THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF TURKISH NATIONALISTS AND THE SOVIETS IN 1919

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ABSTRACT.

Following the Treaty of Mudros, a pivotal moment in the history of the weakened Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalist forces emerged and initiated a struggle for national liberation. To achieve success in this endeavor, it became imperative to establish a strategic alliance with a party that shared common interests with Turkish nationalists and was amenable to providing military assistance. In this context, amidst the conflict against imperialist forces, Soviet Russia emerged as the sole viable guarantor of survival. The Bolshevik leadership, recognizing the need for an ally in the south, perceived the Kemalist revolution as a means of propagating socialism and replacing pan-Islamist ideologies with revolutionary nationalism.

This paper delves into the historical events at the onset of the national liberation movement in Turkey. Its primary objective is to identify the key individuals involved in negotiations between the Kemalist Turks and the Bolsheviks and to elucidate the dynamics of these negotiations. The study employs qualitative research methods, particularly descriptive and historical event interpretation methods, to substantiate hypotheses and contextualize the alliance between the Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists. Furthermore, this research endeavors to ascertain the negotiators’ identities through an analysis of primary sources.

Through a rigorous examination of historical facts and analysis, our study concludes that the alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalist Turks was forged out of mutual interest. The initial meeting between Georgian Chekists and Turkish nationalists in Havza played a pivotal role in forming this alliance, which, in turn, had profound ramifications for global geopolitics and the fate of the South Caucasus.

Keywords: Bolsheviks; Ataturk; Turkish nationalists; Kazim Karabekir; Karakol
Introduction.

After signing a temporary truce at Port Mudros, the Ottoman Empire capitulated and surrendered to the Entente powers. The Young Turks Unity and Progress Party triumvirate, which has been at the head of the state for years - Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha, and Enver Pasha fled abroad. (Oreshkova, et al., 1982). On December 8, 1918, the United Army of the Entente States entered Istanbul and established the United Allied Administration. At the beginning of March 1919, the Freedom and Consent Party, which supported England, came to the head of the state. The Chamber of Deputies was dissolved by order of the Sultan. On the order of the Sultan, the persecution of the government of the Young Turks began. On February 8, the French general Franchet d’Esperey, like Mehmed, the conqueror, entered the city riding a white horse gifted by the Greeks. (Bernard, 1968). On November 26, 1919, the court declared Enver and Cemal Pasha guilty. (Bernard, 1968). The Entente fleet entered the straits, and the English occupied Mosul and Iskenderun. The French had occupied the north of the Ottoman Empire, from Syria onwards, and Italy - south-eastern Anatolia, including Konya. In addition, on May 15, 1919, the Greek army, with the consent of the Entente, entered Izmir. (Oreshkova, et al., 1982). British occupation units entered the South Caucasus. The British army commander, William Montgomery Thomson, demanded the Turkish army immediately leave Baku and then, in a month, leave the entire South Caucasus. (Chachkhiani, 2013). “The Ottoman Empire was defeated, the Ottoman army was disbanded, and the state was forced to sign a cease-fire agreement that included devastating conditions for the Ottomans. The people were tired and impoverished from the long war. Those who dragged the nation and the country into the world war fled the country to save themselves. The Sultan thought only of saving the throne and the Caliphate. The government headed by Damat Ferit Pasha was humble, weak, cowardly, and obedient only to the wishes of the Padishah.” (Ataturk, 1981)

Methods

This paper delves into the historical events at the onset of the national liberation movement in Turkey. Its primary objective is to identify the key individuals involved in negotiations between the Kemalist Turks and the Bolsheviks and to elucidate the dynamics of these negotiations. The study employs qualitative research methods, particularly descriptive and historical event interpretation methods, to substantiate hypotheses and contextualize the alliance between the Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists. Furthermore, this research endeavors to ascertain the negotiators’ identities through an analysis of primary sources.
Dissatisfaction among the Turkish population gradually grew more assertive. The revolutionary mood that began in 1919 swept the masses of workers in Anatolia. Guerrilla detachments appeared in almost every district, waging a guerilla war against the occupiers. (Oreshkova, et al., 1982). At precisely this time, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk enters the arena. On his initiative, in December 1918, a contradictory guerilla group was created - the Society for the Protection of Rights. (Müşafa i Hukuk). (Bernard, 1968). On May 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk arrived in Samsun. This date is considered the beginning of the national liberation battle. (Svanidze, 2007). Protest rallies began; on May 23, 1919, a large rally was organized in Sultan Ahmed Square; on May 28, a clash occurred in Anatolia between the Greek army and Turkish partisans. On June 20, 1919, a secret meeting was held in Amasia, attended by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Rauf Bey, Refet Bey, and Ali Fuat Jebesoy. Several vital resolutions were adopted at this conference and sent to all military and civilian organizations involved in the counter-movement against the Entente: 1. The country’s sovereignty is under threat. 2. The government of Istanbul does not fulfill its duties. 3. The nation itself ensures the independence of the country. 4. It is necessary to create a national government that will voice the demands of the Turkish nation. 5. A national congress should be convened in Sivas.

As soon as the national liberation battle started, it became necessary to search for an ally. At that time, the situation in Soviet Russia was not peaceful either. The counter-revolutionary movement of the White movement led by Anton Denikin posed a significant threat to the security of Soviet Russia, and the war with Poland continued. Allied fleets entered the straits; Baku and Batumi came under the British protectorate and posed a significant threat to the southern border of Soviet Russia. After November 21, 1918, the Black Sea coast came under British and French control.

Along with French liaison officers, Greek military units appeared in Odessa to protect the region from the Bolsheviks. In the same period, around December, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, Pavle Milukov, arrived in Istanbul and asked his allies for help in the fight against the Bolsheviks. (Kurat, 2011). The Allies also tried to use the Ottomans in the battle against the Bolsheviks. In April 1919, British intelligence officer Beneti Mustafa visited Kemal Atatürk’s home in Istanbul and offered to fight with Denikin against the Bolsheviks; in return, he promised to leave Thrace and Istanbul. (Yerasimos, 2000). The use of Turkish military power by the British against Soviet Russia was in favour of the Turkish reactionary forces. Rauf Bey, who attended the Mudros meetings,
claimed that the unity of Turkey and England would ensure Turkey’s return to the Caucasus borders of 1876. (Shamsudınov, 1999). Ali Fuat Cebesoy evaluates the British policy of this period as follows: “Neither General Denikin nor General Wrangel nor the foreign forces could prevent anarchy in the Caucasus. The Bolsheviks, with their propaganda, tried to bring the situation under control. If England had a correct policy in the East, then Denikin’s and Wrangler’s troops would not have tried to restore the tsarist regime there. Moreover, with the help of the Turkish military units of Ahmed Izet Pasha, the Federation of the Caucasus would be created, and in this way, we would have a strong base against the threat from Russia in the East.” (Cebesoy, 1982).

These political changes gave a push to the beginning of the relationship between Soviet Russia and Turkish nationalists. For both the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks, the “struggle against imperialism” in the context of the revolution of the world proletariat was also acceptable. As Stalin mentions in his article “C Востока свет” (A Light from the East): “Gradually, the wave of the liberation movement is moving inexorably from east to west in the occupied regions.... The motto of bourgeois nationalism “all power to the national bourgeoisie” has been replaced by the motto “all power to the working masses of the oppressed nations!” A year ago, after the October coup, the liberation movement was carried out with the same motto. The bourgeois-nationalist “states” created at that time tried to stop the wave of the socialist movement coming from Russia, they declared war on the Soviet government... German imperialism stopped the liberation movement on the borders, and the power was shifted to the bourgeois-nationalist “states.” Moreover, after the destruction of German imperialism, after the expulsion of the occupying forces, the liberation movement has been rekindled in a clearer form.” (“Правда” [Pravda] № 273). Therefore, cooperation with Turkish nationalists in the fight against “imperialism” was also promising for the Bolsheviks. In 1918, before the national liberation movement broke out in Anatolia, the strategic favour of the Bolsheviks among the Turkish high-ranking military was already noticeable. Even Kiazim Karabekir advocated strategic cooperation with the Bolsheviks to stop British expansion in Batumi and the South Caucasus. “To protect pan-Turkism in the Caucasus and protect it from Georgian and Armenian imperialism, we must adapt to Soviet rule. If we do so, Akhaltsikhe and Borchalo will also come under Soviet rule in the region, besides Kars, Batumi, and Artaan. They will be freed from the occupation of Georgia. Therefore, I am on the side of the Bolsheviks,” - claims the Division Commander Kiazim Karabekir, and so he continues: “The last hope of the Muslim population of Batumi to free themselves from Georgian captivity (!) is to recognize Bolshevism.” (Karabekir, 1960).
The meeting of Turkish nationalists and representatives of Soviet Russia did not happen suddenly. Preparation for the meeting began after the Bolshevik coup in Ottoman Turkey. The ideology of Marxism had a significant influence on Ottoman political circles. Since 1918, Turkish communists Mustafa Sufi, Suleiman Sami, Husein Hilm, and others have been actively appearing in the arena. In 1918, the party of communist ideology Türk Halk İştirakiyün Partisi (People’s Communist Party of Turkey) was founded. Since 1917, under the editorship of Mustafa Sami, the newspaper “New World” (Yeni Dünyə) has been published in Moscow, in which he called for rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Turkey. Decisions and speeches made by Soviet leaders were printed in the same newspaper. (Vandov, 1982). On November 4, 1918, a plenum of the Communist Party of Muslim Peoples was held in Moscow, attended by the Turkish Communist Mustafa Sufi. In his speech at this congress, Stalin stated that the main task was to organize a united revolutionary front. (Chachkhiani, 2013). In 1919, the Socialist Party of Turkey was founded by Huseyin Hilm and Mustafa Fazil. In the beginning, the leader of the party, Husein Hilm, supported the Marxist-Leninist ideology; however, after being bribed by British intelligence, he claimed the need to cooperate with the Entente states. (Vandov, 1982). Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha, the leaders of the triumvirate in Germany, met in Germany in 1919 the ardent German Communist Karl Radek, who was imprisoned in the uprising organized by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Linecht. Radek was so fascinated by the meeting with Enver Pasha that he actively brought Turkey and the International together after he was released from prison. All of Enver Pasha’s studies during this period in 1919-1920 were aimed at bringing the Islamic countries closer to the International and defeating British imperialism in the Islamic world together with Soviet Russia. (Savran, 2020)

There are different opinions of when the first meeting of Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists occurred. At the end of 1918, the Turkish nationalists were already looking to establish ties with the Bolsheviks. During this period, Major Husrev’s rather extensive letter from Havza to Kiazim Karabekir testifies, in which he states that “Bolshevikism can become the basis of unity in the fight against the injustice of the imperialists.” (Karabekir, 1960). Kazim Karabekir was initially suspicious of the prospect of cooperation with the Bolsheviks. However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk thought that “if Turkey supports the exit of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus and we act together with them from the West to the East, all doors will open in Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and India.” Karabekir calls this statement of Atatürk baseless because. He says: “How can we be sure that if the Bolsheviks defeat Denikin’s army, they will not enter the Caucasus, or the governments of Azerbaijan
and Georgia will not reconcile with the Bolsheviks or organize an internal coup... The main thing is not to open a new front with the Bolsheviks and to join forces with them on the eastern front, to protect them from the threat from Armenians and Georgians, and to transfer our military units stationed in the East to the West. Also, we should get weapons, ammunition, and money from the Bolsheviks. Therefore, it is necessary to open the door for the Bolsheviks in Anatolia in advance and put them in danger,” writes Karabekir. - “Ataturk and some other officers are ardent supporters of Bolsheviks, and I have expressed my opinion several times in writing that if we make a mistake, we will trample our interests under the feet of the Bolsheviks.” (Karabekir,1960).

The first concrete connections have already been observed since the spring of 1919. For the Bolsheviks, Ali Fuat Jebesoy recalls a letter sent by Talat Pasha to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at the end of 1919, in which he writes that the national liberation movement started in Anatolia caused great admiration. According to Talat Pasha, the leaders of the Bolsheviks in Germany agreed to assist the national movement. For this purpose, Enver and Cemal Pasha went to Russia and waited for further directives from Mustafa Kemal Pasha. (Cebesoy, 1953). The first connections between the Turkish nationalists and the Bolsheviks were made at this time, specifically in Havza. The fact that the meeting between Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the unknown Bolshevik was not in vain is evidenced by the memory of the head of the intelligence of the Turkish army, Husametin Erturki: “Mustafa Kemal was well aware of how difficult the road he was standing on. Even one mistake could destroy the goals. Courage was needed to start a united national movement, and weapons and ammunition were needed for the battle. Where and from whom should we get all this? It had to be a country against England’s expansion in Asia and had a soft policy. We were forced to choose a country to help us with weapons and money against the victorious countries. After the meetings held in Havza, Mustafa Kemal went on a new path; after the meetings, we were provided with help from Russia.” (Nafiz, 2012).

Based on the memories of Husametin Erturki, several researchers believe that the first meeting between Mustafa Kemal and the Russian Bolsheviks should have occurred in Havza in May or June. To determine the identity of the Russian Bolshevik, we will bring the opinions of several researchers to the meeting. Russian researcher Stanislav Tarasov believes that it must have been Semyon Budion, whom Stalin assigned to negotiate. (Tarasov,2009)According to another opinion, a meeting did take place in Havza, but not with the Bolsheviks, but with the Turkish communists from Odessa, led by Mustafa Sufi, where the prospects of assistance to the national
liberation struggle launched in Anatolia were discussed. After this meeting, as Stefanos Yerasimos writes, the delegates returned to Odessa. However, due to attacks by Denikin’s detachments, Mustafa Sufi’s group joined the 12th Red Army and fled to Moscow. (Yerasimos, 2000). Russian author Alexander Kolesnikov cannot give an exact date. However, he supports the idea that the relationship between the Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists also began in May 1919. (Kolesnikov, 2010).

Alexander Ushakov, the author of Atatürk’s biography, believes that the meeting occurred not in Havza but in Amasia. As he writes in Amasia, “Mustafa Kemal first talked about tactical cooperation with the Bolsheviks. Nothing was surprising in the fact that Kemal, for whom the communist ideology was completely unacceptable, still agreed to cooperate with the Bolsheviks ... because he believed that a compromise was necessary.” The author does not believe Atatürk met Semyon Budion in Havza in 1919, who also promised money and weapons.

Along with all this, Semyon offered Communism to Atatürk, as the author writes: “To make the Turkish brothers happy in the fight against the bloody bourgeois for a bright future.” This opinion of Ushakov is baseless because Atatürk himself, later, on January 3, 1921, speaking at the tribune of the Mejlis, said that no one had asked him to be a communist in order to start a partnership, just as “we did not say that we decided to become communists in order to establish friendly relations.” (Atatürk et al. Book 10, p. 248). The author believes that Budion would be less likely to represent the Bolsheviks, as “Lenin and Trotsky were unlikely to send a cavalryman who barely spoke Russian to such an important meeting when other, smarter people could have been found in his place.” (Ushakov, 2002). A researcher of the history of relations between Soviet Russia and Atatürk, Mehmed Perinchek, also does not share the opinion that Semyon Budion attended the meeting between the Turkish nationalists and the representative of the Bolsheviks from the Soviet government. In July 1919, Budion was appointed as the commander of the cavalry, and due to his duties, he could not come to Turkey. According to him, it must have been Budu <dovani. “His name was misunderstood and attributed to a more unknown person, Budion.” Budu Mdivani held high positions for years, and in 1920, he was the ambassador of the Soviet Union to Turkey. Therefore, Atatürk might have met with him. (Perinchek, 2007).

Another researcher of the relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey, Dimitri Vandov, believes that the representative of Soviet Russia, whom Atatürk’s supporters met with at the end of 1919, was Shalva Eliava. This opinion is not baseless because, in 1919, Shalva Eliava was the chairman of the Turkestan Affairs Commission of the Executive Committee of Soviet Russia. In 1920, he was appointed as
the plenipotentiary representative of Russia in Ottoman and Iran; however, due to his illness, he sent Jan Upmal to perform his duties. Ali Fuat Jebeso also confirms that Shalva Eliava was the representative of Soviet Russia in negotiations with Turkish nationalists. “The Russian commander who secretly arrived in Istanbul” - he titles this chapter and writes: The Bolsheviks, who are at the head of the Russian state, are at war with the Entente countries on various fronts. They declared that they were ready to provide material and military assistance to save the East from the influence of imperialists and capitalism. After the Sivas Congress (September 4, 1919), Comrade Shalva Eliava, the commander of the Caucasian Bolshevik detachments of Soviet Russia, secretly arrived in Istanbul to ascertain the situation created in the Ottoman Empire. Shalva Eliava, with the help of the representatives of our partisan movement in Istanbul, contacted us and said that they are ready to support the Turkish people in the fight against the imperialists.” (Cebesoy, 1960 Ali Fuat Jebeso recalls another essential fact, which is also related to the first attempt at negotiations with Soviet Russia. This fact concerns the story that happened in Berlin, where Talat Pasha was contacted by Redek, one of the representatives of the Third International, who asked to send Jemal Pasha and Enver Pasha to Moscow and promised to help these two generals in Anatolia. Jemal Pasha and Enver Pasha went to Moscow at different times. In Ali Fuat Jебeso’s memoirs, he cites a letter from Cemal Pasha as a sign of the beginning of these negotiations, in which he writes that the Russians are “sending us an ambassador. This ambassador is Eliava, who is said to be a professional, serious person. It seems that they want to send an ambassador from you to Russia. They (Russians) believe the cooperation agreement between Turkey and Russia must be signed.” (Cebesoy, 1960). This letter is dated June 11, 1920, and was written by Ali Fuat Pasha because the Bolshevik government would send a person who was well aware of the issues of the East, specifically Turkey, as the first ambassador. We can assume that Shalva Eliava was the representative of Soviet Russia who appeared with Secretary Budu during the first contact with the Turkish nationalists.

We are still determining whether the first meeting between the Bolsheviks and Atatürk was about accepting Bolshevism. Still, the acceptance or non-acceptance of the Bolshevism ideology caused a significant difference of opinion among Turkish nationalists, as evidenced by the memoirs of Atatürk’s commander, Kiazim Karabekir. Above, we quoted an excerpt from Kazim Karabekir’s memoirs, showing how cautious he was about the Bolsheviks. Even in 1919, when there was a specific meeting between the two sides in Havza, the argument about Bolshevism continued among Turkish nationalists. On June 16, 1919, Atatürk Kiazim sent a letter to Karabekir, precisely after the secret meeting held in Havza, where he wrote about
the necessity of cooperation with the Bolsheviks: “Once again we consulted and agreed that Bolshevism, as an ideology... has nothing to do with faith and tradition and, therefore, does not pose a threat to our country. However, ... it is necessary to act so that we do not put our homeland under the threat of the expansion of the Bolsheviks, and the partner forces are far from our country. They were...Let us not wait for the first proposal from the Bolsheviks; let us select a reliable person from there (Kazan et al. are meant) to start negotiations.” (Atatürk’ün Bütün Eserleri, 2004). It seems that the differences of opinion around Bolshevism lasted for a long time. Even in the February 29, 1920 letter, Kemal Atatürk did not rule out accepting the ideology of Bolshevism, if necessary. An excerpt from the letter addressed to Talat Pasha: “Our cooperation with the Bolsheviks was limited to joint action against common enemies... Even today, money and other needs are urgent for us. The recognition of the Bolshevik principles may be unimaginable today, but in case of need... To preserve the unity of our homeland and save our people from the pressure of England, if the solution is to recognize the principles of the Bolsheviks, despite the great difficulty, we must consider our existing forces and think again about this matter.” (Atatürk’ün Bütün Eserleri, 2004). Turkish nationalists were indeed faced with a great dilemma. The prospect of cooperation with the Russian Bolsheviks was viewed with caution, but there was no alternative in the political arena. The leaders of the Communist Party of Turkey were also actively involved in the process of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Turkish nationalists. As we have seen above, some researchers believe that the Turkish Communist Mustafa Sufi was the first to discuss with Atatürk the prospect of rapprochement with Soviet Russia. However, this opinion is equally unfounded since the meeting between Atatürk and Mustafa Sufi occurred in August 1920, which is mentioned in Mustafa Sufi’s letter to Stalin. This opinion is developed by Mehmed Ferinchek, a researcher of Russian-Turkish relations, with whom we also agree. The Russian communists did not ignore the differences of opinion among the Turkish nationalists. In the meeting of Atatürk with the Turkish Communist mentioned above, Mustafa Sufi says that “the government of Anatolia is far from the ideology of Communism and is foreign to its principles, this may raise suspicions about Turkey in Russia. To be sure that Russia will help you, Turkey should, therefore, be open to meetings with the communists.” (Perinchek, 2007). Grigory Zinoviev, one of the leaders of the Russian Bolsheviks, said the same thing: “Mustafa Kemal’s policy is the policy of the Communist International; that is, it is not our policy. However, we are still ready to help the rebellion linked to the rise of British imperialism.” (Cebesoy 1982).

One way or another, Turkish nationalists were still looking for ways to get closer
to the Russian Bolsheviks. A few months after the Sivas Congress, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk sent Halil Pasha to Soviet Russia as an ambassador. (Perinchek, 2007) Halil Pasha served in the Caucasus after World War I and was captured by the British. There are different opinions regarding the place of captivity. Ali Fuat Jebesoi writes in his memoirs that the British captured him in Bekir Agha’s company and, as the researcher Yerasimos writes, also in Batumi. Along with Halil Pasha, the commander of the Islamic Army, Nuri Pasha, was also in prison. (Yerasimos, 2000). He escaped from prison on August 7, 1919, with the help of the secret organization “Karakol.” In the memoirs of Ali Fuat Jebesoy, Halil Pasha mentions a certain Mulazim Shadi who was directly involved in his escape. (Cebesoy, 1982). and went to Ankara, where he met Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. We quote Halil Pasha’s account of this meeting from the memoirs of Ali Fuat Jebesoi: “We want you to go to the East,” - said Mustafa Kemal - “you should help us establish relations with the Bolsheviks; after establishing contact with them, we should try to get weapons, ammunition, and money from them as aid.” Atatürk’s choice of Halil Pasha was unsurprising because he “served in the Caucasian army and knew the Bolsheviks well.” (Cebesoy, 1982). Atatürk sent Halil Pasha to Baku in the East. where “a large part was already Sovietized” (Cebesoy, 1982). Halil Pasha is another important figure who greatly contributed to establishing relations between Soviet Russia and Turkish nationalists. At the end of 1919, he arrived in Baku, where he learned that Nuri Pasha was in Dagestan. (Cebesoy, 1982). In Baku, he was met by a certain Levandovsky - a communist born, raised, and Bolshevized in Tbilisi. The Red Army members were interested in the purpose of his departure to the north. After Halil Pasha confirmed the purpose of his arrival, they attached a colonel named Iskoc-hko to him and sent him to Moscow (Cebesoy, 1982, p.176). Halil Pasha arrived in Moscow in 1920 (Perinchek, 2007). and met with Chivherin with the help of a colonel. (Cebesoy, 1982).

Another group of Turkish nationalists - “Karakol” - tried to establish relations with the Bolsheviks. Karakol was a secret organization created by Unity and Progress Party members that operated independently of Atatürk’s resistance movement. The first connections with the Bolsheviks in the South Caucasus were made with the help of the members of this organization. At the beginning of July 1919 (Yerasimos, 2000). In a letter written by one of the founders of Karakhol, Kara Wasif, to Ali Fuat Jebesoy, we learn that “the Russian Bolsheviks told the representative of the Eastern Committee, who asked them to send two delegates to agree on the terms of aid, that Soviet Russia agrees to give aid to the Turks from the Crimea.” (Cebesoy, 2000). Ali Fuat Jebesoy immediately sent this information to Erzurum, where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Kazim Karabekir were present. Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk rejected the arbitrariness of the rulers of Karakhol. From then on, contacts with the Bolsheviks were to be conducted only under the direct supervision and directives of Kazım Karabekir. Accordingly, Omer Lutfi and Doctor Fuat Sabiti went to Baku on a particular assignment, and Fuat Sabiti met Victor Naneishvili, a member of the Caucasus Committee of the Communist Party. Omer Lutfi returned to Erzurum on September 2. In the letter sent to Kazım Karabekir, we read: “Bolsheviks have not set foot in the Caucasus yet. However, their silent influence is felt. The Musavati government of Azerbaijan in Baku is under the influence of the British, and they believe that the Bolsheviks will soon be defeated. The Georgian Menshevik government is also in the hands of the British. In Baku and Tbilisi, the British military forces are not very visible. Most likely, the British will leave the entire Caucasus. Dr. Fuati went to Moscow to negotiate with the Bolsheviks.” (Karabekir, 1960). Before leaving for Moscow, doctor Fuati, a supporter of Turkish nationalists, met with a representative of the Bolsheviks in Baku. Ierasimos thinks that he should be the Georgian Chekist Victor Naneishvili. (Yerasimos, 2000). However, he does not mention the name in his letter, which Dr Fuat sent to Kazım Karabekir on November 21, 1919. During the meeting, the representative of the Bolsheviks promised to be ready to help Soviet Russia, but at this stage, it was limited only to monetary assistance. (Karabekir, 1960). Shalva Eliava was also involved in the negotiations with the representative of Karakhol, as proof of which we cited above the letter sent by Jemal Pasha to Ali Fuat Pasha. Some researchers (Mehemed Ferincek and Yerasimos) believe this person should be Ilyichov, and Ali Fuat Pasha might have needed clarification. At the same time, Baha Saitative of the Ushak Congress at the same time and was involved in the negotiations with Soviet Russia. In January 1920, in Baku, he signed a cooperation agreement with the representative of the Caucasus Regional Committee of the Communist Party. Kara Wasif, one of the founders of Karakhol, sent a copy of the agreement to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who in turn conveyed the information to Kazım Karabekir in an encrypted telegram. The parties agreed to joint action against Western imperialism according to the provisions. For this purpose, Soviet Russia undertook to provide Turkey with weapons, military materials, and material assistance. The representative of Turkey, in turn, promised to help the representative of Soviet Russia with armed detachments in the fight against Denikin, Kolchak, and other enemies of Soviet Russia. (Karabekir, 1960). Kara Vasif, who reported this fact to Kazım Karabekir, wrote that Ilyichov, a representative of the Bolsheviks, came to Istanbul to sign the agreement. (Karabekir, 1960). There is a difference of opinion regarding the identity of the signatory. Kazım Karabekir indeed mentions Ilychev. Still, it is possible that it was Shalva Eliava because Ali Fuat Jebeşoi writes in his memoirs that at the end of
1919, Shalva Eliava was conducting negotiations between the Bolsheviks. (Cebesoy, 1982). Researcher Richard Hovanesian also shares this opinion. Shalva Eliava was actively involved in talks with Karakhol overlords in Anatolia and Istanbul, specifically Baha Sait, and he was the official representative of the Bolsheviks who signed the indictment on January 11, 1920. (Hovaninisian, 1973). Atatürk had a substantial adverse reaction to Karakol’s representative signing an agreement with the Bolsheviks without his permission. Kiazim Karabekir writes in his memoirs that after he sent Dr Fuat to negotiate with the Bolsheviks, the authority of the Baha’i Site was shaken, and he decided to intervene as a separatist. “Bolsheviks will soon realize that Baha’i Site is not a representative of Turkey,” writes Karabekir. (Karabekir, 1960). Due to the situation, Karabekir considered it appropriate to send a group led by Major Ali Riza, commander of the Trabzon regiment, to Baku. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk gave special directives to Miamavl Jgguf in Baku. In particular, the leaders of the national liberation movement agreed to engage in a joint struggle against the imperialists. At the same time, they did not recognize the agreement signed by the representative of Karakhloi with the Bolsheviks. (Karabekir, 1960). “Bolsheviks will soon realize that Baha’i Site is not a representative of Turkey,” writes Karabekir. (Karabekir, 1960). The mentioned agreement was not recognized by the Soviet side either.

Conclusion

The negotiations started in the summer of 1919 and became especially active at the end of the year and the beginning of 1920. Negotiations were mainly held in Baku, and two groups demanded help from the Soviet Union - officers sent by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and members of the Karakolio. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made a profitable move and united these two groups into one organization for coordinated actions. These single meetings, which began in 1919, laid the foundation for a great union, which was determined by mutual interests and fully fit into the ideology of the world proletarian concept for the Bolsheviks. The joint struggle against imperialism was beneficial for both sides. This alliance was fatal for the independent republics of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus was one of the foundations of a strategic deal between the Turkish Nationalist Government and Soviet Russia, united against the imperialists. This unity determined the fate of the states of Southern Kazakhstan. As a result of this alliance, the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia ended in 1921.
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