1990-1995' (1997) 'Open Society – Georgian Foundation'

⁴ McQuail, D. (2005).p.12

⁵ McQuail, Denis (2005). p. 81

⁶ McQuail, Denis (2005). p. 92