Georgian Nationalism and Soviet Power: Background and Impact of the March 1956 Events

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Between 2nd and 11th March 1956 thousands of young people took part in un sanctioned commemorations of the anniversary of Stalin’s death in Tbilisi and other cities in Georgia, culminating in armed interventions by the Red Army which cost dozens if not hundreds of lives. Most general histories describe the decision that sparked these events – Khrushchev’s denunciation of Iosif Stalin and the cancellation of commemorations of the 3rd anniversary of Stalin’s death – with little reference to any context broader than the Stalin cult:

In Georgia [Stalin] was venerated as a national hero although he had executed many Georgians. A riot took place in Tbilisi.
Historians who do look beyond the immediate causes tend to do so at a high level of generalisation:

The famous riots in Tbilisi...were not simply an outburst of hurt Georgian pride, as the popular version has it, because the "great son" of their nation had been denigrated. According to witnesses and participants in the protests, what actually happened was that the initial pro-Stalin demonstrations that occurred...rapidly developed into nationalist protests. By 9 March...demonstrators were no longer concerned about Stalin, but the question of Georgian self-determination and civil liberties. Some apparently openly called for Georgian independence.²

For these authors, whose sympathies are clear, the demonstrations were a manifestation of the eternal Georgian longing for independence. In many respects, Georgian nationalism changed little over the course of the twentieth century, and the 1956 events were part of a long sequence (1905, 1924, 1978, 1988) of more or less insurgent protests against Russian or Soviet rule. Georgian nationalism, with all its complexities and contradictions, is an essential part of the background to the events of March 1956. The significance of personality cults – in this case, those of Stalin and Beria – can not be understood in isolation from this broader background. Analysis based on anything in between the immediate demands of protestors and sweeping generalisations about the Georgian nation have, however, been hampered by lack of dependable sources and the Manichean framework of totalitarianism which reduces analysis to support for or opposition to, in this case, the Georgian national cause.

This contribution seeks to focus attention on the medium term circumstances surrounding March 1956. This was a key event in the relationship between Moscow and one of its peripheries - Georgia. Destalinisation shook up many of the old certainties across the Soviet Union, but in Georgia destalinisation coincided with the political reorientation of the republic after twenty years of domination by Beria and his supporters. Khrushchev’s secret speech led to the era of open dissidence in the Soviet Union, and to the emergence of the ‘thaw generation’ which played such a key role in the collapse of Soviet communism and the order that replaced it.³ In, Georgia, however, the process of destalinisation itself fuelled the hostile character of Georgian nationalism, and the street protests which followed only two months after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech further cemented the peculiar character of destalinisation in Georgia.⁴ This could not but have a profound impact on a generation of Georgians which included Zviad Gamsakhurdia and other participants in Georgia’s post-independence civil war.⁵ For the mass of Georgians, March 1956 seems to have been a turning point in which anti-Russian attitudes became, for the first time, an integral part of Georgian nationalism. The ultimate consequences of this can be seen in the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

This paper is based mostly on published sources and is the product of preliminary work intended to lead to a full-scale research project on the 1956 events and their circumstances. As such, it may succeed in identifying different factors that lay behind these events, without being able to isolate which of these factors was more important
than the others: while some eyewitness accounts are recorded, more extensive oral history would be needed to establish the principal motives of the protestors. The recent availability of Georgian Communist Party archives will, hopefully, yield precise insights into the political and social context.

The course of events in Tbilisi from 3rd-9th March 1956 are pretty well established. A detailed account by the Trud journalist S. Statnikov, later published in Is­tochnik in 1995, is more or less corroborated by the account drawn up by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia for the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Further colourful details, such as the pig adorned with a photograph of Khrushchev that was paraded around the streets of Tbilisi, are provided by eyewitness accounts recorded much later.7

On the surface, it is clear what motivated the demonstrators. The disturbances began as spontaneous commemorations of Stalin’s death in the absence of any official events. Monuments to Stalin provided the focal point in Tbilisi, Gori and Sukhumi; portraits of Stalin (and to a less extent Lenin) figured prominently; poems in praise of Stalin were read out; speeches denounced Khrushchev’s secret speech; the slogan ‘Long Live Stalin’ was chanted; and so on. An appeal read out to the crowd at Stalin’s statue in Tbilisi on 9th March by Ruben Kipiani summarised their demands. At different trials Kipiani later claimed variously that he had been drunk and had the petition thrust on him, reading it out without being aware of its contents, or that he had been told that it was written by the First Secretary of the CC CPG Mzhavanadze.8 At his first interrogation by the KGB on 21st March 1956 he claimed the document was written by a half-Jewish schoolgirl called Eteri.9 In spite of Kipiani’s unreliability as to the provenance of the document, he was consistent as to its contents and the sources indicate that the demands were received favourably by the crowd:

1. Return the closed letter [circulated to party organisations after the Secret Speech] on I.V. Stalin to the CC CPSU
2. Remove Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan for their declarations against Stalin and impeach them
3. Ask Molotov to form a new government and hold new elections to the Central Committee and government. To include Mzhavanadze and Stalin’s son, Vasilii Stalin, in the new government
4. Return Stalin’s son Vasilii to the Soviet Union
5. Review the circumstances of Beria’s execution and the reasons for sending Vasilii Stalin out of the Soviet Union. This review should be conducted by appropriate organs under the leadership of Georgia
6. Name Akakiya Mgeladze Secretary of the CC CPG - a true pupil of Stalin, who appointed him head of Abkhazia
8. Send these demands immediately for publication in the newspapers Kommunist and Zarya Vostoka, printing them word for word and in translation.10
The demands are truly Stalinist in two senses: they envisage a return to the old order, embodied in a government led by close associates of Stalin, while the strength of the personal attachment to Stalin and his cult is attested by the three references to his son Vasili.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, later recollections of eyewitnesses and participants in the March 1956 events (collected in a volume devoted to 1956) disagree as to the strength of feeling for Stalin personally. According to Eduard Shevardnadze “They didn’t think Stalin was God here in Georgia”. Rather, what motivated the protests were the slurs against the Georgian nation that Khrushchev had supposedly added to his denunciation of Stalin.11 This analysis is partly confirmed by the recollections of demonstrator Mikhail Dzhalabadze, who insisted that in denouncing Stalin Khrushchev had insulted the whole of Georgia and the protests were against Khrushchev’s nationality policy.12

Givi Bepkhuadze denied even this – Stalin did not actually think of himself as a Georgian, and the demonstrations were rather protesting against Khrushchev, who wanted to throw Georgians out of Georgia.13 Kaki Kavsadze, whose good friend Rauli was among the fatalities of the events, illustrated rather the confusion of the time, insisting he was not a Stalinist but that he felt compelled to protest after being told that the positive portrayals of Stalin over the last thirty years were a lie.14 Other testimonies, however, refer to affection for Stalin as the sole motive for participation in the March 1956 events.15

To seek to pinpoint a single overriding motive for participation in a mass event is likely to be futile given the different biographies and dispositions of different protestors. The small number of published testimonies suggest that devotion to Stalin was real but was also a symptom of Georgian national pride. All of the sources suggest that the demonstrators were overwhelmingly young, most of them students, which again suggests a link not just with Georgian nationalism but also with political radicalism influenced by that nationalism. Memories recounted at such distance are also likely to be faulty, especially when feelings about such a controversial figure as Stalin are concerned. The evidence does, however, point overwhelmingly towards the centrality of the figure of Stalin in motivating the Georgian demonstrations, and this makes investigation of the Stalin cult in Georgia an important topic for research.

This conclusion should not, however, prevent us from looking into further factors behind the events. The conclusions of the CC CPG report delivered to the Presidium of the CC CPSU pinpointed the Stalin cult alongside a litany of the usual suspects – hooligans and anti-Soviet, parasitic and immoral elements, mistakes in propaganda work and so on. But in more sober analysis, the report also points to weaknesses in economic policy, and mistakes in nationality policy with especial regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.16 Such candidness did not even amount to self-criticism, given that any such faults could be laid at the feet of the Beria-sponsored group which had been in power in Georgia until 1951.

If the Secret Speech came as a bolt from the blue for most citizens of the Soviet Union, Georgians may have been less surprised by it. From one perspective, the events of 1956 were a continuation of a process initiated in 1950 by Stalin himself. The so-
called 'Mingrelian affair', which Khrushchev described as a personal initiative of Stalin over which he did not consult, resulted in a widespread purge among the republic's leadership which has generally been interpreted as aimed at weakening the grip of Lavrenti Beria on the region. The mention of Beria in Kipiani's list of demands is just one indication that the cult of Beria, while not as significant as that of Stalin, was of at least some consequence. Perhaps more telling is the nervousness of the surviving Presidium members in dealing with the legacy of the man they had had executed. Khrushchev's exasperated cry of 'Beria shot Georgians as much as he did Russians!' in response to the March 1956 events sums up his appraisal of the place of Beria for Georgian nationalism. The difficulty of dealing with Beria's legacy also took more concrete forms. Even before Beria's execution, in August 1953, the Georgian CC wrote to Khrushchev requesting that measures be taken to expel Beria's relatives from the republic. It took until May of 1954 to fully authorise this action, and in September the following year some of Beria's relatives, exiled to Krasnoyarsk and Kazakhstan, were still proving sufficiently troublesome for the KGB and the Presidium to order their arrest. Coincidentally, the Presidium of the CC CPSU returned to the matter of Beria's malingering influence in the immediate aftermath of the March 1956 events, resolving that a commission should set to work releasing political prisoners wrongly imprisoned by Beria and his associates. While this measure did not refer specifically to Georgia, and may already have been under discussion in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet before the March events, it is another piece of evidence focussing on the Beria legacy as a further cause of tension within the Georgian SSR. While there is as yet no direct evidence of Beria's supporters using the disturbances and their aftermath to pursue a political agenda, the fact is that a substantial group or 'clan' of Georgians, among them many Mingrelians, had recently been ousted from power and were handed an opportunity by Khrushchev to make something of a populist comeback. Beria's name clearly still had some popular resonance and the role of the remnants of his support in 1956 at least deserves further investigation.

Beria and his associates had, after all, controlled Georgia at all levels since the early 1930s, and exorcising his influence on the republic was going to be a difficult task to achieve without causing major disruption. For those who identified Beria as a champion of Georgia, the undermining of his position by Stalin, followed by his arrest and execution after Stalin's death, would easily be interpreted as a blow against Georgia's freedom to manage its own affairs within the strictures of Soviet federalism. It might also have been taken as a move against the Georgian nation, which foreshadowed the insults dealt to Stalin in 1956.

But the Mingrelian affair may have represented more than just a move on Stalin's part to undermine the position of a former favourite who was now falling out of favour. Despite Khrushchev's claim that Stalin never discussed the purges in Georgia with the Politburo, the purges were accompanied by an administrative reorganisation which saw the creation of two new oblasti with their own regional party organisations (obkomi) centred on Tbilisi and Kutaisi. While this move is easily interpreted as further weakening the position of the CC CPG by creating rival power bases, the Politburo resolution on the reorganisation makes for instructive reading. Overtly, the aim of the re-
organisation was to 'strengthen the leadership of Party and Soviet organs in economic, agricultural and cultural construction'. Mechanisation of agriculture and electrification of the countryside were immediate aims, but emphasis was also put on the creation and strengthening of the various clubs, cultural organisations, and media outlets for mass-political education work, particularly among Georgian youth. The new organisations were also urged to assist the MGB in the struggle with foreign agents and to report up to higher levels of the party and state on 'serious mistakes of lower institutions over non-fulfilment of Party and government decisions, anti-State activities, incorrect and illegal use of financial resources and material resources'. If taken at face value, this resolution would indicate a raft of serious concerns over the state of Georgia: a youth and working population that was out of touch with the political values of the regime, and open to the ideas of foreign subversion, and a corrupt and/or incompetent party and state apparatus. While there is nothing here as extreme as Khrushchev's Secret Speech claim that Stalin believed Georgian nationalists were preparing a move to secede from the USSR and unite with Turkey, there are signs that the centre was concerned with developments in the republic, behind which one might consider a rise in Georgian nationalism linked with the Beria regime. On the other hand, much of the language of this resolution is formulaic and fairly standard for the times and on this evidence alone it is hard to judge whether Stalin and the Presidium perceived a real, deeprooted problem in the republic.

Of the other factors mentioned by the CC CPG report on 1956, and which may already have been playing a role in 1951, the economy is an altogether different question, while material on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is notoriously hard to obtain. The 1951 reorganisation took Akakiya Mgeladze away from leading the CP in Abkhazia to head the new Kutaiss obkom, and it is noticeable that until then the Politburo of the CC CPSU had not discussed appointments in Abkhazia since 1943. The period 1934-1951, it can be argued, was the only period in the past 200 years when Abkhazia was effectively ruled from Tbilisi. The removal of Beria's supporters brought this period to an end, and Khrushchev also moved rapidly in the summer of 1956 to remove and reverse the policies of linguistic and cultural Georgianisation. A commission he formed reported back on the overwhelming desire of Abkhaz parents to have their children educated in Abkhaz and Russian rather than Georgian, and the same commission also made moves to restore the Abkhaz-language presence in universities and newspapers. Given the subordination of Abkhazia and South Ossetia achieved during Beria's ascendancy, the reversal of this power relationship and of linguistic and cultural policies could easily be interpreted as blows aimed deliberately against the Georgian nation. In any case, after the March 1956 events there were a number of complaints from Abkhaz citizens that the Georgianising policies previously associated with Beria were being renewed.

The slogans which featured most heavily in March 1956 centred around Stalin, Lenin, and denunciation of Khrushchev, and in fewer cases around Georgian national demands and claims for independence. From the available accounts, there is little to suggest actively hostile attitudes towards other ethnic groups, in particular Russians. This was in contrast to the Baltic republics in the same period, where slogans such as
'Russians go home!' and 'Freedom from the Russian occupiers!' featured heavily in public graffiti and on defaced ballot papers, and were reported to the CC CPSU. While there is, accordingly, little to suggest that anti-Russian attitudes as such were a motivating factor in the March events, there is at least some evidence that in their aftermath Georgians in certain areas were targeting ethnic Russians for acts of violence, intimidation, and discrimination – the latter in particular are mentioned as having been sanctioned at the lower levels of the CPG and Soviet authority structures. The CC CPG reports on the March events denied that there were any significant national antagonisms prior to the events, but admitted to a growth of this manifestation of Georgian nationalism afterwards.27

But even then the CC CPG seems to have been downplaying the extent of Georgian-Russian tensions when their reports are compared with the letters of complaint that were making their way to the CC CPSU. Towards the end of April 1956 a group of Russian inhabitants of Tskhaltubo sent a desperate appeal to Voroshilov, claiming they were 'in fear of our lives' as a result of the anti-Russian mood. They had been told to leave immediately or face the consequences, amid rumours that anti-Russian atrocities were being prepared for 1st May. One of the leaders of the anti-Russian campaign was the local procurator, and the authorities were doing nothing to stop the threats or protect the population.28 In the same week a military officer on the railways complained to Zhukov of the growing nationalism in Tbilisi and that he was treated as 'an alien, a Pariah, an undesirable'. According to this letter, official capitulation to nationalism was demonstrated by the removal of non-Georgians from their positions.29 Later in the year, a member of the CPSU for twenty years, Boris Belkov, alerted the central committee to the growing number of assaults on Russians in his town of Rustavi, which had grown so regular that Russians could not go out at night. He linked rising nationalism on the part of the authorities to corruption, a link that was to be made with growing regularity.30

This apparent growth in anti-Russian attitudes raises important questions about centre-periphery relations and the nationalities question in the USSR, as well as more general questions of the way in which nationalists do not just designate 'primordial' characteristics to other groups but also assign guilt and blame to entire national groups. In addition to Khrushchev’s denigration of the memory of Stalin and other longstanding grievances, the shooting of demonstrators gave Georgians a further cause for complaint against the central authorities. The authorities in charge of the CPSU, the administrative structures of the Soviet Union, and the Red Army, were Soviet rather than strictly speaking Russian, and although they were located inside the RSFSR, its capital city was also multiethnic. Such considerations did not prevent the régime’s opponents in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia identifying their situation as that of a Russian occupation, and it seems that Georgians viewed the central authorities in the same way. The difference is that, at least in March 1956, the protests do not appear to have been motivated in the first place either by anti-Russian feeling or anti-communism at all. Indeed, the demonstrators were calling for a return to the communism which for them was represented by Lenin, Stalin, Beria, and Molotov. Yet the armed suppression of what might otherwise have flourished into a 'Tbilisi Spring' precipitated – or
brought to the surface – a wave of anti-Russian hostility. Reconciling this more typical manifestation of nationalism with the pro-Stalin, pro-communist feelings of the demonstrators (if indeed the same individuals did share both types of sentiment) is one of the challenges the case of the March 1956 events presents. After all, as Givi Bepkhعادze pointed out, Stalin himself had had little connection with Georgia for the last fifty years of his life, and was in many ways an odd choice for a national icon.

This paper has been based on a limited range of sources, but the opening of the archives of the Georgian Communist Party and KGB should make possible a more detailed picture of the development of Georgian nationalism and the place of the 1956 events. Other scholars, notably Thornike Goradze, see the March events as a crucial turning point. Georgian nationalism, blended with socialism, had been at the basis of the independent state of 1918–21 and had continued to provide a headache for the Bolsheviks after sovietisation. But the resistance to the 1921 Red Army invasion and the risings of 1924 appear to have been anti-Bolshevik rather than anti-Russian in character, while in the years of Beria’s ascendancy Georgian elites accepted Soviet rule and prospered, much as they had in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. Nationalism seems to have been defined as much by attitudes to Georgia’s own minorities as by relations to Moscow. But this changed immediately the moment the Red Army opened fire on Tbilisi on March 9th 1956.

Endnotes

5 This was a formative period for many other future leading figures in Georgian politics. In 1956 Eduard Shevardnadze was head of the Georgian Komsomol. Georgia’s first post-Gamsakhurdia foreign minister, Aleksnder Chikvaidze, who studied in the same class at University as Mikhail Gorbachev, hints at the impact of the March events on his generation and also provides insights into the official youth politics of the time. A.Chikvaidze. (2006). *Na izlome istorii: SSSR – Rossiya – Gruzia* (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye otoshnieniya. pp. 28-29. Further evidence of the 1950s as a formative period for Georgian politicians is provided by the dissident poet Evgeny Yevtushenko in a 1986 interview: ‘the first thing [Georgian first secretary Jumber Patashvili] told me was that when he was a student he managed to smuggle his way into the great hall of Tbilisi University to listen to a poetry recital of mine....Do you know what he said to me: “We grew up in the spirit of your poetry”’, cited in Jerry F. Hough. (1997). *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 56.
6 Dokladnaya zapiska Biuro TsK KP Gruzii o massovykh volneniyakh naseleniya gg. Tbilisi, Gori, Sukhumi I Batumi 4-9 marta 1956 g. v svyazi s osuzhdeniem kul’ta lichnosti Stalina’ in A.A. Fursenko (ed.) *Arkhiv Kremlya: Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964. Tom 2. Postanovleniya 1954-


10 Idem, p.168.


12 Mikhail Dzhalabadze, idem, p.142.

13 Givi Bepkhuadze, idem, pp.145-46.

14 Kaki Kavsadze, idem, pp.150-51.

15 Otar Urushadze, idem, pp.152-53.

16 *Arkhiv Kremlya tom 2*, pp.290-91.


22 ‘Soobshenie Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o merakh po bystreishei likvidatsii posledstvii prestupnoi deyatel’nosti Berii i ego sobshhchnikov’, *Arkhivy Kremlya tom 2*, pp.221-22.

23 Politburo proceedings of 29.X.1951, Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-politicheskoi Istori z.17, op.3, d.1091


25 Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istori f.5, op.31, d.60, ll.121-123, 137-149.

26 In addition to the accounts already mentioned, see the KGB and army reports in Lur’e and Malyarova, *1956 god*...pp.156-62.

27 ‘Report of the CC CP Georgia to N.S.Khrushchev on signs of nationalistic inclinations of the Georgian population in connection with the condemnation of the cult of personality of Stalin at the XX Congress of the CPSU [not later than 23rd May 1956], *Arkhivy Kremlya tom 2*, pp.296-303.

28 Letter from Russian Inhabitants of Tskhaltubo to Voroshilov, 27th April 1956, RGANI f.5, op.31, d.60, ll.75-76.

29 Letter from a railway forces officer to Zhukov, 22nd April, 1956. RGANI f.5, op.31, d.60, ll.79-84.

30 Letter from Boris Gavriovich Belkov, 28th August, 1956. RGANI f.5, op.31, d.60, ll.93-94.